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Thesis Summary 
 In varying ways, scholars working in the discipline of International Studies have 
found themselves, often implicitly, wrestling with the question of what should and should not 
count as harm and the implications of this for wider social life. Core to this tension is the way 
in which the discipline can be understood as lying between the explanatory concerns of a 
social science and a normative endeavour concerned with the reduction or mitigation of 
avoidable harm. This thesis argues that this tension results in an understanding of the problem 
of harm as a particular problem-field defined by a set of questions that motivate various 
aspects of theoretical activity. However, it attempts to address the problem of harm as a 
whole through the lens of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. In doing so, it aims to draw out 
the implications of the problem of harm for the discipline of International Studies and social 
science more broadly. 
 The importance accorded to the problem of harm in Critical Theory is the source of 
considerable problems for an understanding of how social science might operate due to the 
way that normative concern serves to overwhelm attempts at explanation. This thesis 
considers Linklater’s sociology of harm conventions a way of rebalancing this equation such 
that some practical conclusions may be drawn. However, the theoretical underpinnings of this 
project in the process sociology of Norbert Elias serve to preclude sufficient engagement with 
normative questions. A reconstruction of the sociology of harm conventions through the 
ontology of critical realism serves to resituate the production of sociological knowledge with 
regard to normative concern, and re-theorise the link between them. Following this 
reconstruction it becomes possible, through Critical Theory, to address the kind of theory that 
is needed in order to interrogate the problem of harm in International Studies. 
  
  
 
 
 
For Lexi-Louise, in anticipation. 
  
Acknowledgements 
 
 In the first instance my supervisors, Milja Kurki and Charalampos Efstathopoulos, 
have shown me the greatest patience throughout the rewrites, rethinks and epistemological 
dilemmas that accompany any PhD project. In their absence, this thesis would contain far 
more unnecessary digressions than it does now, and its structure would be questionable at 
best. Other members of staff whose influence was crucial include Kamila Stullerova and 
Hidemi Suganami. Andrew Linklater, whose willingness to indulge my questions can only be 
understood as gracious, deserves special thanks. I sincerely hope that he understands this 
project as the constructive critique and engagement with his ideas that it is intended to be. 
 Both inside and outside of the department, the past and future denizens of the 
basement have both influenced my thinking and made my time at Aberystwyth far more 
enjoyable than the weather reports might suggest. In no particular order: Dyfan Powel, 
Bleddyn Bowen, Lydia Cole, Tom Marshall, Matt Rees, Florian Edelmann, Sarah Jamal, Gill 
McFadyen, Matthew Campbell, Katja Daniels, Kat Hone, Tabea Groeneveld and Danita 
Burke. As one of my most formidable interlocutors, Andre Saramago has been a continuous 
source of inspiration, debate and passionate argument. 
 Finally, I would like to thank my parents, whose indulgence of my passion for reading 
and learning started this journey off. This thesis is dedicated to my niece, Lexi-Louise. 
  
  
Contents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1 
1 – The Problem of Harm in 
International Studies: 
Five Theoretical 
Transitions 
 
22 
2 – The Problem of Harm in 
Critical Theory 
 
49 
3 – Harm and Critique in the 
Sociology of Andrew 
Linklater 
 
93 
4 – Ontology and the 
Sociology of Harm 
Conventions 
 
132 
5 – The Demands of Harm on 
Worldly Theorising 
 
177 
Conclusion 
 
211 
Bibliography 228 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
 ‘I have thus endeavoured to preserve the truth of the elementary 
principles of human nature, while I have not scrupled to 
innovate upon their combinations.’ 
- Mary Shelley, Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus1 
 
 
It is entirely possible that, due to unfair working practices and the exploitation of 
labour, the person that built your smartphone committed suicide shortly afterwards. 
Moreover, it is almost certain that despite your participation in this situation through the 
provision of a consumer base for the production of such commodities, you are unlikely to 
ever find out about this beyond a brief mention in the international section of your national 
paper, which apportions no blame to be laid at your feet.
2
 These events, in which we can see 
the problems and consequences that come with lengthening chains of global interconnection, 
serve to reveal the ever-more-complex ways in which subjects around the world are 
confronted with the harm that they may do to others, or which may be inflicted upon them. 
More particularly, they show the changeable nature of harm and the demands that it can place 
upon us in terms of ethical response. Forms of social activity which were previously not 
considered as ethically problematic, such as mineral extraction or transportation, are now 
increasingly considered to be harmful to the prospects of species survival in the context of 
global warming. In more immediate spheres of social life, practices of subjugation, once 
external to us in the context of slavery or colonialism, now sit within our frameworks of 
moral concern. 
It is clear from these examples that the concept of harm, despite its prevalence in 
social affairs, does not refer to a single thing or behaviour but is adapted to many different 
                                                 
1
 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus (Oxford University Press, 2008), 13. 
2
 When asking the question of whether he is to blame, Joel Johnson of Wired claims that he is, even if ‘just a 
little’. See Brita, ‘1 Million Workers. 90 Million iPhones. 17 Suicides. Who’s to Blame?’, WIRED, 28 February 
2011. 
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aspects of social life. Furthermore, the set of behaviours or objects to which it can be 
attributed are highly changeable. Nonetheless, it seems to be the case that the idea of harm 
operates as a key aspect of moral concern and as a principle of restraint in the way that 
subjects interact with others, found in most if not all societies that we are hitherto familiar 
with.
3
 In short, the way in which normative commitments and obligations to others change is 
at least partially a function of the way in which we see and understand what counts as harm. 
In engaging with the idea of harm and the way it changes, this thesis is therefore concerned 
with the social activity that subjects engage in when they consider how they might live while 
minimising, directing or in some way controlling the harm that they, or we, do to each other 
across different times and contexts.
4
 
An engagement with harm as it changes and adapts is made ever more necessary by 
the way in which harmful consequences arise, often seemingly beyond our control, from 
changes in the configuration of social life, whether technological development or changing 
resource needs. In this regard, there is an important debate to be had over the development of 
drone warfare and the distribution and expropriation of water resources, just as there is over 
the consequences of more readily visible forms of harm such as war or torture. In this regard, 
the deployment of the term ‘harm’ to describe such practices serves to bring the practice 
within the sphere of ethical concern and to reject the interpretation of processes as natural or 
politically neutral. Attempts to evaluate a form of behaviour or interaction as harmful thus 
forces us to consider that there is more at stake than merely ‘getting things done’ in an 
efficient or timely manner and that there is some value in the thing, person or population that 
is harmed. It is possible that such processes of consideration may result in us qualifying or 
rejecting a given form of social engagement, as we can see in the case of the Geneva 
Conventions.
5
 In this case, it is not just that war – as perhaps the archetypical area of concern 
for International Studies (IS) – is ‘the continuation of politics by other means’, but also that 
this form of activity is subject to a particular form of ethical concern that is at issue; there is 
                                                 
3
 Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations, 1st Edition. 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), 5. 
4
 Each of the elements of this categorisation will be problematized later in the thesis. Nonetheless, it is necessary 
to highlight that there are qualitative distinctions at play here; the question of who the ‘other is’ remains a 
persistent problem, but also the normative impulse to ‘minimise’, an action that only makes sense if there is, in 
some sense, a pre-existing hierarchy of what it means to harm and be harmed with a peculiarly quantitative 
focus. 
5
 ‘Geneva Conventions’, Legal Information Institute, 6 August 2007. 
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an ethical hierarchy to the ways in which it is possible to harm which makes some forms of 
social interaction more permissible than others. 
However, it is also the case that the inverse is true and that there are forms of social 
interaction that are not considered as harmful. This is complicated by the fact that social life 
is characterised by a continuous stream of new actions, events, relations and technologies, the 
consequences of which are not immediately apparent. The fundamental uncertainty which 
characterises our orientation toward the future ensures that for humanity at least, a propensity 
toward invention and rationalisation is matched by the possibility of uncertain outcomes at 
every step. We thus live with an anxiety that is underpinned by the knowledge that our ethical 
judgements and principles may have been left behind by technological or social change. The 
opportunity that the concept of harm presents us with – to consider and restrain our forms of 
social practice – is thus based on our broader capacity to describe and explain our interactions 
with ourselves, with others and with nature. In short, what we consider harmful is influenced 
by the words with which we describe society in the first place. These accounts may provide 
us with a basis for putting forward the understanding of an aspect of social interaction as 
harmful, but also have the potential to push forms of suffering outside of the sphere of moral 
concern through practices of exclusion and delimitation. In this case, the idea of harm that is 
at play with a given subject or community offers a point of reference that mediates between 
the position of an actor, their preconceptions, and ability to act, thus enabling and 
constraining forms of behaviour. By way of example, the disparate groups that came to be 
known as the Levellers were involved in espousing a concern with exploitation on a 
theological basis as well as on an understanding of the material situation of famine that so 
often pertained. If one had occurred without the other, it is likely that the results of efforts at 
reformation in England would have looked dramatically different.
6
 As well as developing 
ideas of harm through discourse and negotiation, then, we also receive them through 
tradition, upbringing and authority. 
 While the specific role that the concept of harm has played has varied in its concept 
and application, the imbuing of accounts with moral or ethical concern in this fashion can be 
                                                 
6
 Hill argues that despite a few attempts at the construction of a holist materialist worldview, the answers that 
were grasped at in the attempt to overthrow particular doctrines were always theological in nature because the 
newfound historical conditions could only be understood through means already familiar to the participants. See 
his account of sin and hell in the English Revolution, Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: 
Radical Ideas During the English Revolution, New Edition (Penguin, 1991), 151–83. 
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seen as playing a role in many of the concerns of IS, and of social thought more broadly.
7
 The 
various manifestations of the ‘distant strangers’ problem in moral philosophy highlight the 
problem of the duties we owe to strangers who fall outside of the sphere of ‘our’ community.8 
Answers to these basic issues of the quality of our relationships with others, and what we owe 
them, have had significant effects; work done by Wheeler suggests that it has knock-on 
effects for our ability to conceptualise practices such as humanitarian intervention.
9
  In a 
sphere such as international politics which is by definition wrought by forms of social 
division, that people outside of our immediate communities can be harmed in a way that 
demands a response is, then, by no means given. The tragedy of the commons, which 
highlights the way that collective gains are undermined by egocentric behaviour further 
typifies the close ties between narrativisation, boundary setting, and the problem of harm in 
collective action.
10
   In this instance, we see that our ability to construct stories that construct 
interests as shared is one possible way to overcome the harm we do to others in a negative 
sense, by omission or complicity in the deprivation of others. From this standpoint, the 
development of the League of Nations following the First World War was as much a way of 
developing collective identity as it was a set of formal rules aimed at the avoidance of war.
11
 
Such principles can function, in some circumstances, to overcome the immediate interest we 
might have in engaging in such behaviour. These examples suggest the possibility that work 
conducted in IS contributes to debates around harm by providing, modifying and developing 
a vocabulary attuned to such issues. It does so by bringing objects into view and debating 
their ethical import; this does not merely include abstract theorisations of justice in war, but 
also the more fundamental constituents of international life such as women, the environment, 
or refugees.  
                                                 
7
 But see Feinberg on the development of harm’s centrality to liberal jurisprudence, in particular Joel Feinberg, 
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, 1984); Joel 
Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 4: Harmless Wrongdoing, New Edition (Oxford 
University Press, 1990).  
8
 Toni Erskine, Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of ‘Dislocated 
Communities’ (OUP/British Academy, 2008). 
9
 Work done on this in International Studies has come to the conclusion that approaches to the problem lead to 
competing approaches to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers : 
Humanitarian Intervention in International Society: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 49. 
10
 As can be seen in Johnson’s argument for collective agreements in addressing uncoordinated resource use. 
Baylor L. Johnson, ‘Ethical Obligations in a Tragedy of the Commons’, Environmental Values 12, no. 3 (2003): 
271–287. 
11
 For a study of the kind of internationalism the League embodied, see Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm 
Wessel, ‘Transnationalism and the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of Its Economic and Financial 
Organisation’, Contemporary European History 14, no. 4 (November 2005): 465–492. 
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Harm in International Studies 
Our argument is that if the examples given above highlight the deeply international 
and connected character of contemporary life and its relation to the problem of harm, then the 
discipline whose substantive concerns include ‘encounters between difference across 
boundaries’ is surely well placed to address it.12 From its earliest phases, International 
Studies has been oriented toward the informing of practical wisdom, or phronesis, such that 
the discipline has consistently been involved in debates that contribute to the understanding, 
minimisation or management of harm between individuals and groups. Such debates began 
with concern for the causes and meanings of war and have developed to encompass broader 
concerns over the effects of power in conjunction with a deep interest in ethical and moral 
reasoning. Whether the links between people should be subject to moral concern, or indeed 
that they might be understood as substantive links at all, has been subject to explanation and 
critique in the discipline and reflect back upon the ways that we conceptualise and practice 
community. Theoretical debate concerning the process of ‘right explanation’ therefore have 
direct knock-on effects on our ability to explicate the problem of harm in particular historical 
contexts; the inclusion, exclusion and relationship between different objects and processes of 
explanation thus has implications for the kind of contribution the discipline can make to 
social life. 
The primary aim here is not to put forward a definitive understanding of International 
Studies as a discipline, but to engage in a reading of the discipline such that the discipline’s 
consistent engagement in debates concerning harm becomes apparent. It is now common 
conviction that the discipline functions along evaluative premises at least since Cox’s seminal 
statement concerning the purposive nature of theory.
13
 However, reading the discipline 
specifically in terms of harm will allow us to draw out these consequences at a more general 
level, asking after the broad consequences of such evaluative concerns beyond specific 
debates, critiques and rebuttals. Approaching the discipline with a synthetic, rather than 
fragmentary, mindset somewhat runs contrary to the trend whereby new contributions are 
likely to lead to further splits in the discipline rather than overcoming or moving beyond 
                                                 
12
 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ‘Must International Studies Be a Science?’, Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 43, no. 3 (1 June 2015). 
13
 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 10 (1981). 
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particular tendencies.
14
 However, we will argue that harm allows us to identify common 
features of the discipline that lead us to understand it as a form of debate that is centred upon 
a common ethical object. 
The importance of the problem of harm for the discipline can be seen as far back as 
the early debate between Idealists and Realists. While concern has been raised over the exact 
nature of this debate – the supposedly realist and idealist camps bleeding into each other to an 
extent – its status as the founding myth of disciplinary consolidation ensures its continued 
relevance.
15
 The controversy, occurring around the end of the First World War, concerned the 
varying ways in which statist oriented realists and the more internationalist idealists 
understood the potential for mitigating war and violence that lay with various forms of 
international organisation. It thus bears significantly on an understanding of international life 
with regard to the problem of violent harm in particular; idealists argued for the mitigation 
potential that institutions such as the League of Nations held out, while realists criticised this 
line of thinking for hubris and a lack of understanding of the dynamics inherent to the 
international system.
16
 Fundamental to this concern were the different modes of explanation 
held by each party which underpinned their proscriptions, and in particular the value each 
placed on the prevalence, power and direction of the interconnections between various 
aspects of international life. In short, a shared commitment to the informing of practical 
conduct in the sphere of international politics ensured that different approaches to the 
question of war – a form of harm which continues to be a chief object of concern in the 
discipline – result in remarkably different approaches to ethical conduct in the international 
sphere. 
Developments in IS have consistently run up against this dynamic, and continue to do 
so. Indeed, emerging challenges to the hegemony of realism can be read not just as 
articulating a fundamental error or exclusion in the story of anarchy as the fundamental truth 
of international relations, but often articulate this in relation to its potentially harmful 
implications for those that fall outside of the great game of states. In the face of realism’s 
rendering of the state as the source of infinite concern through which the protection of 
citizens from harm can be best accomplished, approaches such as gender, green and 
                                                 
14
 Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing 
Story of a Death Foretold (Routledge, 1998), 107. 
15
 On the history of the discipline in this regard, see Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Where Are the Idealists in Interwar 
International Relations?’, Review of International Studies 32, no. 2 (April 2006): 291–308. 
16
 Ibid., 295–96. 
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postcolonial theory have all drawn attention to the neglected constituents of the prevailing 
social order. In expanding our understanding of the constituent elements of past and present 
social ‘states of play’, they do not merely allow us to correct or modify prevalent accounts, 
but revise the evaluative element of the discipline itself, and particularly its concern with the 
harm done to a variety of subjects and objects of concern. 
This narrative is not to be understood as a strictly historical list of facts – few authors 
in the discipline have engaged with the question of harm under that name – but an 
engagement with the discipline on a level which attempts to highlight the implicit and explicit 
value judgements inherent in any form of active intellectual engagement.
17
 This requires a 
step away from the specificities of accounts of social life, and towards an investigation of the 
broader kinds of debate that are had in International Studies, inclusive of the kind of 
vocational commitments put forward by Weber.
18
 International Studies, as a social activity, 
itself requires investigation as a site of contestation and negotiation over what should and 
should not count as harm and which can be found as a broad (although often 
unacknowledged) current that underpins disciplinary interventions, as we will see in the first 
chapter. These interventions, particularly outside the sphere of mainstream developments, 
often rest on their ability to do justice to new or unacknowledged forms of harm such as 
sexual violence, environmental degradation or the persistence of colonial exploitation and 
appropriation. In such debates, it is not merely the scientific question of what an object is that 
is at issue, but the potential social and ethical implications that follow from providing 
particular accounts of it and the way in which these might become restricted. 
The puzzle for this thesis therefore concerns the dynamic that pertains between the 
task of ‘getting things right’ in a scientific sense, and ‘getting things right’ in an ethical one. 
If, as we suggest, IS is part of a broader social debate that goes beyond its disciplinary 
boundaries, then it is possible to investigate the consequences of its concern with the problem 
of harm in a way that may have implications for the conduct of enquiry in the discipline. 
However, making such connections in a discipline that is characterised by fragmentation is 
likely to run up against several objections, foremost among which is the characterisation of 
the discipline as in some way unified under the banner of harm. This is, as we shall see, 
certainly not the case. Various schools of thought, from Realism to Postcolonialism, hold to 
different hierarchies in ethical judgement and sources of concern. Nonetheless, it is fitting 
                                                 
17
 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics, 9. 
18
 Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, 1919, 5. 
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with the scientific ideal that we can understand such differences and tensions to be part of a 
process of negotiation and debate; while our understanding of harm does not exhaust this 
process, it is nonetheless a consistent and important aspect of it. This would allow us to 
examine the role that the problem of harm plays, and can play, more directly. 
 
The Sociology of Harm Conventions 
Andrew Linklater’s sociology of harm convention has attempted to examine the 
negotiation of different ideas of harm, with the aim being to trace the changing ways in which 
people have responded to it over the course of long-term historical processes.
19
 This line of 
investigation, he argues, can serve to investigate the possibility of more inclusive and 
responsive formulations of the harm conventions that underpin any society that exists over 
time. 
20
 While this may initially seem abstract, Linklater is not arguing for an ideal 
philosophy of harm, but rather that we might examine the dynamics underpinning the ways in 
which it arises.
21
 Given that the vocabulary with which it is described varies, however, it is 
possible to draw a family resemblance between historically varied concepts in order to bring 
out their common element; it is not that they are identical, but that they are similar enough, 
and perform similar enough functions, to draw useful comparisons. Linklater’s focus on the 
experience of suffering, through which he links the problem of harm to common features of 
human life, allows him to do this with a minimal ‘labour of translation’ between different 
historical instances, allowing us to recognise a common element between different instances 
of , for example, exploitation, or of complicity in harmful practices.
22
 The argument, 
therefore, is not that suffering is identical between subjects – quite the opposite due to its 
inherently private element – but that nonetheless subjects can recognise the suffering in 
others through a process of empathy and understanding.  
Placing suffering at the core of attempts to explain and understand harm is an 
important move for a project that intends to ground ethical action in common interests. In 
effect, Linklater is arguing that the processes through which we attempt to come to terms 
with suffering is a key point from which the problem of harm develops, allowing subjects to 
                                                 
19
 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics, 262. 
20
 Andrew Linklater, ‘Citizenship, Humanity and Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions’, in Critical Theory and 
World Politics (Routledge, 2007), 132. 
21
 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics. 
22
 Andrew Linklater, ‘Towards a Sociology of Global Morals with an “Emancipatory Intent”’, in Critical Theory 
and World Politics (Routledge, 2007), 181. 
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draw on their own embodiment and suffering as a common point of reference from which 
subjects interact with others in an ethically grounded way. These common features can be 
understood as the basis for many past and contemporary harm conventions, which intercede 
between the ability to harm and shared vulnerabilities.
23
 While new ideas of harm, such as 
that done to the environment, are less reliant on the decisive action of individuals and operate 
more as collective outcomes, it is certainly the case that the accounts that we give of harm 
still often rely on the shared capacity for the private experience of suffering as a way of 
bridging the gap between the outcomes of social activity and ethical concern. In short, it is 
our ability to empathise with the suffering of others that allows us to consider our relatively 
small contributions to global warming, financial instability and so on as potentially harmful 
behaviours. Moreover, putting forward harmful social outcomes as something that we all 
contribute to raises the possibility that social scientific accounts can engage in work that 
contributes to conventions and institutions governing the permissibility of forms of harm. 
These accounts - the sociology of harm conventions - move beyond the problematic 
particular conceptions of harm put forward in philosophical approaches, instead providing an 
empirical ground for more qualitative questions about how we might begin to address it.
24
 In 
doing so, Linklater’s approach suggests that IS might benefit from drawing upon the level of 
analysis and synthetic approach that process sociology offers.  
Linklater’s sociology thus contributes to the debate over harm in IS by reframing it as 
a sociological problem, rather than one that is subject to purely philosophical examination. It 
is not the case that we can formulate an ideal concept of harm, but that communities are 
involved in a shared labour of constructing and contributing toward ethically-charged ideas of 
what is at stake in forms of behaviour, some of which are part of broader processes of 
civilization. In this regard, we begin to move away from the concept of harm as holding some 
absolute truth or definition, and toward what he understands as the problem of harm.
25
 This 
term is an inevitably crude attempt to circumscribe the social activity that we undertake when 
we engage in the question of how we live while minimising the harm we do to each other.
26
 
                                                 
23
 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics, 30. 
24
 Ibid., 23. 
25
 Ibid., 6. 
26
 Each of the elements of this categorisation will be problematized later in the thesis. Nonetheless, it is 
necessary to highlight that there are qualitative distinctions at play here; the question of who the ‘other is’ 
remains a persistent problem, but also the normative impulse to ‘minimise’, an action that only makes sense if 
there is, in some sense, a pre-existing hierarchy of what it means to harm and be harmed with a peculiarly 
quantitative focus. 
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Linklater’s sociology is, therefore, an empirical investigation into what harm can be, rather 
than a purely theoretical investigation into what it should mean. More particularly, it allows 
us to understand the way that the problem of harm is deeply implicated in social change and 
development, thereby situating it within broader social and relational dynamics rather than as 
an ahistorical or transcendental ‘good’ that we can strive toward. Such an investigation is 
intended to perform an orienting function through which normative and critical work can be 
empirically grounded and take into account the directions, possibilities and tendencies of 
social change and development.
27
 
The function that Linklater envisions for the sociology of harm conventions arises 
from his engagement with the process sociology developed initially by Norbert Elias.
28
 Elias’ 
process sociological framework is of particular interest to Linklater due to its focus on the 
kind of affective and empathetic relationships that he sees are core to the problem of harm; 
the emotive response it provokes can be seen to have ready parallels in work done by Elias 
concerning shame and embarrassment.
29
 This framework further offers Linklater a way of 
focussing on the complex processes of interconnection and interpenetration through which 
normative concepts come about. Harm conventions in this sense are not optional but essential 
to social life inclusive of whatever problems they may bring. Elias’ rejection of the idea of 
the atomistic subject common to liberal and Enlightenment thought and his adoption of a 
model of ‘open persons’ provides a way to approach the process by which harm conventions 
come about not as some ideal progression toward freedom or domination, but as messy, 
complex and subject to sudden reversals and changes of direction. Social life, rather than 
governed by abstract dualistic terms such as ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ are instead dynamic 
complexes – figurations – that are subject to balances of power that change over time.30 The 
problem of harm can be understood as an expression of the ethical dimension of these 
processes. Elias’ contribution to this was to ‘advise against trying to ascertain whether 
‘power’ has been more influential than ‘morality’ in shaping modern society’, as the task was 
                                                 
27
 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics, 7. 
28
 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics; Andrew Linklater, ‘Norbert Elias, The “Civilizing 
Process” and the Sociology of International Relations’, International Politics 41, no. 1 (March 2004): 3–35; 
Andrew Linklater, ‘Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process’, Review of International Studies 31, no. 1 
(2005): 141–54; Linklater, ‘Towards a Sociology of Global Morals with an “Emancipatory Intent”’. 
29
 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics, 211. 
30
 Norbert Elias, What Is Sociology?, trans. Stephen Mennell and Grace Morrissey (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 
71. 
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to study ‘how they evolved together as part of the reconfiguration of social bonds’.31 In doing 
so, he formed the basis for an account of society that decisively rejected the separation of 
ethical and political life. 
The characteristic focus of Eliasian process sociology in studying these dynamics is 
upon long-term changes in human conduct and restraint, over generations or longer. This 
allows the social scientist to take account of the way in which social life is a shared labour, 
and any given person is part of a ‘chain of generations’ across which changes taking years, 
decades or centuries might play out.
32
 Rather than static ‘state-reducing’ concepts, Elias 
argued that it was better to put forward ‘process’ concepts that were better able to account for 
change; informal become informalisation, bureaucracy becomes bureaucratisation, and so 
on.
33
 This basic theoretical point, however, is carried over into Elias’ major empirical 
contribution and a key theoretical touchstone for Linklater’s understanding of harm – 
processes of civilisation.
34
 These processes, taken together, comprise the various ways by 
which peoples come to understand themselves as civilised and involve patterns of restraint 
and permissiveness in the interaction of people with others inside or outside their immediate 
community. Putting this forward as a sociological contribution to our understanding of the 
forms of conduct we see in the international realm, Linklater suggests that the problem of 
harm is one way we might investigate the potential for a high-level, even global, civilising 
process that influences behaviour at the highest level of interconnection humans have yet 
achieved. In order to do so, it is first important to develop a higher level synthesis in the 
social sciences that is able to analyse these broad processes in the face of countervailing 
tendencies which result in scientific specialisation and fragmentation.
35
 
A further result of this reformulation of social life is that the sciences are not 
privileged with a ‘view from nowhere’, but operate in relation to society. Contrary to the 
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characteristic focus of the philosophy of science upon claims to validity, truth and objectivity, 
we find that work inspired by Elias’ approach focusses on the way that the production of 
knowledge is subject to balances of involvement and detachment with regard to their object 
of study.
36
 The natural sciences can be seen as holding to a rather more detached view than 
the social sciences, which have historically been characterised by forms of involvement that 
surreptitiously influence the kinds of ethical judgement that disciplines such as sociology and 
International Studies arrive at.
37
 By formulating a model that allows empirical testing of 
hypotheses, however, it may be possible to ground social science upon a more detached 
approach which combines theoretical and empirical approaches, and is less amenable to 
subjective concern and more adequate to its object of study.
38
 The preoccupation of social 
science, for the time being, should lie with the collection of more object-adequate knowledge, 
with potential ethical concern and engagement being a task that can be approached once this 
‘detour via detachment’ has been conducted.39 
A broader possibility that arises from this reformulation of the activity of social 
science concerns the way that IS itself might operate as an expression – and perhaps 
potentially a pioneer – of the trends and negotiations that concern the problem of harm. It is 
this possibility that will be central to the work conducted in this thesis. The tension that we 
observed above with regard to the potential consequences of social scientific accounts for 
broader social life are not to be understood purely as objective measures of gathering and 
weighing potential accounts of harm against each other, but are contributions to the wider 
debate that we understand as being constituted by the problem of harm. The practice of 
(social) science, in this case, can be situated within broader structures of power and 
knowledge and contribute to the construction and reconstruction of particular understandings 
with potential ethical consequences. The aim of Linklater’s framework is to operate as a 
synthetic tool in order to facilitate a greater degree of scientific or objective adequacy to this 
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process such that the resulting contribution of the social sciences more broadly is less subject 
to the ideological biases that it has historically been associated with.
40
  
 
The Foundations of a Critical Theory 
This argument – that the sociology of harm conventions can provide a point of 
synthesis for the wider discipline due to its orienting function – can be understood as the 
starting point for the work undertaken here. In particular, the clear normative consequences 
of such a framework and how these operate need to be understood if the discipline is to be 
consistent in its task of situating enquiry in a historical fashion and with a reflexive grasp of 
its own biases and presuppositions. In this regard, Linklater is clear in outlining the normative 
content of his project despite the Elias’ more circumspect approach to the relationship 
between normative issues and sociological enquiry.
41
  
In this regard, Linklater maintains an affinity with the Frankfurt School that has 
characterised his work throughout his career, both agreeing with the capacity to sympathise 
with others can provide a basis for solidarity, and with the belief that academic and 
theoretical work can contribute toward this effort.
42
 The parallels between Linklater’s project 
and the trajectory of the thinkers that constituted the first generation of Critical Theory, 
however, are noted but not systematically followed up in the course of The Problem of Harm 
in World Politics.
43
 It is significant that these links are not explored more fully in Linklater’s 
work, as the contributions of an area of thought so concerned with the implications of 
suffering for attempts to understand the world may have consequences that are not fully 
accounted for in the course of his investigation. Examining the characteristic focus of Critical 
Theory upon aspects of what we have described as the problem of harm therefore may serve 
as a way of greater understanding its implications for the kind of social science that might do 
greater justice to it. 
Indeed, a significant aspect of this investigation will concern the way in which the 
critical import of sociological knowledge must be of a particular form if it is to be more than 
just discourse, or if it wishes to articulate a substantive case for the amelioration of harmful 
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practices. In putting forward an idea of social science that is oriented toward harm 
conventions, and in particular one that has a practical purpose, the problems of knowledge 
production with which social science has been concerned become all the more accentuated.
44
 
While greater attention to the specific understanding of these issues posed by Critical Theory 
will be considered later in the thesis, we will argue that they run along three main axes, the 
threefold problematic raised by the problem of harm: 
 The problem of object adequacy, or the question of what it is to be correct in our 
accounts of the world; 
 The problem of critical value, which concerns the impact that our changing ideas of 
harm has upon the world; 
 The problem of reflexivity, through which we consider how we might alter and 
become aware of new forms of harm that arise from our changing understandings of it 
as a form of worldly activity. 
These problems arise from the process of interrogation that has been a key 
contribution of Critical Theory to the discipline and, as we shall see, are characteristic of its 
way of engaging with social life more broadly. Each is not separate from the others, but 
instead reveals different aspects of the problem of harm and its relationship to the practice of 
social science. While they are problems that are often raised in debates between schools of 
thought or between disciplines more widely, Critical Theory serves to bring them together in 
a manner that demonstrates their close and interrelated nature. Just as importantly, this occurs 
in a way that demonstrates the close relationship between the problem of harm and the ethical 
and evaluative stance that is held in the discipline of International Studies, as well as the 
social sciences more broadly. 
Let us consider the threefold problematic in more detail. The first of the three 
problems concerns object adequacy, or understanding what it means to ‘get things right’ in 
the study of a social object. This is grounded in the tension that we have seen over the ability 
to give an account of the problem of harm that is able to ground its engagement with the 
evaluative aspects of IS upon an account that is considered more scientifically or objectively 
adequate than others. Such a principle can be seen at play in the development of theories that 
attempted to incorporate objects that ‘fell through’ the cracks of state-centric theories such as 
realism. If, as we have noted, our ability to explain what harm is or might become depends on 
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our ability to explain its social situation and history, then our understanding of how social 
scientific explanation operates with regard to its object needs to be considered. 
The second of these concerns the critical value of social scientific accounts 
concerning the problem of harm. In many regards, the practical orientation of the discipline 
toward the wider social world of which it is a part forms a common thread that unites 
seemingly disparate views and theories. However, the socially and historically placed nature 
of scholarly enquiry demonstrates the necessity of accounting for the position from which 
such enquiry speaks. This is rendered more complex due to the differences between the social 
sciences and the detachment that characterises natural science; it is therefore necessary to 
consider what kind of relationship best suits the attempts of International Studies to engage 
with harm and its potential consequences. 
Finally, the problem of reflexivity is characterised by the inexhaustibility of the 
problem of harm and the way in which it changes. If, have we have argued, the problem of 
harm is characterised – as any other social dynamic – by a myriad conjunction of power 
relations and forms of knowledge, then it requires an understanding of how the discipline 
should deal with change, reification and implicit bias in the accounts provided. In the context 
of the problem of harm, this is exacerbated by the responsibility taken on by the social 
scientist in accounting for particular types of harm despite their own, perhaps 
unacknowledged, limitations in knowledge and judgement. This aspect of the threefold 
problematic thus necessitates a consideration of the particular demands that the problem of 
harm places on the conduct of social science more broadly. 
Taken together, these aspects of the problem of harm suggest the possibility of a 
systematic engagement with the problems that Critical Theory raises. In the context of IS, this 
might help us clarify the potential held out by the discipline’s consistent fascination with the 
problem of harm. The intention is to put forward the approach and characteristic forms of 
thought developed by the critical theorists such that the contribution made by Linklater’s 
sociology of harm conventions can be better understood and developed in the context of the 
wider discipline. As such, we can pose the research question: 
What implications does Critical Theory have for the 
interrogation of the problem of harm in International 
Studies? 
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 The key point is that the problem of harm, understood as a consistent social tension 
and addressed regularly in the context of International Studies, is a key aspect of how theory 
in the discipline understands its social activity and position. In a world that seems to shift and 
outpace our inherited understandings of harm, clarification of this area of concern can 
contribute to the self-understanding of the discipline, open up possibilities for critical 
intervention and potential contributions toward the broader social tension that we have 
described. Throughout this thesis, the problem of harm will refer to this understanding, while 
harm will refer to its conceptual content or definition. In this spirit, while Linklater has 
advanced our understanding of the study of harm and what it requires, it may be the case that 
further interrogation of harm along the lines put forward in Critical Theory holds out an 
improved understanding of its importance and key dynamics. This exercise thus rests on the 
relationship between the knowledge produced in IS, its critical value, and how we understand 
its operation. 
 
Thesis Structure and Arguments by Chapter 
 In addressing the various implications that Critical Theory has for the way the 
problem of harm can be understood in International Studies, this thesis will proceed in five 
main chapters. This will begin with an assessment of the way in which developments in the 
discipline have sought to embrace the problem of harm and respond to its demands. As an 
exhaustive survey is not possible in the scope of this thesis, focus will be placed on key 
transitions and debates in the discipline and interpreting them with regard to the problem of 
harm and its implications.  
While the initial impulse for the discipline as such can be found in the wake of the 
First World War, historical developments have led to a concomitant broadening of the scope 
of International Studies, inclusive of issues that have arisen with technological development 
as well as those that existed before but were not recognised or prioritised in disciplinary 
discourse. These include changes such as the inclusion of marginalised groups in postcolonial 
and gender Theory, the broadening of the object of concern in human security and green 
theory, and the recognition epistemic violence as a problem in critical theory. Nonetheless, 
and despite differences in particular cases, a persistent thread can be found in the call to 
practical involvement centred on the problem of harm. This common thread rests on three 
strategies of contention that illustrate the various ways in which the problem of harm is raised 
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in disciplinary debates, and concerns issues of scientific correctness, the normative position 
of various perspectives, and their ability to account for their own limitations and biases. 
However, we argue that Critical Theory presents a more holistic attitude toward the problems 
that harm raises for IS that provokes important questions regarding the sociology of such 
knowledge and the identification of avenues through which social change can be brought 
about. In examining authors such as Ashley, Cox and Linklater, we argue that their approach 
to the problem of harm was characterised less by particular arguments than it was by an 
insistence on the interconnected way in which harm poses a problem for the production of 
knowledge in the discipline. Rather than three strategies of contention, then, Critical Theory 
allows us to characterise the relationship between IS and the problem of harm as a single 
problem field centred on a three aspects – the problems of object adequacy, critical value and 
reflexivity – that we understand as the threefold problematic underpinning the role that harm 
plays in disciplinary debate. In this light, we suggest that a deeper engagement with the 
problem of harm requires us to engage with the threefold problematic and its 
interconnections, and that this is best served by an engagement with its historical antecedents 
in the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. In developing this engagement, we might 
better understand the potentially widespread implications that Critical Theory holds for the 
way that IS understands the problem of harm. 
 The role that Critical Theory plays in how harm is understood in the discipline leads 
us to investigate its way of approaching harm through the work of its key thinkers, beyond its 
specific application in IS.  The second chapter suggests that while various broad arguments 
from Critical Theory have been taken on board in the context of the discipline, an 
understudied aspect of this contribution concerns the close relationship that major figures 
within the movement saw between the problem of harm and the ethical possibilities held out 
by academic enquiry. Driven by their experience of the horrors of the early twentieth century, 
they argued that the social experience of harm can be understood as placing considerable 
weight on the construction of theory as a historical exercise that is responsive to the 
requirements of critique. For Adorno and Horkheimer in particular, this point was raised by 
the juxtaposition between subject and object, man and nature, which characterised the human 
condition and ensured that suffering was an essential aspect of life under conditions of 
contemporary capitalism. The chapter examines the way in which this necessitated a 
normatively-motivated form of radical critique through which Adorno attempted to 
demonstrate the way in which theoretical concepts and systems would necessarily fall short 
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of the essential problems posed by suffering in society. Adorno went on to argue that through 
a practice of constant negative reflection, it may be possible to mitigate the gulf between 
subject and object in a historically-limited and partial fashion. When we engage in a process 
of critique, therefore, we are involved in addressing a fundamental problem that reveals the 
problem of harm as one of the guiding principles of critical social thought. Later articulations 
of the critical project attempted to ground the possibility of addressing the problem of harm 
through an engagement with the emancipatory potential maintained in the capacity for 
communication. However, the restrictions of this approach and persistent critiques of it 
demonstrates the necessity of a greater focus on the potential of the social sciences if the 
problem of harm is to be addressed rigorously. We conclude by putting forward the particular 
constellation through which Critical Theory allows us to understand the problem of harm and 
some of its key dynamics. Having understood these relationships, we can proceed to address 
the work of Linklater – whose work on harm attempts to address it directly – with a view to 
seeing how his engagement with the problem of harm operates in light of the contribution 
made by Critical Theory. 
 The third chapter addresses Linklater’s historical sociology as an attempt to formulate 
a sociological examination of the problem of harm that can operate as a point of synthesis for 
the wider discipline of International Studies. Having investigated the background for such a 
project, we can understand the sociology of harm conventions as potentially offering a way to 
move beyond the dichotomy between the Critical Theory’s overwhelming normative impulse 
and the social scientific task of explaining the problem of harm in social life; in doing so, it 
offers an approach to the threefold problematic that does not overemphasise any one of its 
aspects. Linklater’s aim, to provide a historical sociology that can inform understandings of 
harm and the way in which they are historically situated, explicitly suggests that an 
engagement with empirical work does not necessarily operate to the detriment of normative 
concern.
45
 However, a close engagement with his work demonstrates that this sociology is 
predicated on a particular ontology that restricts the critical claims that it is possible to derive 
from empirical knowledge. Using the example of structural harm as a limit case for the 
theory, it becomes evident that while the figurational account holds great potential for 
describing the development of intersubjective understandings, it does not fully account for 
the problematic relationship between social science and its object that is a key issue raised by 
Critical Theory. The way that figurational sociology conceptualises the production of 
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knowledge knowledge thus lacks a clear account of how we might engage in critical 
scholarship in the discipline. Arguing for the necessity of an account of this relationship, we 
propose a reconstruction of the sociology of harm conventions that more clearly relates to the 
implications of the threefold problematic in the context of International Studies. 
 The fourth chapter undertakes this reconstructive effort through an engagement with 
the philosophy of science, and particularly Critical Realism, in order to ask what the 
formulation of an object-adequate account of the problem of harm might look like. Having 
made significant inroads in International Studies, Critical Realists propose to conduct a 
metatheoretical analysis of the conditions that make social scientific activity possible, and 
argue that this can best be understood through the concepts of emergence and stratification. 
Based on this development, we argue that the sociology of harm conventions can be bolstered 
if we find a way to link the problems of critical value and object adequacy with regard to the 
problem of harm. By addressing these questions directly, it becomes possible for us to put 
forward an account of the way in which subjects confront history as objective. This argument, 
in turn, is based on an account of how social structure becomes an object of knowledge for 
social science, thus formulating a viable alternative to Linklater’s Eliasian account of 
scientific knowledge formation. The relationship between object-adequacy and critical value 
is demonstrated through the idea of explanatory critique, a process which describes the value 
that social science derives from negotiating the subject/object divide. This constitutes a move 
to relate the implications of the problem of harm, as put forward through Critical Theory, 
directly to the practice of social science, and in doing so, allows us to better characterise the 
normative contribution that the sociology of harm conventions can make. However, this 
framework does not fully address the problem of reflexivity – the third aspect raised by the 
threefold problematic. Bringing this issue to the fore thus remains a key challenge if we are to 
fully address the implications of the problem of harm, particularly given the close association 
between Critical Theory and reflexivity in International Studies.  
 The final chapter concludes our investigation by examining the reconstruction put 
forward in the previous with regard to two points – the problem of reflexivity, and the 
relationship that this holds to the social and historically delimited nature of attempts at social 
science. In doing so, it clarifies the way that Critical Theory serves as an agent provocateur 
in the discipline by first highlighting various perspectives’ commitment to the problem of 
harm before insisting on the irreducibility of this commitment. It argues that an understanding 
of the objective historical situation of International Studies demonstrates various possibilities 
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and limitations upon its activity, drawn from our understanding of the discipline 
contextualised against the problem of harm. Having predicated the possibility of critique 
upon the social scientific explanation of forms of harm and suffering, we consider the Critical 
Realist approach in light of the dangers of reification that were a key concern for Critical 
Theory. The chapter argues that the interrogation of the subject/object divide is a key aspect 
of the way that Critical Theory can help IS negotiate the problem of harm, and that the 
sociological aspect of this is best served by the approach we derived from Critical Realism. In 
this context, we can situate the task of Critical Theory to be the mediation of this relationship 
with the intention of chastening the knowledge produced by social scientific enquiry. This is 
understood as a complex endeavour that seeks to render the objective grounds for social 
change intelligible and demonstrating the historical limits of these conceptions. It is not 
merely that Critical Theory makes a particular positive contribution to practical knowledge, 
or that it is purely concerned with negation, but that it is fundamentally concerned with both 
when understood in relation to the problem of harm and the priority it accords to suffering. 
Indeed, it is precisely the nature of this contradiction that places Critical Theory in such a 
vital and pressing position – to mediate between theoretical understandings, interrogate the 
subject/object divide and provide insight into possibilities for social transformation. 
In closing, it is worth noting the manner in which the thesis contributes to the broader 
academic literature. In the first instance, it follows the work of Linklater and attempts to 
develop the sociology of harm conventions, understanding his work to be both normatively 
important and incredibly ambitious – although not beyond a process of critique, refinement 
and clarification. In this light, the contribution of the thesis is to broaden and clarify the 
potential impact of sociohistorical investigations into the problem of harm.  
There are some other areas in which the reflections here are likely to be more useful 
than others. Foremost among these is the literature on Critical International Studies and its 
related theories, to which it contributes both an understanding of the way in which normative 
commitments are vital to theory construction, as well as a philosophically realist 
understanding of how they can support the impulse toward critique. In this regard, it offers an 
original reading of the problem of harm that attempts to bridge the recent sociological work 
of Linklater with critical work in the discipline.  
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Secondly, the interpretation of the Frankfurt School put forward here is intended as a 
way of furthering the critical reassessment of Adorno that is currently taking place in 
International Studies.
46
  
Thirdly, it is intended that the continuing and fruitful debate on the philosophy of 
science within International Studies can benefit from its reflection on the role of 
epistemological reflection with regard to such a realist understanding. In this regard, the 
thesis brings together the Frankfurt School and Critical Realism as important forms of 
enquiry for those who think about the historical situation of attempts at social science, and 
furthers the debate over pragmatism, realism and ethics in the philosophy of science.
47
  
Finally, in embracing the question of how we live with others while minimising the 
harm we do to them, this thesis is concerned with the perennial critical-theoretical question – 
that of the reasonable conditions of life.
48
 It thus makes a contribution to the development of 
Critical Theory more generally, particularly in regard to understanding how the social 
conditions that ground our attempts at theoretical reflection impact upon our understanding of 
ethical and normative proscription beyond the debate over objective truth content. That 
Critical Theory persisted in its reflections based on an avowedly ethical commitment to the 
amelioration of suffering, and was willing to reflexively critique itself in light of the manner 
in which this needed to be justified is, I think, an admirable tendency; certainly one that bears 
continued reflection as we proceed towards barbarism as quickly as we do emancipation. 
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Chapter 1 – The Problem of Harm in 
International Studies: Five theoretical 
Transitions 
 
 
Introduction 
 While enquiry in International Studies has focussed on different objects according to 
circumstance, the problem of the harm that we do to others seems to persist in different forms 
as a common feature of scholarly debate. This chapter engages in a reading of the discipline 
that highlights this concern and attempts to understand the role harm plays in a discipline 
whose object centres on ‘encounters between difference across boundaries’.49 In the context 
of continuous changes in technology and social life that have accompanied increasing levels 
of social interconnectedness, ethical reflection comes to be placed in an ambiguous position, 
reliant on ever-greater capacities for technical manipulation while being increasingly unable 
to understand the consequences of doing so and the harm that may result.
50
 Our argument is 
that debates in the discipline have reflected on these processes, as well as engaging directly 
with each other, in a way that implicitly reflects upon the nature of harm. 
 When we pay attention to the problem of harm in the context of IS, we find a 
discipline that is persistent in reflecting on the ethical dimension of past, present and future 
enquiry. In this regard, key issues arise repeatedly and are rarely entirely pushed aside by 
new concerns. It remains the case that many undergraduate textbooks begin with the focus on 
war and the possibility of its mitigation that was the catalyst for disciplinary integration 
around the end of the First World War.
51
 Indeed, in incorporating the study of war as well as 
debates concerning sexual violence, colonial expropriation or environmental degradation, IS 
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seems to operate as a broad church that addresses itself to many of the most pressing forms of 
harm humanity has yet encountered. Its function as a site for critical debate of these issues 
allows us to understand the discipline as constituting a forum through which the broader 
social tension that Linklater has termed the problem of harm is accounted for and 
negotiated.
52
 By reflecting on this process, it may be possible to gain a clearer understanding 
of how IS is at least partly constituted by an implicit concern with harm, and the 
consequences this has for the way that enquiry is conducted in the discipline. 
 This approach does not lend itself to the evaluation of particular viewpoints, 
perspectives or theories, but is better served by examining the discipline and its conversations 
in motion. This allows us to better understand disciplinary engagement less as a series of 
statements and more as parts of a conversation that indicates the form that ethical engagement 
and debate takes in IS, illustrating the kind of claims that are made as to its significance. 
While an exhaustive survey of such claims is not possible here, we engage with five key 
theoretical issues as a way of examining the role that the problem of harm has played.
53
 It is 
important to note that few, if any, of these transitions have resulted in a fully-fledged 
paradigm shift. Indeed, the early touchstones of International Studies, including Realism and 
Liberalism, remain key touchstones such that fragmentation likely to be the result of any 
novel theoretical endeavour.
54
 The reasons given for this result may vary, but with regard to 
core theoretical understandings more often than not focus on the way in which the 
traditionally-defined ‘key’ actor of study for International Relations – the state – remains 
central to contemporary international politics despite the changing way in which theorists 
have characterised it.
55
 However, many of the approaches that have been critical of the 
centrality of the state in IS have become legitimated to the extent that the discipline would 
seem curiously bereft without them. While attempts at gaining this legitimacy continue on the 
peripheries of the discipline, it would be difficult to formulate and undergraduate course that 
did not at least touch on the insights brought to the field by theories such as feminism, critical 
theory and postcolonial approaches. In this sense, examining IS as a discipline-in-
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conversation, rather than providing a taxonomy of stated positions or paradigmatic 
orientations, is likely to give us a greater understanding of the role that the problem of harm 
plays in its development. 
 The debates discussed here are intended to give an insight into key debates that have 
influenced disciplinary development, allowing us to examine the role that the problem of 
harm has played within them such that we might appreciate its significance for the discipline 
more broadly. Their selection reflects the way in which they have contributed to the 
discipline in varying ways that centre on the problem of harm, and illustrates the different 
forms that disciplinary engagement takes when we understand harm as a key object of 
disciplinary concern.
56
 These debates are: 
- The debate between idealists and realists 
- The development of critical theory 
- The transition from state security to human security 
- The incorporation of marginalised groups 
- The developing concern with environmental issues 
Once again, this is not an exhaustive survey, but is aimed at exploring the way in 
which theoretical transitions have been negotiated in the discipline in a way that highlights its 
distinct ethical qualities and which are centred on the problem of harm. While the current 
state of disciplinary pluralism is more than accepting of the idea that theoretical outlooks in 
conversation with each other are often talking about different objects, we will see that a 
continuous engagement with the problem of harm can be found in debates concerning how 
issues of ethical significance should be approached; a process which Linklater argues takes 
place in social life more broadly.
57
 This holds out the possibility of understanding the 
problem of harm as a persistent point of contention in the discipline that continues despite the 
way in which the empirical objects of concern that IS is concerned with changes over time. 
Understanding what drives the problem-field of the discipline, and thus the practices of those 
that engage in it, therefore constitutes a way of understanding the implicit commitments of its 
practitioners rather than collecting together a set of distinct knowledge-claims. 
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Idealists and Realists: A Founding Myth for International Studies 
 The pervasiveness of the idealist/realist debate before the Second World War is a 
principle around which introductory texts to International Studies often centre, despite debate 
over the historical accuracy of these accounts.
58
 Historical basis aside, however, it is certainly 
the case that the pedagogical prevalence of such principles serves to portray the founding of 
contemporary political realism on a chastening of an ‘immature’ idealist tendency that was 
principally committed to internationalism, and thus a more ‘mature’ response to the reality of 
international politics on the grandest scale imaginable at the time.
59
 The prevalence of this 
formulation tends toward the periodization of the discipline as a series of ‘great debates’, the 
integrative power of which have been central to the self-understanding of its practitioners as 
involved in a historically developing process of investigation. As an early example of such a 
debate, the disagreement between Idealists and Realists nonetheless rested on a shared 
commitment to phronesis, or the provision of practical wisdom that could inform practice in 
the international sphere.
60
 However, the two perspectives differed in their guidance. In the 
terms of a later appraisal, Idealists were committed to the problem of justice in international 
affairs, while realists argued that the possibility of justice was only salient once the problem 
of order had been solved.
61
 Despite a process of historical revision that has demonstrated 
many Idealists as closet Realists, and Realists to be just as often concerned with questions of 
justice and principle, the pedagogical primacy of this (potentially imagined) debate serves to 
highlight core problems, such as that posed by war and survival in the lack of an overarching 
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hierarchy, as the historical ‘first mover’ of disciplinary formation. These problems, we argue, 
operate as practical issues that are raised by what we understand as the problem of harm; their 
formation as problems tells us something significant about the forms of international 
behaviour that were to be embraced or avoided due to the harm they might cause to citizens 
or states. 
 It is important to note the extent to which this early period of International Studies 
was characterised by a real or imagined proximity between the academic study of 
international politics and its practice.
62
 Indeed, suggestions that realism remains close to the 
promotion of (normally American) hegemonic interests continue to be made today, 
particularly with regard to the potentially harmful consequences of superpower hubris for 
sovereign integrity and the protection of citizens.
63
 Core to this pragmatic support for existing 
powers is the idea that realism can be understood as revealing a path to security that is shorn 
of its immature idealistic assumptions and focussed on the truth of the situation that pertains 
in the international state system. Such security, although articulated differently across 
contexts, is most often at root an analogue for ‘survival’ on some level, thus rendering 
international political life in terms of the potential harm to self that could stem from utopian 
misconduct. Realist arguments against post 9/11 American foreign policy can be seen in a 
similar light, attempting to reveal the manner in which America had lost sight of its objective 
national interest and was conflating these with the world interest in a manner that the early 
realists had criticised so heavily, thus potentially opening itself to severe blowback.
64
 Such a 
strategy is one that involves the supposition of a basic reality that idealism misrepresented 
through a conflation of normative injunctions and the ‘nature of things’. It is precisely this 
argument that is made by Gilpin, who suggests that power games in the context of anarchy 
are the basic reality of politics in the international realm.
65
 In this regard, attempting to move 
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beyond such objective limitations can only be understood as hubris, and beckons in the tragic 
fate of an actor that goes beyond their means.
66
 
 The core imperative of the realist vision of international politics, that of finding a way 
to survive in a system with no institutional hierarchy, thus can be understood as an orientation 
toward the problem of harm that delineates an understanding of the real and epiphenomenal 
objects of social scientific enquiry. On this understanding, any real change is more likely to 
occur in a way that is not amenable to idealistic proscription or normative intent.
67
 It remains 
the case that steering the state in a pragmatic and power-oriented fashion may serve to 
minimise the risk of harm to the state involved, and its citizens by corollary, but international 
politics should not be subject to normative interventions such as occurred with pacification at 
the domestic level. In arguing that the international sphere has unique properties that guide 
our approach to the problem of harm, normative debates such as those found in political 
theory are removed from consideration.
68
 Rather, for each state there is a situational logic that 
guides national interest objectively, and an understanding of this is the best way of 
formulating a prudent foreign policy centred on state survival. While it may not be the object 
of enquiry as such, the manner in which survival is understood as the sine qua non of 
international politics flows directly into what is considered prudent or not and is an 
irreducible principle that overwhelms all other judgements. At the core of the foundational 
myth of IS as a discipline, we therefore find an irreducible ethical imperative that defines the 
object of study in a debate centred on the problem of harm. 
 The Idealist/Realist debate, we suggest, can be characterised by drawing on the 
sources of normative concern that each theory took to be at stake in the international system. 
The intervention of the political realists grew out of a concern with the potentially tragic 
effects that could follow from incorrect sources of knowledge concerning the international 
realm, an aesthetic approach that highlights the key concern of such theorists with 
unnecessary harm.
69
  These early debates are instructive not just because of their content, but 
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due to how they illustrate the way in which the discipline has located areas of core concern 
around which further debates are constructed and carried out. In this case, we can see that the 
blurring of the objective and normative claims that are encoded in the imperative toward 
survival and prudent conduct can be understood as an attempt to solidify disciplinary norms 
in light of the ‘true’ nature of international politics, and as a way to prevent the problematic 
importing of foreign or inappropriately normative ideas into the international realm. The 
consequence of such a strategy is to define a particular dimension of international life as 
irreducible – states in the context of anarchy – which serves to delimit and define the 
boundaries within which the problem of harm can be addressed. Crucially, this arises from a 
claim to objectivity, but is prompted by an initial normative injunction that solidifies the state 
as the key source of concern with regard to the problem of harm. 
 
Problem Solving and Critical Theory 
 Contrary to the received wisdom that dominated the early period of International 
Studies, the development of Critical Theory sought to highlight the way in which many areas 
of activity in the discipline could be understood as offering a legitimation of unquestioned 
assumptions such as those that the realist victory had embedded in the structure of 
disciplinary enquiry.
70
 The fact that these assumptions, in being rendered timeless and 
permanent, could serve as rationalisations for prudential violence in the practice of 
international politics ensured that IS, rather than being concerned primarily with isolated 
reflection, could be implicated in supporting violent or harmful practices. Cox’s Gramscian 
dictum, that ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ can be understood as a 
paradigmatic reflection on the manner in which theoretical work are capable of being used in 
an instrumental fashion with the possibility of harmful consequences.
 71
 Rather than purely 
objective descriptions or explanations, the purposive nature of social scientific accounts 
highlighted their susceptibility to prevailing power relations and socially-embedded nature. 
Contemporaneously with this, other Marxian-inspired approaches such as those of Linklater 
and Ashley sought to reflect upon the presuppositions of universal knowledge and its basis in 
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particular understandings of history and development.
72
 Introducing the heritage of Critical 
Theory, and particularly the work of Jurgen Habermas, to International Studies, they 
demonstrated the restrictive model upon which knowledge in the discipline was based, thus 
problematizing traditional categories and demonstrating the need for normative reflection on 
theoretical assumptions. 
 Ashley’s deployment of Habermasian categories allowed him to draw a line between 
the increasingly technical and manipulationist view taken by structural realism and the 
practical wisdom that was the key lesson of its classical predecessor.
73
 As such, structural 
realism disguised a partial understanding of the nature of international politics in forms that 
pretended toward universality, claiming prestige through an understanding of such work as 
scientific and running against the more practical claims of realism’s key founder in the 
discipline, Hans Morgenthau.
74
 Such claims at objective knowledge, Ashley argued, 
necessitated an equally proactive engagement with the social situation of that knowledge and 
the problem-field from which it had arisen.
75
 It is only in this context that one can 
acknowledge the role of particular forms of knowledge as complicit in various political 
projects, just as revaluations of the Marxist tradition had served to highlight the totalitarian 
tendencies of structuralist thought.
76
 It was the task of critical thought in the discipline to 
open up spaces for thought such that it was possible to move beyond closed concepts that had 
served to ‘paper over the cracks’ and hide instances of harm and violence that operated 
through the exclusion of the least-powerful in society from dominant discourse.  
 Critical Theory’s demonstration of the social underpinnings of knowledge production 
further served to historicise many of the concepts that International Studies had traditionally 
relied upon.
77
 The realist prioritisation of the ‘facts of the matter’ thus falls subject to the 
claim that such an ahistorical focus does not take account of the transitory nature of many of 
the forms of political order. On a grand scale, political institutions such as the state or 
sovereignty are not the first forms of political community, and it appears that they will not be 
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the last. Critical Theory therefore drives toward an understanding that maintains the openness 
of possible futures, attempting to ground such ideas on the objective basis of immanent 
potentials for change.
78
 Furthermore, the fact of socially situated knowledge is as true for the 
theorist as it is for the statesman due to the way in which the academy is by necessity part of 
its object of study.
79
 The drive to produce knowledge within the discipline therefore should 
be subject to critique and reflection in a manner which reflects the potential for bias in its 
understanding of its potential contributions. In later work of Linklater’s, this critical dialogue 
would be reformulated as the basis for a universal communication community that was able 
to reconcile itself to difference, taking further prompts from Habermas’ formulation of a 
discourse ethics on the basis of knowledge-constitutive interests.
80
 Importantly, this moved 
beyond the limitations of the critical framework posed by Marxism to include forms of 
unjustified exclusion beyond that of class, such as that of gender or race that had previously 
been marginalised in processes of ethical consideration.
81
 
 The culmination of these efforts was to render the production of knowledge as partial 
and historically delimited. Further developments of this idea in social science, based on the 
sociology or philosophy of knowledge, have pushed this line of argument further, but most 
rest on the fundamental idea of epistemic violence through the production of knowledge 
within power structures, and often link this to consequences for practice.
82
 In doing so, they 
provided the conditions for accounts that have put forward the restrictive consequences of 
dominant theories in more particular terms, some of which will be discussed below. In Cox’s 
terminology, this serves to highlight the critical, and not merely problem solving, possibilities 
inherent in the discipline through which it is able to become more responsive to the world and 
provide more adequate and inclusive accounts.
83
 Contrary to the problem solving approach 
which seeks to take things as they are along the lines of disciplinary subdivision, one of the 
benefits of critical approaches is that they attempt to grasp larger synthetic pictures which 
take the possibility of change as their starting point. As such, they are inclusive of a process 
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of ethical reasoning and are open to participating in debates concerning the problem of harm. 
The starting point for such a theoretical endeavour should be more than the received concepts 
and theoretical apparatuses of the discipline, but include the changing tides and development 
of history itself.
84
 
 The introduction of Critical Theory to IS can be understood, on our reading, as 
opening up space for ethical reflexivity and change in an environment that had previously 
formulated its relationship to the problem of harm on the discovery of fundamental truths. It 
therefore served as a basis for later work that would open up the field to other areas of 
relevance to international politics which had previously been foreclosed by the political 
realist commitment to state survival as the fundamental object of disciplinary concern. While 
the tendency of political realism toward tragic narratives demonstrated the ethical starting 
point of such theoretical endeavours in an aesthetic vision, critical theory attempted to 
demonstrate that the self-pity of such narratives belied the failure of changes to the 
international system that were not the wishes of deluded idealists, but objectively possible.
85
 
In such a context, it falls to theory to interrogate such possibilities in a way that recalls the 
central ethical imperative of International Studies; not merely a question of what we study, 
but why we study at all and what the social role of academic enquiry should be. While hopes 
for the change of international relations at large have varied by theory or theorist, critical 
theories have argued that it is the promise that we might transcend existing conditions, 
regardless of its success, that lies at the centre of social science.
86
 That the problem of harm 
presented the discipline with possibilities, and not merely problems, is a theme that we shall 
return to in the next chapter. However, in the current context we will now see how this 
philosophical basis provided further impetus to developments in the discipline that altered the 
way we think about harm in particular situations and circumstances. 
 
From State Security to Human Security 
The Cold War, being the ground in which International Studies ‘grew up’, provided a 
context in which ‘weapons provided most of the questions, and they provided most of the 
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answers’.87 A key transition arrived at the end of the Cold War; developing on Buzan’s 
sectoral approach to security in People, States and Fear, Booth argued that the key security 
challenges facing populations were now as likely to emerge from the economy, crime or 
disease as they were to arise from the actions of states, and that it any case the state might not 
guarantee the safety of its citizens.
88
 In many ways, Booth’s argument was grounded upon the 
realist attitude towards the ‘facts of the matter’, but argued for the inclusion of new objects of 
study in accordance with historical change. On this understanding, it is not the case that states 
have lost their import as a unit of analysis in the discipline, as they clearly remains salient. 
However, novel threats arising due to historical development or their recent recognition 
undermined the adequacy of ‘our’ words, concepts and the priority they were accorded in 
disciplinary discourse.
89
 The development of a new understanding of international politics 
that was more adequate to explaining the relationship between security and the various 
threats that pertained in a post-Cold War globalised world became a top priority when faced 
with these problems, allowing the discipline to better understand what was at stake in the 
historical changes it was witness to. 
Such a development was part of a broader movement toward demonstrating that 
traditional theories of security were tied to dominant state-based discourses of security.
90
 As 
we have noted above, it is not uncommon for even the most traditional theories to contend the 
objectivity of the dominant view of how states should act. However, Booth contended that in 
allying their discourse to the actions of the US during the Cold War, political realism and its 
offshoot strategic studies had lost sight of what the principle of security had set out to do in 
the first place. In effect proposing the question of who security was for, he put forward 
security as an instrumental good that allowed theory to acknowledge the close ties between 
security and the emancipatory goal at its centre, thus proposing – under other terms – a 
refocussing of the problem of harm in order to place key values on the lives of people, rather 
than states.
91
 In this regard, the disparity between security-as-emancipation and state security 
is clear; it is entirely possible to have a secure state and an insecure population, thus 
rendering the former useless or nominal at best, and part of the problem at worst. In light of 
changed historical circumstances, the theorist has a responsibility to speak truth to power, 
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which in this case takes the form of reminding the state of its instrumental purpose and the 
goal at which it is aimed. This practice of critique served to revive the debate over the 
different ways that the problem of harm was manifested in international life, in opposition to 
the way that strategic studies had sought to limit possible areas of normative concern. 
Booth’s move toward human security can be seen as one aspect of a broader debate 
that resulted in the development of critical security studies following the end of the Cold 
War.
92
 Such a debate has considerably broadened the object of study for scholars along the 
lines of Buzan’s sectoral approach, but has also deepened it to include referent objects that 
were imperceptible within the frameworks of International Studies that were laid as 
convention in the early days of the discipline.
93
 While it may be the case that security studies, 
as a bastion of knowledge oriented toward pragmatism and phronesis was one of the later 
areas of International Studies to undertake a ‘critical’ turn, it is precisely this practical 
element that renders it interesting sociologically.
94
 In this case, it was precisely the failure of 
the discipline to address the problem of harm beyond a particular and limited Cold-War 
perspective that was the provocation for theoretical revision. While there is a significant 
extent to which the changes in security studies were concerned with how to describe the 
particular circumstances that would make a person ‘secure’ – the world had moved beyond 
the words designed for it – it was also the case that the more general question of what 
security studies was aimed at achieving came under significant scrutiny.
95
 
It is these early moves that laid the groundwork for the area of security studies to 
expand into the many and diverse areas that it is currently concerned with. As in many other 
areas of the discipline, fragmentation has followed, with it now being commonplace to 
understand security studies as being concerned with various securities rather than security per 
se as it was applied to a unified and homogenous model of what a state is or what it is capable 
of.
96
 In this regard, the proliferation of forms of security has served to diversify the possible 
units of concern beyond the specificity of the state, requiring a process of evaluative 
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judgement that we understand as taking part in debates concerning the problem of harm. 
Indeed, more recent work has attacked the concept of security itself on the basis that it is 
directly linked to an ideology of stasis or reification that seeks priority by definition and fails 
to adapt to the changing world of which it is a part.
97
 Despite the varied arenas in which such 
debates now occur, the consequences are often familiar from our understanding of Booth’s 
work; thinking about security and international politics more broadly should pay great 
attention to the manner in which the world, and thus the object of study, are subject to 
change. With regard to the problem of harm and the way in which it has changed historically, 
the development of Critical Security Studies demonstrates an example of how IS goes about 
re-evaluating received understandings of what international politics and security consists of, 
thus restoring the ethical centrality of scholarly enquiry in the discipline. 
 
The Incorporation of Marginalised Groups 
 One of the longer term impacts of the critique of state-centrism in International 
studies has been the incorporation of marginalised groups as legitimate objects of concern in 
the discipline.
98
 In particular, gender studies and postcolonial studies have sought to 
demonstrate the importance of their respective objects of study in the operation of 
international relations generally. This runs counter to the dominant voices that are heard in 
accounts of international relations, often white and male, which serves to reify dominant 
assumptions about what politics in the international sphere is and should be. The key 
questions of the discipline, particularly the problems of global order, of war and power, are 
often based on particular claims concerning what it is to be powerful or successful in 
international politics and are predicated on a particular cultural and historical understanding 
of the function of the world system.
99
 As such, the inclusion of different voices into the 
discipline serves to destabilise these dominant meanings and clarify systematic patterns of 
exclusion that allow harmful practices to go unnoticed. 
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 These arguments take two forms of importance for our argument. Firstly, they serve 
to demonstrate the manner in which women, children, indigenous groups and colonised 
peoples often bear the unacknowledged weight of war, production and sovereignty. In this 
arena, gender studies has highlighted the disproportionate vulnerability of women and 
children as ‘collateral damage’ in war, while postcolonial studies has involved itself in 
studies of the elimination and oppression of indigenous culture and consequences of patterns 
of global accumulation.
100
 This serves to expand our understandings of harm from standard 
measurements, such as war deaths, to include other forms of violence including rape, 
systematic killing of civilians and destruction of cultural heritage. Beyond the immediately 
negative consequences of international politics, such as war, such approaches have further 
attempted to highlight the problematic reification of political institutions and the violence that 
is a consequence of this. Against ideas of the miraculous coming-into-being of states, 
postcolonial theory has reformulated the forging of territories and borders as efforts that 
involved considerable violence to indigenous populations, as in the case of American 
expansion.
101
 Similarly, feminists have demonstrated the masculine qualities associated with 
the liberal public sphere.
102
 In such cases, it is not merely that International Studies has 
ignored forms of harm throughout its history, but that these forms of harm are a consequence 
of precisely those institutions that are its object of study.
103
 
 The second of these arguments follows on from this, and suggests that there are forms 
of violence that are constitutive of the international system more broadly. In arguments that 
are structurally similar to the Marxist claim concerning the foundational necessity of a 
proletarian class, gender scholars have highlighted the double-working day of women, and 
postcolonial/decolonial scholars have demonstrated colonial expansion to be key to our 
understandings of the international system.
104
 These are not mere externalities or unforeseen 
consequences, but are foundational to global political processes as such; Enloe has 
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demonstrated the varied industries that are constitutive of military deployment and highlight 
the gendered labour that supports traditional images of war or intervention.
105
 These debates 
demonstrate the foundational violence that is at the core of the lofty goals of ‘high’ politics 
and force us to reconsider the conceptions of political community that we take for granted 
such that the core concepts of political theory and International Studies become reformulated 
in a more diverse and complex fashion. 
In general, the differentiation of masculine and feminine in gender theory, and the 
broader self/other distinction that postcolonial theory has also contributed to theoretically, 
have been developed into theories that demonstrate the way in which social relations are 
defined by pairs of binary opposites, and the way that this impact upon the wider social form. 
These critiques have considered the way in which this difference is not merely taxonomic, 
but constitutes the very form of the social relation itself.
106
 Such relationships in feminist 
theory are seen as attributing gendered characteristics in order to justify their oppressive 
nature, demonstrating gender as a social framing device that serves as a common foundation 
of knowledge and which allows hierarchical justifications to be made.
107
 These binary 
distinctions lead to a tendency to marginalise feminine categories on the basis of masculine 
tendencies toward hierarchy and categorisation. Rejecting this frame would not only consist 
of opposing the dominance of patriarchy, but of rejecting and overcoming the binary 
distinction itself as a general form under which harmful practices are legitimised or ignored. 
 While the starting point of gender theory is often the unseen 50% within society, 
postcolonial theory has put forward hidden histories that expand this strategy to include the 
constitutive violence that allowed Western societies to become dominant in the world system, 
including slavery and expropriation. Moreover, they serve to highlight the long histories of 
racism and binary opposition that are constitutive of modern forms of political community, 
including ideas of sovereignty and the state.
108
 Such concepts are of course the foundation of 
the conceptual apparatus deployed by traditional forms of International Studies, and in this 
vein postcolonial study has made inroads into revealing the close ties between the academy 
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and the Western rationalist power/knowledge nexus.
109
 Broadly speaking, the aim is to 
broaden conceptualisations such that it is possible to view postcolonial and indigenous 
societies less as ‘deviant’ or ‘underdeveloped’, but having a unique history of their own, a 
large amount of which is often subject to colonial occupation, slavery and genocide. This 
serves to bring back into view a historical process of domination that prevented proper 
consideration of the harm inflicted upon marginalised groups through processes of colonial 
expansion. 
 The slow incorporation of marginalised voices in the discipline has served to highlight 
the legitimating properties of many of the concepts used to explain international relations in 
the past. In addition, such concepts have restricted the ability of other groups to dissent or 
speak in the first place.
110
 In extremis, such accounts have argued against the abstract 
rationalism that has characterised theoretical study of the international more broadly, 
proposing alternatives such as ‘bottom up’ ethnographic studies that begin from the subjects 
of concern.
111
 In such a context, it is essential to maintain open concepts that are cognisant of 
difference and change, acknowledging the ‘standpoint’ implications of the social context of 
truth-claims.
112
 In this regard, a focus on the problem of harm with regard to different groups 
serves to force the discipline open, ensuring that the concepts employed by the discipline 
remain open to input from the communities that are most vulnerable to its failings. The 
particular examples above, therefore, demonstrate that ideas of harm in society can operate 
with regard to sectional interests, legitimising the accounts that are put forward in their name 
and attempting to restore marginalised groups to their place in explanations of international 
life. 
 
Green Theory: Decentring the Object of Harm 
 The development of Green theory has served to resituate the location of international 
politics at large, both decentring our understanding of the foundations of political action and 
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imposing significant weight on the timescales that theory attempts to account for. While 
earlier attempts at constructing an environmental view of world politics had been limited 
because of the tendency to externalise environmental problems, the inclusion of an ecological 
dimension has resulted in attempts to push beyond the ‘statist frame’ as a key object of 
concern, arguing that a more holistic view of the humanity’s ecological situation is 
necessary.
113
 Tracing a lineage from concerns over pesticides in the 1960s, through the limits 
to growth thesis, and onto contemporary concerns about climate change, the concerns of 
green theory have proven to be a consistent and sustained critique of the practices of 
modernity that go beyond visions of politics that prioritise the human as an isolated 
subject.
114
 In doing so, it becomes possible for us to move beyond the distinction between 
man and nature, instead accounting for forms of harm that is based on an understanding of 
their relationship. 
 This concern for the sustainability of the natural environment often proceeds from a 
claim that their causal interconnection demonstrates the conventional separation of man from 
nature to be a fallacy, and that the social world is ultimately constituted by a high degree of 
interdependence between species and their ecological situation.
115
 This is often argued as a 
critique of the enlightenment scientific attitude, epitomised by Francis Bacon, which places 
emphasis on the enlightenment as a promethean effort to overcome, and even conquer nature. 
The discourse of overcoming, and an implied separation from the chaotic realm of natural 
processes, hides the way in which those natural processes are constituted upon an exploitation 
of the natural world. In the realm of social theory, anthropocentric attitudes have led to a 
focus on the social world at the expense of our understanding of our location within the 
natural world, and lead us to ignore the destruction that is the consequence of modernist 
understandings of growth and development. Such an argument serves to group together 
understandings of development that rely on production in order to develop or improve the 
situation of different communities, including liberalism and Marxism. Contrary to 
environmentalism, which seeks to manage ‘natural resources’, ecological theorists locate the 
locus of social being in the natural world, thus forcing us to reconsider our notions of what 
harm is against this broader context. As such, while the debate over a viable alternative to 
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anthropocentrism still continues, it is clear that the ethical legacy of enlightenment humanism 
is inadequate due to its construal of individuals or groups as in some way autonomous from 
their broader situation.
116
 
 The implications of this thesis have led ecologists to formulate a ground for the 
extension of moral consideration, or even the granting of full subjecthood, to nature. This 
makes it possible to bring nature within moral and practical discourse and raises the 
possibility that nature can be harmed, as is evidenced by the attempt to develop new 
categories of harm such as ecocide.
117
 Such arguments may extend as far as considering a 
concern for nature as an extended form of concern for the self.
118
 The focus on 
interconnection and interpenetration over discrete subjects tends toward a holism that is 
highly critical of the Cartesian split between subject and object. Rather than being derived 
from the problem-solving mindset of instrumental viewpoints, interaction should be focussed 
on the complex interdependencies of the natural world. The moral justification for 
considering nature as a subject arises, as noted above, from what Eckersley terms the 
‘ecological model of internal relations’, which attempts to erode the arbitrary and limiting 
intellectual barriers between humans and nature in moral discourse.
119
 The shift to 
ecocentrism is elaborated through the justification of nature as having intrinsic value based 
on this complexity. This may either arise intrinsically through autopoiesis (self-
reproduction/renewal) or through greater awareness of our interconnectedness and a 
transpersonal ecology based on this.
120
 The result, a green theory of value, would challenge 
anthropocentric theories of value by extending the sphere of hierarchical value relations, 
which our ideas of harm depend on, to those things that were produced by non-human 
processes. 
Ecological political theory has offered accounts of the structures that produce 
contemporary outcomes by demonstrating the logics inherent to various aspects of manmade 
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(second) nature. While these vary, they tend to centre on the areas of the state system, 
capitalism, knowledge production, and patriarchy as structures that preclude proper 
consideration of the forms of social/natural entanglement.
121
 We can therefore read green 
theory as suggesting not merely that these can be changed in order to fit with green outcomes, 
but that expanding our ideas of the problem of harm allows us to understand the intrinsically 
harmful qualities that are essential to particular forms of social organisation. They therefore 
put forward the idea that harm is not merely an external byproduct of social processes, but 
that it can be produced. The orientation of disciplines such as IS should not, therefore, be 
toward producing explanations that attempt to aggregate together all marginalised voices, but 
to involve itself in the study of social depth that incorporates the constitutive elements of life 
itself. This social depth goes beyond a particular idea of the subject, but extends its 
conception of constitutive elements to a global, perhaps even cosmic, scale and describes 
social life in term of interconnection rather than as discrete units.
122
 More importantly, it 
should acknowledge the time-horizon of its theoretical activity, acknowledging the degree to 
which scientific activity is engaged in negotiating unintended consequences in the context of 
a complex social organism that goes beyond our understanding. The problem of harm, which 
in IS has been focussed upon an enlightenment conceptualisation of human subjectivity, thus 
becomes decentred and subject to a broader set of natural processes that go beyond 
mainstream understandings of its extent and implications. 
 
The Problem of Harm: Aspects of a Disciplinary Conversation 
 The debates above suggest that it is possible to understand the discipline of 
International Studies as being involved in a debate in which the problem of harm operates as 
a key source of contention. Theoretical arguments in this regard do not develop in isolation, 
but through critical or qualifying stances toward others that centre upon particular problem-
fields. Moreover, they react to historical circumstance; we have seen theories prompted by 
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the horror of war, the rebellion against gender discrimination or colonial rule, the equivalence 
between development and industrialisation, and the idealisation of science. Despite the 
specificities that come with particular engagements, however, we argue that each of these 
debates can be understood in a general sense as holding an ethical content that we identify 
with an orientation toward debates centred on what is or should be harmful. Once again, the 
aim here is not to identify the ‘best’ understanding of harm in the discipline, but to offer a 
reading of IS that describes how it is engaged in a social activity centred on the problem of 
harm and the consequences that follow from this. 
 From this viewpoint, we can see that the problem of harm has provoked various 
strategies of contention in the discipline in a way that highlights its importance in the way 
that International Studies has developed. These strategies are not mutually exclusive, but 
nonetheless allow us a qualitative understanding of the way that the ethical stance of the 
discipline is formulated and plays out in disciplinary debate.  
 The first of these strategies concerns the argument that a perspective has 
misrepresented or misunderstood some fundamental constituent of social or international life. 
This can be best characterised by the Realist insistence on anarchy as the ‘basic reality’ of 
international politics; in doing so, it becomes possible to render other issues epiphenomenal 
or insignificant. In the Realist case, this has had a significant impact on the orienting of the 
discipline toward state-centric concerns.
123
 However, this does not just operate in the defence 
of traditionalism; in the case of Green Theory we saw the expansion of the domain of the 
international to areas that go far beyond issues of statecraft and diplomacy, and the 
incorporation of marginalised groups has also served to include the permissive conditions of 
the international as it is traditionally understood. This process of revision has served as much 
as an ethical indictment of previous perspectives as it has a purely scientific concern over the 
accuracy of our explanations. Indeed, if the Realist attempt to contribute to political 
judgement in the context of war as an archetypical form of harm is based on an incorrect 
account of the international system, then the judgemental and ethical consequences following 
from these accounts are also likely to be incorrect. Starting from the assumption that the 
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discipline is concerned with practical wisdom, as many do, we are therefore compelled to 
contest the adequacy of the explanations produced in the discipline as a way of better 
accounting for the problems we are interested in.
124
 
 The second of these strategies is focussed on the potential ethical consequences of 
particular accounts. In this context, Booth’s development of human security is instructive; it 
was not necessarily the case that the state-centric model of security was wrong, but rather that 
it was inadequate to the true ethical call of the discipline, that of security/emancipation.
125
 A 
reorientation of the discipline toward this approach allows us to see previous concerns in a 
new light and develop a fuller understanding of the possibilities that international life holds 
out. Similarly, we have seen gender theorists arguing that the impact of war can be better 
qualified if our accounts are situated in the context of gendered labour and exploitation. 
Invoking moral concern, therefore, can lead us to develop new approaches to the study of 
international politics which highlight its commitment to phronesis and possible contributions 
to practical action. It does so by forcing disciplinary engagement into an explicitly ethical 
register; in this form of contention, it is not just whether explanations are correct but whether 
they are right that is at stake. For marginalised groups in the discipline, such questions have 
focussed on the contribution it might make to the decolonising of public spaces and 
imaginations and the development of feminist strategy as normative and political goals.
126
 In 
doing so, questions of judgement which may have become obscured are pushed to the 
forefront of disciplinary concern in a way that rests on a practical orientation to the 
possibilities that the problem of harm holds out. 
 The third strategy concerns calls for greater reflection upon the role and impact of the 
discipline as part of the broader social negotiation that the problem of harm constitutes. In 
this case Critical Theory provides the paradigmatic example of an approach which highlights 
the close relationship between power structures and the production of knowledge.
127
 
Numerous later authors have made this approach core to their strategy of engagement; 
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Booth’s argument for human security rested not only on Realism as inaccurately reflecting 
international life, but also on the necessity of adapting the discipline to historical change.
128
 
Contrary to understanding the work undertaken in the discipline as revealing something about 
the objects that we study, this strategy pushes us to understand explanations as grounded 
historically and reveals our previously unquestioned value assumptions and priorities. As 
such, it forces us to consider the discipline as part of a broader social and historical process 
that is unable to stand outside historical change; International Studies can contribute to the 
creation and recreation of harmful practices as much as it aims at ameliorating them. In Green 
and Gender Theory, we saw that a process of reflection upon what made international politics 
possible led us to a greater understanding of how state-centric explanations do not merely 
omit environmental or gendered concerns so much as they actively exclude them from 
consideration while relying on them implicitly. In doing so, arguments that focus on 
reflexivity rely less on contention centred on an external standard as much as they provoke 
existing approaches to better account for their own assumptions. 
 In highlighting these three strategies, we can see that debates in the discipline take on 
a variety of forms while still maintaining an ethical aspect that we identify as an engagement 
with the problem of harm. In doing so, debates concerning harm take place in different areas 
and at different levels of debate, arising in questions of scientific adequacy as much as it does 
the reflective and ethical debates of international political theory. To this extent, the 
discipline fulfils Linklater’s understanding of the problem of harm as a social process of 
negotiation and contestation.
129
 However, while this analysis allows us to understand the 
various ways in which the discipline has sought to engage with it, it does not provide us with 
an integrated understanding of the problems and opportunities presented by the idea of harm 
in International Studies. In this case, we have been able to identify various points at which the 
problem of harm has been a key issue of contention, but have not reached any conclusions as 
to how we might address it more fully. The discipline’s orientation toward the problem of 
harm, therefore, may simply rest on an attempt to ‘do better’ in each of these three areas; 
more correct understandings of international politics, better normative standards, and a 
greater awareness of unquestioned assumptions. 
 However, among those perspectives examined above, Critical Theory attempts to 
move beyond such teleological understandings of disciplinary development and provokes us 
                                                 
128
 Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, 313. 
129
 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics, 4. 
44 
 
to examine the problem of harm in more depth. It does so, we argue, by formulating the 
strategies of contention examined above less as a catalogue of different ways to debate the 
problem of harm, and more as an interconnected set of problems that are intrinsic to the way 
in which the discipline is able to reflect upon the way that social science is able to account for 
it in the first place. This is, in part, a historical argument; many schools of thought in the 
discipline have drawn on the insights that Critical Theory brings to bear, and as such it has 
had a broad impact on our understanding of the way social science is conducted.
130
 More 
broadly though, work done under the auspices of Critical Theory has sought to characterise 
the discipline as having fundamental features that we can understand as relating the problem 
of harm as an object of study or debate directly to problems that characterise the production 
of knowledge. Furthermore, the key contemporary theorist of harm in the discipline, 
Linklater, maintains a key place in his approach to the problem of harm for the kind of 
engagement that Critical Theory promises.
131
 In this vein, our intention is to examine the 
implications that Critical Theory has for the way that the problem of harm is understood in 
IS. 
 
Critical Theory and the Problem of Harm 
 Within the discipline, Critical Theory has been involved in interrogating each of the 
strategies put forward above in a way that highlights their close interconnection; an approach 
which can be seen in three of its major theorists. Ashley’s attack on neorealism begins by 
highlighting the errors in the neorealist understanding of world politics, but also proceeds to 
put forward its implications for practice and reflecting on how its restricted understanding of 
world order might better be formulated.
132
 Cox’s synopsis of a Gramscian approach to IS 
similarly serves to highlight the instrumental function of claims to object-adequacy, and 
provokes a concern with reflection in calling for theory to be more responsive to a changing 
world.
133
 Finally, Linklater’s persistent concern with unjustified forms of oppression has 
come together in attempts to understand the dynamics of world historical development and 
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the potential normative resources that such an awareness might give us.
134
 These 
contributions suggest that addressing the problem of harm in a more complete way is not 
simply an issue of better responding to the strategies of contention put forward above, but 
rather rests on our ability to formulate their relationship to each other. 
 Our argument is that Critical Theory provides a point from which we can begin to 
better understand the implications of International Studies’ fascination with the problem of 
harm. In doing so, it prompts us to understand the discipline as being involved in the problem 
of harm in ways which reflect broader social trends, but also in forms that are characteristic 
of the social sciences. This begins with conceptualising the various strategies that have been 
used to address it as a whole; what we shall call the threefold problematic that arises from the 
problem of harm which will be used as a heuristic throughout this thesis. In doing so, the 
three strategies of contention outlined above can be formulated as a single problem field with 
different aspects. Corresponding to the account given of them above, they can be understood 
as: 
- The problem of object adequacy, or the question of what it is to be correct in our 
accounts of the world; 
- The problem of critical value, which concerns the impact that our changing ideas of 
harm has upon the world; 
- The problem of reflexivity, through which we consider how we might alter and 
become aware of new forms of harm that arise from our changing understandings of it 
as a form of worldly activity. 
In formulating these problems as an interconnected whole, Critical Theory has 
provoked changes in the way that the problem of harm is negotiated in the discipline, but also 
highlighted the way that these issues constitute ongoing processes of refinement and debate 
centred on the standards that social science should meet.
135
 In this context, scholars in 
International Studies are not ‘merely’ scientists concerned with the question of getting things 
correct, nor are they limited to questions concerning the nature of the right or the good, but 
they pose questions in a way that we can understand the fundamentally concerned with the 
problem of harm in a broad sense. This concern allows us to conceptualise the problem of 
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harm in a way that does not rest on the features of particular engagements, but as having 
characteristics that run throughout many different and competing approaches to disciplinary 
enquiry. In short, we can understand the tension that the problem of harm provokes within IS 
as exhibiting features that are familiar from social life more broadly in its drive toward 
ethical engagement, but also as raising questions that pertain directly to the production of 
knowledge in the discipline.  
The strategies that Critical Theory has pursued throughout its history have, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, varied considerably. However, they often take the form of occupying 
one aspect of the threefold problematic with a view to understanding its implications for the 
other aspects. In this vein, we can see Ashley’s argument as occupying a position of 
reflection from which he can begin to disentangle the complex ties between object adequacy 
and critical value in neorealism, highlighting an interconnected whole despite the Realists’ 
protestation of their scientific integrity.
136
 The importing of Habermasian Critical Theory into 
the discipline in the work of Ashley and Linklater has sought to put forward new sources of 
normative value, and in doing so reflects on the history of the international more broadly as 
well as engaging with questions concerning the objects the discipline should attend to.
137
 In 
each case, we find that normative, scientific and epistemological issues are framed less as 
straightforward problems for scientific advancement, and more as involving broader 
processes of reflection on the qualities of social life that involve a complex balancing of 
evaluation, critique and judgement.
138
 Taking this insight and applying it to our 
understanding of the discipline as characterised by its engagement with the problem of harm, 
we can begin to see that the complex analysis proposed by Critical Theory may have 
important implications for how we understand the importance of harm and its consequences 
for the way in which enquiry centred on the idea of harm is conducted.  
A key lesson of Critical Theory for the way we understand harm therefore lies in its 
insistence on presenting the problem of harm as a whole in a way that is irreducible to its 
constitutive parts. This argument gives rise to our heuristic of the threefold problematic of 
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object adequacy, critical value and reflexivity and indicates that any engagement with the 
problem of harm needs to respond to each of these if it is to be adequate to the tension that 
the problem of harm denotes. The aim, therefore, is to understand the implications of an 
approach to harm which does not rest purely on one or two of its aspects, but considers the 
problem of harm as a whole. This task rests on our ability to characterise the threefold 
problematic and its relational structure, and to investigate the dynamics that result. This 
characterisation, we suggest, might be best fulfilled by an engagement with the work of the 
Frankfurt School as the historical antecedent of the development of Critical Theory within IS. 
In addressing the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and others, we may be able to put forward 
some of the consequences of their intellectual project for the way that the problem of harm is 
understood more broadly. Indeed, given the strong influence Critical Theory has had in the 
discipline, it may be the case that an engagement with this work can clarify understanding of 
the formation of the threefold problematic itself. Our aim, therefore, is first to gain a better 
understanding of the significance of the threefold problematic for the problem of harm, and 
then to proceed in developing its implications for the discipline more broadly. 
 
Conclusion 
 By focussing on five theoretical transitions in the discipline, this chapter has provided 
a reading of International Studies that highlights the various ways in which the problem of 
harm is addressed, although often in an indirect or implicit fashion. The examples given are 
not intended to be entirely representative of the varied work that occurs in IS, but are 
illustrative, serving to highlight the viability of an approach that puts forward the problem of 
harm as a core concern of the discipline. This reading, we argued, suggests that the role that 
the problem of harm plays in IS was centred on three strategies of contention. These 
strategies – those of object adequacy, critical value and reflexivity – form three key ways in 
which the problem of harm is raised time and again in the discipline. However, in adopting 
the standpoint of Critical Theory, we find that these issues are not separate but intertwined; it 
is possible to understand them as three distinct aspects of the problem of harm considered 
from the perspective of knowledge production in the social sciences. This innovation, we 
argued, may have significant implications for the way that we understand the problem of 
harm in the discipline. 
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 In characterising IS as a discipline in transition as opposed to a set of isolated 
theoretical positions, we are able to understand the way in which debates centred on the 
problem of harm occur in a historical and social context that shapes the way they play out. 
Beyond the ‘great debates’, therefore, it is possible to see the way in which disciplinary 
perspectives have responded to historical change in the broader stock of social knowledge; 
they are responses, not sui generis acts of intellectual innovation. Whether the end of the 
Cold War, the collapse of the formal colonial system, or the development of new 
understandings of humans’ relationship to their environment, approaches in IS have sought to 
comprehend change through a process that culminates in new understandings and 
explanations of previously unknown or unacknowledged social phenomena. Our reading 
highlights how such interventions have a stake in what such changes mean for the discipline 
at large and its practical implications, and that this can be understood to centre on the 
problem of harm as a core concern.  
Our understanding of how this process works has been deepened following the 
introduction of Critical Theory to the discipline; with the possibility that the theorist 
themselves may be implicated in the perpetuation of violence in the social world, the problem 
of harm has only become more pressing. Through the lens of Critical Theory, we can see that 
the issues that the problem of harm pushes us to confront are not isolated problems, but 
reflect a broader set of ethical concerns centred on the way in which knowledge is produced 
and used. In adopting this position, the various strategies of contention that have 
characterised debates over harm are limited manifestations of the problem of harm in general. 
If this is the case, then understanding the problem of harm more fully rests on our ability to 
characterise the threefold problematic and its relational structure. In order to do this, we will 
examine the approach taken by the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School; both the 
theoretical antecedent of many of the theoretical debates examined here and, as we will see, 
an intellectual project which placed the problem of harm front-and-centre in its theories of 
society. 
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Chapter 2 – The Problem of Harm in 
Critical Theory 
 
 
Introduction 
 In one of his more often-quoted phrases, Theodor Adorno proclaimed the 
contemporary relevance of the problem of harm in his famous dictum that ‘to write poetry 
after Auschwitz would be barbaric’, thereby relating the ethical problem posed by suffering 
directly to a context in which it was no longer possible to fully address it.
139
 The development 
of Critical Theory in its early phases can be understood as being guided by this assertion, 
persistently trying to find a way of justifying theory construction in the face of overwhelming 
suffering. He and others of his generation, witness to the instrumentalisation of life in the 
policies of the Third Reich and the destructive power of the atomic bomb, are perhaps the 
paradigmatic example of a group of thinkers committed to the problem of harm and its 
relationship to suffering.
140
 This chapter will attempt to examine this concern with a view to 
evaluating its potential contribution to the discipline of International Studies. 
 Our argument is that Critical Theory can be understood as responding to the tension 
that we saw in the introduction; the proliferation of possible forms of harm and their rapid 
change makes it apparent that our ideas of harm have become more uncertain. In doing so, 
their explicit commitment to the social situation of suffering can be seen as an implicit 
acknowledgement of the problem of harm more broadly. When this uncertainty overwhelms 
our technological capabilities, we find ourselves playing catch up with the Hippocratic Oath, 
the injunction of which to do no harm was stated so categorically.
141
 Indeed, one of the 
successes of Critical Theory in International Studies has been to highlight the social situation 
of knowledge production. If this is the case, then our understanding of what is to be included 
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or excluded in debates over the problem of harm is interwoven with the broader normative 
commitments that are part and parcel of both everyday life and the civilizing processes that 
societies produce and are subject to. In this context, it is unlikely that one could put forward a 
definitive ideal of social value or action concerning what can harm or be harmed. However, 
this does not mean it is impossible to explore and perhaps refine; we argued that a key 
contribution of Critical Theory in IS was to open up this exploration through the problems of 
object adequacy, critical value and reflexivity, as well as the relationship between them. In 
doing so, the work of the Frankfurt School might allow us to better understand the problems 
and opportunities that arise from engaging with the problem of harm. 
 Critical Theory, however, is not limited to the discipline of IS but encapsulates a 
broad range of theoretical endeavours, key examples of which were explicitly concerned with 
how they might engage with the problem of harm and its relationship to suffering. Having 
seen the way in which Critical Theory within the discipline of IS holds strong links and often 
operates as a basis for attempts to grapple with the problem of harm in International Studies, 
we will now examine how key theorists of the Frankfurt School sought implicitly to 
understand the interaction between theory construction and the ethical issues raised by the 
problem of harm as a whole. This interaction rests on an understanding of the relationship 
between academic enquiry – understood as producing concepts – and the experience of 
suffering subjects, a dynamic that we have seen articulated in Linklater’s argument for the 
importance of the problem of harm.
142
 As we shall see, the way in which this was approached 
in Critical Theory results less in a particular solution to the problem of harm so much as it 
gives us insights into the balance and formulation of the threefold problematic that was a key 
contribution of Critical Theory to the development of IS as a discipline and which holds 
wide-ranging consequences for the conduct of social enquiry. The aim, therefore, is to clarify 
the way in which Critical Theory approached the problem of harm, and to examine the way in 
which their philosophical position led to a particular understanding of the object adequacy, 
critical value and reflexivity of scientific accounts. As with the last chapter, this is a reading 
which highlights the focus of Critical Theory on the problem of harm and its explicit 
engagement with the suffering of subjects; in the context of Linklater’s suggestion of the 
close relationship between the study of harm in IS and the evaluative role of Critical Theory, 
it may be the case that the latter has implications for the way in which enquiry is conducted in 
the former. 
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 The theoretical issue at stake for Critical Theory more broadly can be seen in the way 
that the problem of harm, described by Linklater as foundational for conceptions of social or 
political order through time, breaks out of the vocabulary that has been developed to account 
for it both in the context of International Studies and beyond.
143
 Contrary to the stasis of 
concepts that were maintained through religion or political absolutism, we now understand 
that our understandings, definitions and explanations of harm have to be adapted to historical 
circumstance in a world that is constantly shifting. The forms of harm that we now recognise 
are transmitted over huge distances, whether in the form of offshore labour exploitation or the 
atomic bomb, and have developed in lock-step with developments in technology that bind us 
together irrevocably. Moreover, the development of increasingly novel and devastating forms 
of harm only ever appears to travel in one direction, ‘from the slingshot to the megaton 
bomb’.144 In this context, Critical Theory seeks to demonstrate the social nature of new forms 
of harm, linking it to the direction of social change under capitalism as the defining feature of 
social life. More particularly, their argument concerned the essential alienation of these forms 
of destruction from their social origin, a process which allows harmful practices to continue 
beyond the scope of moral concern. 
 In order to understand the ways in which International Studies can gain a greater 
responsiveness to the changing problem of harm, this chapter puts forward a reading of 
Critical Theory that focusses on their understanding of harm and suffering. In doing so, we 
draw upon three key themes that characterise the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and others. 
Firstly, Critical Theory puts forward an understanding of harm that is explicitly conditioned 
by the modern era and its understanding of the relativist implications of what had previously 
been considered universal concepts. In the context of the problem of harm, this means that we 
will address the historicising impulse of Critical Theory as a way of understanding the 
implications of harm’s conceptual variability and its relationship to suffering.145 Secondly, 
the understanding of concepts that is put forward by the Frankfurt School places high value 
on the role of suffering in the world, attempting to pose the public and universal nature of 
enlightenment concepts against the very personal and private experience of suffering.
146
 The 
relationship between experience and the development of concepts in this way serves to 
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demonstrate important links between the ideas we have and the society we live in. Thirdly, 
the thoroughgoing attempt to critique epistemological and conceptual formulations through a 
focus on their historical nature allowed Critical Theory to argue for a strong ethical 
commitment on the part of social science, but in a way which ultimately limited the historical 
analysis they were able to undertake.
147
 Taken together, these themes have implications for 
the way in which social scientists engage with the world and constitute a form of engagement 
which is underpinned by a particular framing of the threefold problematic.  
 The chapter will proceed as follows. Firstly, it examines the basis that Marx provided 
for Critical Theory in philosophical and sociological terms. While an exhaustive analysis of is 
impossible, key themes of Marx’s work warrant attention in this context due to the way that 
the Frankfurt School would generalise his concern with exploitation under capitalist social 
order to a concern with suffering more broadly. In doing so, Marx provided a starting-point 
for later thinkers to examine the social origins of suffering and demonstrate the way in which 
ideal concepts had a historical origin that was subject to critique, thus providing a template 
for our understanding of how concepts of harm relate to the experience from which they are 
drawn. Following this, the major part of this chapter will be concerned with the way that the 
Frankfurt School appropriated this analysis as a way of thinking through the relationship 
between suffering and the possibility of social change aimed at its amelioration. This leads us 
to understand how the critical theorists engaged with their historical experience as a way of 
thinking through the extremes of human suffering and domination. In doing so, we are able to 
characterise the perspective of Critical Theory and the way that it highlights the problem of 
harm as an issue for the production of knowledge. Furthermore, we are able to outline the 
implications that follow from this in their approach to the problem field that we have termed 
the threefold problematic. As we shall see, this approach to the problem of harm 
demonstrates the focus of Adorno in particular on a particular kind of critique and 
simultaneously puts forward important implications for the possibility of a social science 
aimed at engaging with, and ameliorating, harmful practices, as we consider IS to be. In 
doing so, the theorists of the Frankfurt School provided an invaluable viewpoint from which 
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to approach the problem of harm, but only in the context of severe limitations on the extent to 
which it can be understood. 
 
Marxism and the Critical Theory of Society 
 While the first steps were taken by Kant, and were followed up on by Hegel and 
Fichte, the work of Karl Marx is often considered as the decisive point at which a concrete 
critical theory of society was inaugurated; the basic statement of such being the claim that 
while the philosophers had thus far interpreted the world, the point was to change it.
148
 In the 
face of rapid changes brought about by the industrial revolution and continuous revolutionary 
developments in the sphere of capital, Marx’s impulse toward an analysis of society as a 
whole, focussed on understanding patterns of social interconnection rather than isolated 
individuals, would aim at undermining the triumphalism of idealist accounts in a manner that 
was systematic and, importantly, drawn from the historical presuppositions of idealist 
bourgeois-economic theories themselves.
149
 In this regard, Marx’s work laid the foundation 
for much of Critical Theory to follow. In this section, we present a reading of Marx’s work 
that focusses on his generalisation of exploitation to the broader workings of capitalist 
society. 
 It is important to note that, despite the highly systematic nature of Marx’s work in 
Capital, his early statements of a critical orientation would be a manifesto toward a ‘ruthless 
criticism of everything existing’ that aimed at the distinction between essence and appearance 
in social life.
150
 Specifically, he argued that the proliferation of bourgeois ideals served to 
disguise the ruthless and efficient exploitation of the proletariat that had come about with the 
development of capitalism into an all-encompassing social system. In doing so, he inverted 
Hegel’s fascination with ideal concepts and focussed on the way in which bourgeois ideals 
papered over material history, the core of which was class struggle.
151
 As such, the practice of 
post-enlightenment law, in venerating the individual as the core constituent of social life, hid 
the uncaring barbarity of capitalist exploitation behind a veil of neutrality that was merely a 
pretext for class interest as ‘He [the worker] and the owner of money meet in the market, and 
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deal with each other as on the basis of equal rights […] both, therefore equal in the eyes of 
the law.’152 Having submitted, through necessity, to this relationship, the worker becomes 
subject to the structural system of capital, its whims and tendencies, such as the tendency 
toward the intensification of labour.
153
 
 Marx’s contribution to the problem of harm lies with his immanent critique, a strategy 
which allowed him to hold up the concrete fact of exploitation against the ideology of liberty 
and freedom that underpinned the way in which it was generally described.
154
 Despite the 
development of the ideas associated with the Enlightenment there was little, Marx suggested, 
that would demonstrate its success when compared with the objective technological 
capabilities of bourgeois society. While railing against the ‘bad’ utopias of Proudhon and 
others, Marx defended the possibility of a free society based on the empirical abundance 
allowed by the modern means of production and which could be harnessed to ameliorate the 
exploitation of the proletariat.
155
 While forms of exploitation vary throughout history, the 
impulse toward the expansion of real freedom and the amelioration of real suffering becomes, 
in Marx’s argument, ever more pressing due to the possibility of actually doing so.156  
 Marx’s differentiation of the forms of consciousness that characterised a given society 
and the material social form allowed him to highlight the possibility of objectively pressing 
needs that were based on the abstract interconnections of social life.
157
 In this regard, we are 
able to discern the ways in which he moved between the promises made by liberal-juridical 
notions of responsibility and intention and the actual exploitation of the proletariat. In this 
                                                 
152
 Karl Marx, ‘Economic Manuscripts: Capital Vol. I - Chapter Six’, Marxists.org Archive. 
153
 Karl Marx, ‘Economic Manuscripts: Capital Vol. I - Chapter Fifteen, Marxists.org Archive. 
154
 Karl Marx, ‘Moralizing Criticism and Critical Morality’, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 1st ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 216–18. 
155
 This criticism was at the core of Marx and Engels’ distinction between ‘scientific’ and ‘utopian’ socialism. 
See Karl Marx, ‘The Poverty of Philosophy’, Marxists.org Archive, 1847. 
156
 This argument lies at the core of the dispute over the labour theory of value, seen as essential to the analysis 
Marx provides in Capital. The uncertain status of the theory in the face of a post-fordist economy has meant that 
attempts to appeal to Marxism directly today often incorporate the previously unknown texts of the Paris 
Manuscripts, which demonstrate the humanist concerns of the young Marx. Nonetheless, the internal 
consistency of this link has come under fire from theorists such as Althusser, who argued that the ‘epistemic 
break’ demonstrated by the distance between Capital and the manuscripts was incommensurable. The manner in 
which the mode of exploitation can be deriven from Marxist theory remains a key source of contention. See 
Herbert Marcuse, ‘The Foundation of Historical Materialism’, Marxists.org Archive, 1932. Louis Althusser, 
‘Feuerbach’s “Philosophical Manifestoes” in “For Marx”’, Marxists.org Archive, 1962. 
157
 Marx’s grounding of this as objective can be seen in his statement that ‘It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.’ Karl Marx, 
‘Economic Manuscripts: Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, 1859. 
55 
 
move, we see the embryonic form of contemporary theories for which social structure is a 
real moment in the social process that contributes to the proliferation of particular forms of 
life. Despite wide variations in the attitudes of individual authors towards Marx’s work, it is 
at points such as this that we can see how green theory and theories that articulate the 
concerns of marginalised groups often take the presuppositions he laid for Critical Theory as 
essential to an understanding of the broader social whole, as we saw in the first chapter.
158
 
 For Marx, the relationship between the social position of subjects and their ideas 
further opens up the possibility of a critique of ideology through which beliefs can be 
restored to their correct position. Marx’s argument thus opens up the possibility that different 
forms of knowledge, and their object adequacy, varies according to social position such as 
that found in societies where a division of labour pertains.
159
 While whole societies can be 
enculturated into particular systems of understanding and belief, the development of 
liberalism with its focus on sacrosanct individuality had served to hide the interdependent 
nature of the class system under which the exploitation of proletarian labour for the benefit of 
the capitalist was the norm. However, it is also the case that the ‘capitalist’ in this case is not 
just a particular individual, but rather a social role for which the maximisation of profit is the 
most immediate form of rationality. The disjuncture between being and thought, through 
which the capitalist can fail to recognise their exploitative practice, is thus the basis for which 
contradictions can exist under the umbrella of a broader social totality.
160
 
Marx’s use of the term contradiction takes on several forms.161 However, all of them 
are based on the importance of going beyond particular experience in our explanations of 
social life. In doing so, we might find a degree of truth in common between subjects in a 
process of negotiation that bears similarities to Linklater’s problem of harm. Fundamental to 
this process for Marx is the way that society emerges from the way in which its means of 
production are organised; it is possible for social science to examine the interconnections 
through which the exploitation of the proletariat not only occurs, but is legitimated through 
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the production of knowledge. In beginning from the experience of the proletariat, rather than 
abstract concepts such as liberalism suggests, we are able to discern the interconnections and 
interdependencies of social life in a more object adequate way. Furthermore, it is possible to 
understand that the past failures of our explanations lay not just with the failure of 
knowledge, but with historical limitations upon its production. 
 
Marx and the Theme of Alienation 
 Marx’s argument is taken a step further through his generalisation of the exploitation 
of the proletariat to a broader claim on the qualities of alienation. This is of interest to us 
because the arguments concerning exploitation, pertinent at the time of the industrial 
revolution and the basis for the rhetorical effect of Marx’s writing, are grounded historically 
in the chapters in Capital that concern factory machinery and industry and may be less 
relevant today.
162
 However, the continued relevance of Marx’s approach to exploitation lies 
with his claim that it is an objective quality of capitalist social organisation, rather than a 
historical particular. This has particular relevance for IS given Linklater’s examination of 
exploitation as a form of harm, as well as the common use of exploitation as a fulcrum for 
approaches such as world systems theory.
163
 In examining exploitation through Marx, we 
gain an insight into how ideas of harm relate to our explanations of society. 
 The argument that capitalism inherently tends toward the alienation of subjects finds 
grounding in Marx’s claim that ‘Man is a zoon politkon in the most literal sense; he is not 
only a social animal, but an animal that can individualised only within society.’164 The 
features of subjectivity that we have come to recognise as human, collectively called ‘species 
being’ by Marx, cannot be developed except in the context of society, which has existence 
both through and beyond the existence of any given subject. It is this being that is suffocated 
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by alienation, allowing us to understand this as a way in which the social structure of society 
restricts our understanding of the suffering that others experience. 
 The process by which alienation comes about can be seen in production, and consists 
of the way in which social relationships between people come to be seen as relationships 
between things: 
 ‘The object that labour produces, its product, confronts it as 
an alien being, as a power independent of the producer. The 
product of labour is labour that has solidified itself into an 
object, made itself into a thing, the objectification of labour. 
The realization of labour is its objectification. In political 
economy this realization of labour appears as a loss of reality 
for the worker, objectification as a loss of the object or 
slavery to it, and appropriation as alienation, as 
externalization.’165 
This is not merely the externalization of vital forces, i.e. the physical labour power required 
for production, but the submission to a process over which the worker has no power, that of 
production under the aegis of the wage relation. In this relationship, it is not that labour is 
carried out voluntarily, but rather that the means of production are provided by the capitalist 
in a form that may be contrary to the development of the proletarians’ species being. The 
expenditure of her labour power operates in the context of a given machine or factory, not a 
vocation of her own choosing. This elevates the alienation of labour beyond the exploitation 
of any particular worker, and toward alienation as a general feature of capitalist society. As 
rationalization in the production process takes place, this is further intensified in the way that 
piecemeal and repetitive tasks may only produce part of the total commodity, as is indicated 
by the development of the assembly line.
166
 We can therefore see that exploitation is 
underpinned by structural forces that prevent the worker from attaining their full potential; it 
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is not just that they do not have control over the products of their own labour or social being, 
but that the solidarity they might find with others is restricted due to the form of labour they 
are involved in. 
 We can understand alienation as the point at which knowledge of the broader social 
conditions underlying exploitation is restricted. Marx’s account, at a foundational moment for 
Critical Theory, serves to clarify this relationship by abstracting from the historical conditions 
that constitute particular instances of exploitation. Exploitation, as the physical and material 
aspect of this alienating process can only be generalised once we understand it in a far broader 
sense than a given worker being overworked or underpaid. This pertains as long as the 
relationship of the labourer to his product is already defined – the social conditions that lead 
to production exist before and after the process of any particular production, but also before 
and after the process by which the labourer comes to be in her social setting. Moving between 
these themes therefore allows us to understand the relationship between the suffering (in this 
case, particularly of the proletarian) and the knowledge that we have of it that is also 
constructed in a given context. This context, for Marx, is the objective framework that 
underlies capitalist society and therefore impacts upon the way in which we produce 
knowledge. 
 
Marx: Objectivity, Tendency and Social Structure 
 As we have seen, the harmful situation that is inherent to capitalist society rests on not 
a particular worker, but workers in general. The extent to which social conditions exist prior 
to, and persist after, the intervention or existence of particular actors is a key argument for the 
objective existence of social structure beyond these actors and which allows us to speak of it 
as a whole. The theme of time remains central to many reading of Marx’s work.167 It is the 
relationship between the time experienced by subjects and the longer term structure of capital 
that underpins his famous statement on the objectivity of history: 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as 
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
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by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given, and transmitted from the past.”168 
We thus find that the objective conditions that confront subjects are not only theirs to 
negotiate and survive, but rather have far wider social consequence. The complex systems in 
which they are coerced and entangled are not constituted by their presence in particular, but 
rather is the concrete ‘because it is the concentration of many determinations’ that are 
diverse, but unified within the societal totality.
169
 A full understanding of social relations 
under capitalism thus needs to involve an account that is abstracted from personal experience 
in proportion to the way in which capital does not require particular subjects, but a more 
general form such as labour, in order to function. 
 In engaging in social life, subjects work upon this system of objective conditions in a 
way that reflects their understanding and interpretation of them. It is this process of 
conceptualisation, either received or based in the subjects’ social position that dictates the 
appearance of social relations and is the basis of the ideology that Marx puts forward as the 
superstructure of everyday life. This parallels the production process; the proletarian has no 
choice of what she works upon, and receives the concepts which allow her to do so. In this 
way, social structure becomes an objective force despite the way that it originally arose from 
the labour of those that participate in it.
170
 
 When we consider the role of this objective social structure in the perpetuation of 
harmful conditions, we are forced to consider talk of rights and responsibilities in a new way. 
The moral responsibility of the capitalist cannot be addressed by the worker in those terms, as 
she finds herself embroiled in a particular objective social relationship that is independent of 
his subjective emotions or capacity for moral reasoning. The capitalist is not defined by his 
relationship to aspects of his personality, but rather by his role; to maximise surplus value as 
the objective structure of society dictates. Marx’s positioning of the economic component of 
social life, as the fundamental basis of its operation, means that it tends to dominate the 
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language, conventions and institutions lying at the superstructural level, even when they are 
designed to mitigate some of the harsher tendencies of capitalist social systems. With regard 
to labour campaigns in areas such as the working day, occasional gains may be rolled back as 
soon as economic conditions demand that they be. The tendency that wins over the long term 
however, is the maximization of unpaid labour that is expropriated as surplus value.
171
 In this 
way, capitalist society always tends toward exploitation despite efforts at moral or ethical 
reform. 
 The difference between essence and appearance both provides for change and 
demonstrates the way in which concepts or abstractions can become influential in social life. 
What Marx’s work allows us to understand is how exploitation is perpetuated by alienation; 
the potential for social change inherent to concepts is also a potential for limiting this change 
when concepts become rigid and inflexible.
172
 The collective realisation by the proletariat of 
their past, present and future exploitation would, according to Marx, pave the way to 
revolution and a communist future. However, getting a grasp of the exploited position of the 
proletariat requires an understanding of social life that runs contrary to historical 
circumstance and the appearance mediated by prevailing culture. The historical 
understanding of a concept, whether slavery, property or exploitation, defines the way in 
which it is reproduced or transformed; Marx hopes to provide an account through which the 
dynamics of the problem of harm faced by the proletariat are rendered clear and overcome. 
 Marx’s demonstration of the way in which the appearance of social relations become 
the condition of their own obfuscation points us toward an understanding of how social 
situations become less than transparent to those that take part in them. We therefore lose sight 
of the social origins of our concepts, and they become less adequate to the way in which 
social reality changes. At the beginning of Capital, he argues that relationship between 
labouring subjects becomes the appearance of relationship between things: 
“A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply 
because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to 
them as an objective character stamped upon the product of 
that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum 
total of their own labour is presented to them as a social 
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relation, existing not between themselves, but between the 
products of their labour.”173 
This shows us that capitalist social order has the consequence of perpetuating a limited and 
particular structure through which people identify. This alienated condition becomes 
systematised in the concepts that we use to navigate the social world, and are reproduced as 
long as we fail to see outside of these limits. In the context of our investigation, this allows us 
to understand the limiting role that particular concepts of harm can have; in relying on them, 
we come to forget the changing social background to which they refer. The role of social 
science in this context is to engage in a practice by which we come to understand and 
appreciate these hidden histories. 
 If this is the case, exploitation and alienation are not merely a function of opportunism 
or the abuse of power. In generalising aspects of the social life of workers, Marx argues that 
we begin to see an objective social structure that dominates over all spheres of life. It is these 
objective conditions, and their realisation by the historical subject of the proletariat, that 
eventually leads history toward the abolition of exploitation, rather than its mere reform: 
“When socialist writers ascribe this historic role to the 
proletariat, it is not […] because they consider the 
proletarians as gods. Rather the contrary. Since the 
abstraction of all humanity, even of the semblance of 
humanity, is practically compete in the full-grown 
proletariat; since the conditions of life of the proletariat 
sum up all the conditions of life of society today in all 
their inhuman acuity; […] yet at the same time has not 
only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but 
through urgent, no longer disguiseable, absolutely 
imperative need […] is driven directly to revolt against 
that inhumanity; it follows that the proletariat can and 
must free itself. But it cannot free itself without abolishing 
the conditions of its own life.”174 
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 The proletarians’ realisation of their oppression must, according to Marx, take place at 
the intersection of two levels of analysis. At the base, material level of the forces of 
production, labour must aim to reorganise society. However, this can only occur through once 
they confront society’s ideology with the objective condition of alienation; Marx hopes to 
provide the conceptual tools by which they might do so. A given society, in this case the 
mode of production, contains the seeds of its own radical overcoming due to its reliance on 
ideational factors that social science can contribute to changing. 
 Despite the proliferation of ways of thinking that would restrict a proper 
understanding of their exploitation, the proletariat in Marx’s account find themselves able to 
change society from within. This particular revolution, of course, was not fully realised. 
However, in answering the problem of change in society by abstracting the real possibilities 
of a given historical situation, Marx provides us a way of approaching the problem of harm 
through social science. From this understanding, several important questions arise, foremost 
among which is the question of structural determination; given the production of obfuscating 
knowledge in capitalist society, how does the social scientist know they are right when they 
approach the concept of harm? Secondly, it is important to consider whether Marx’s account, 
linked as it is to a certain idea of technology and production, is relevant today. These issues 
begin to lay out some of the key themes that were at the core of the Frankfurt School’s 
reappropriation of Marx’s efforts and which served to preserve his important contribution to 
social thought. 
 
The Marxist Inheritance: Socialising the Concept of Harm 
 The work of Marx contains three arguments that are key to our investigation. Firstly, 
he argued that it was possible to refer to general social position, rather than individuals as 
such, and in doing so put forward a way in which we can understand harm as reaching 
beyond the harmed subject. Secondly, by paying attention to the structured and systematic 
form that exploitation takes in capitalist society, Marx understood social organisation not 
merely as a conditioning factor in harmful practices, but as actually contributing to their 
production. Finally, Marx’s argument for ideology as a product of social organisation allows 
us to understand that social science might be able to contribute to the critique of concepts that 
contribute to the maintenance of harmful social orders. The sum of these efforts is an 
understanding of harm in social terms rather than concepts received from social authorities. 
63 
 
In this regard, it allows us to understand the relationship between the object-adequacy of our 
accounts and their critical value; in providing more correct accounts of harm, we begin to see 
avenues for social change that might ameliorate it. While Marx’s arguments primarily 
concerned exploitation, Critical Theory sought to expand this story to encompass broader 
areas of social life. 
 In the view of the Critical Theorists, the broader implications of Marx’s argument 
after the industrial revolution became increasingly apparent as the revolution failed to 
materialise. The broader history of Western Marxism would be constituted by attempts to 
come to terms with this fact, as well as attempts to locate some other factor that might 
buttress the failed predictive power of Marx’s theory. In doing so, it reached beyond Marx’s 
stricter definition of the proletariat to ask broader questions concerning what is necessary for 
social orders to be possible, a question which continues to be fruitful for many of the theories 
we examined in the last chapter. The development of Critical Theory can be seen as a process 
of reflection upon the significance of Marx’s focus on the proletariat, ultimately rejecting 
these for a focus on a more contemporary historical context.  
 These later attempts to reconceptualise Marx’s work would attempt to revise the 
economic determinism and teleology of his approach by placing greater value on the 
subjective consciousness of the proletariat as a supplement to the focus on social 
contradiction, thus further emphasising the importance of concepts and ideas. However, if the 
ideas produced by a society reflect its means of production and the social position of the 
thinker, then it is viable to consider Marx’s science as much a reflection of his own time as it 
was expressive of some fundamental truth. This demonstrates the key problem of the 
positioned nature of knowledge production that Critical Theory was addressing. 
 For Marx, concepts of harm vary with historical situation, ensuring that it runs 
parallel and is linked to the process of historical change. If it is social being that determines 
consciousness, then subjects are bought into the world into definite conditions, some of 
which are harmful, and their awareness of this (and thus the possibility of addressing the 
problem) is determined by these conditions also.
175
 This includes the change from an 
individual’s recognition of the problem of exploitation to a far wider, indeed global, 
articulation of class consciousness in the face of alienation at what is, for Marx, the end of 
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pre-history. Prior to this event, we can say that knowledge is in some ways determined, thus 
serving to preserve social order as much as it can serve to destroy it. The rise of the Soviet 
Union in particular shows us that even with the best intentions and a focus on the exploitation 
of the most vulnerable in society, the authoritarian consequences that arose from the certainty 
of Marxist-inspired social movements place any attempt at theoretical extrapolation or 
prediction dangerous at best. These tensions lie at the core of the Frankfurt School project, to 
which we now turn. 
 
The Frankfurt School and the Objectivity of Harm 
 In attempting to grasp the brutal and violent outcomes of economic and social 
exploitation that characterised social order under capitalism, the theorists of the Frankfurt 
School placed the problem of harm at the centre of their enquiry. Following Marx, they 
sought to incorporate the objective dimension of suffering that went beyond its expression, of 
which harm can be understood as a socially recognised form. In this move, we see the 
foundation for later work such as Linklater’s, for whom the problem of harm operates as a 
problem-field drawn from the private experience of suffering and translated between subjects. 
While driven by normative evaluation, critical theories such as these tend toward a focus on 
objective social forces as a way of understanding the way that concepts are socially produced. 
Adorno’s claim that that philosophy ‘lives on because the time to realise it was missed’, 
placed at the very beginning of his magnum opus, can be seen to demonstrate this belief; the 
fate of theory can be understood only against the background of a world which moves beyond 
the social limits of subjective comprehension.
176
 While a concern with exploitation would 
continue in the work of the Institute, Horkheimer (as director) would put forward the more 
fundamental category of suffering as a key aspect of the normative problem that Critical 
Theory was concerned with, putting it forward in a visceral fashion that moves beyond 
economic concerns:  
“The only things that would remain unchanged through the ages are 
overpowering physical pain and all the extreme situations in which 
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man is no longer master of himself and is thrust out of his societally-
oriented spiritual existence back into nature.”177 
 As we saw with Marxism, Horkheimer’s understanding of historical experience 
concerns the way that subjects find themselves the recipients of a history that is not 
necessarily subject to the concepts held by the reasoning subject. Nature here can be 
understood as the myriad forms of determination (social and otherwise) which exist 
objectively beyond any historically-situated conceptual scheme. This sets up a framework by 
which suffering is characterised by an ultimately indescribable experience that is 
appropriated, however vaguely, by the process by which concepts of harm are negotiated. 
That this is a problem for Critical Theory demonstrates a key commitment to the problem of 
harm and its explanation, as well as an acknowledgement of the way that forms of suffering 
are ultimately knowable only through experience; it may reach beyond our ability to explain 
it in general terms. This seeming contradiction – between the private experience of suffering 
and the social conceptualisation of harm – outlines the ethical imperative of addressing the 
problem of harm despite the problems that might arise in doing so. It is both the case that we 
are driven to address the problem of harm, but also that the particularity of suffering gets lost 
in the process. 
 Horkheimer’s claim generalises the idea of suffering and ethical concern toward it in 
a way that moves beyond the triumphalism of particular ideologies, such as liberalism, 
communism or fascism. Key to this argument is the way that history had shown how societies 
could rationalise concentration camps, colonialism and atomic bomb to the point where the 
most unimaginable suffering became mere technology at the service of some arbitrary good. 
Following on from Marx’s analysis, the lives of the victims, conceived as subjects, had been 
reduced to relations between things in the manner that bureaucracy made imperative. Indeed, 
the aim was to highlight the suffering that was incumbent upon the increasing manipulation 
of nature that had been inaugurated by subjective reason: 
“The idealistic fable of the ruse of reason, which extenuates the 
horrors of the past by pointing to the good ends they served, actually 
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babbles out the truth: that blood and misery stick to the triumphs of 
society. The rest is ideology.” 178  
 We find here a further theme that would characterise the work of the Frankfurt 
School, and particularly that of Adorno and Horkheimer. Rather than nature being a 
romanticised and anthropocentric view of non-human nature, the concept here includes the 
social environment in a manner that highlights the received and reified nature of historical 
structures and situations that Sohn-Rethel would label ‘real abstractions’.179 This ‘second 
nature’ is a key element in their theorising that puts forward the way in which subjects are 
both part of, but not reducible to, the society in which they are situated. Subjective and 
societal (often considered ‘objective’ by Horkheimer) rationality cannot, therefore, be 
elided.
180
 Regardless of the demands of rationality upon the human subject, it is entirely 
possible for society to be, when considered as a whole, irrational. This irrationality can be 
seen in Marcuse’s analysis of the development of technological and industrial society.181 In 
such situations, the eccentric and unforeseen consequences of the broader social totality can 
be understood as having the functional status of ‘nature’ to the individual human subject and 
are not amenable to reason. 
 It is this lack of control that prompts Horkheimer to consider suffering, if not the 
category of harm per se, to be the category at the core of critical theory, serving to resist co-
option and maintain the possibility of social change.
182
 Prior to all ideology-inflected and 
abstract forms of knowledge, the idea of suffering as a foundational element of human 
experience can be understood as an example of Schopenhauer’s influence on Horkheimer’s 
philosophical development.
183
 The fundamental fact of history is that people die, whether for 
good reasons, bad reasons or, indeed, no reason at all.
184
 The essential point that is being 
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made here, in Adorno’s terms, is that theory must confront suffering as a fact of unreason in 
an apparently reasonable society. Thus far, suffering had escaped our understanding and led 
to horrific consequences in the process. His definition of suffering as ‘objectivity that weighs 
upon the subject’ allows us to contextualise the problem of harm historically as a struggle to 
encapsulate suffering within the concept of harm in the knowledge that previous attempts to 
do so had failed.
185
 However, the recognition of the suffering of others, appropriated in the 
concept of harm, remains a key point at which the impenetrability of social life can come to 
be filtered through the restraining force of moral concern.  
 This idea of solidarity, as with much of the work of the early Critical Theorists, was 
grounded upon a contradiction that was understood to be immanent to modern society. This 
was located in a difference between the emphatic concepts promised by ideology, and their 
technical implementation and rationalisation. The historic facts of the matter always fall short 
of their normative promise when put forward in historical circumstance, but their promise 
remained essential. The historical period in which these arguments were made once again 
bear the imprint of a biography that was witness to suffering on a previously unknown scale: 
‘The merciless structure of eternity could generate a community of 
the abandoned, just as injustice and terror in society result in the 
community of those who resist… If young people recognize the 
contradiction between the possibilities of human powers and the 
situation on this earth, and if they do not allow their view to be 
obscured either by nationalistic fanaticism or by theories of 
transcendental justice, identification and solidarity may be expected 
to become decisive in their lives.’186 
 The interest of Critical Theory lies in the way that the promise of such emphatic 
concepts is mediated through the knowledge practices of society. While the failure of the 
revolution dismissed the idea of a universal historical subject, it became clear that the 
objective suffering inherent to capitalist society was in some way obscured by the knowledge 
for which it formed the basis.
187
 This is a generalisation of the problem Marx engaged in 
above; the aim is to uncover the role of ideology in the constitution and integration of the 
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social form. This would allow the recognition of forms of suffering as harm, and thus pave 
the way for a reintroduction of ethical consideration into social life. 
 We can understand the agenda put forward by Critical Theory to be an approach to 
the problem of harm that focusses heavily on the dialectical mediation of the structural 
determination of social life and the concepts with which subjects approach it. This suggests a 
speculative approach to the problem of harm that was linked to the developmental Hegelian 
influence underpinning their efforts.
188
 In rejecting orthodox Marxist determinism, the 
Frankfurt School theorists instead focussed on the possibility that social science might 
leverage the difference between concepts and the reality of social life in a way that can 
highlight sites of normative engagement. At its core, it was clear that this was a broader 
relationship for the members of the Institute than it was for Marx; rather than class, the 
possibility of breaking through the reification of social life lay with the universality of 
suffering. This clearly highlights a potential avenue through which International Studies can 
relate to the problem of harm. However, in doing so, this avenue led Critical Theory to their 
logical conclusion – the threefold problematic laid out in the last chapter – with significant 
consequences for the way that we might approach the problem of harm. 
 
Knowledge and Experience in the Domination of Nature 
 The darkest turn taken by the theorists of the Frankfurt School is often considered to 
be Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment.189 In this extrapolation of the 
activities of labour and reason, the authors trace the forms of knowledge that characterise the 
process of science in order to understand the developing relationship between Enlightenment 
knowledge and domination. While Dialectic was and remains controversial, it represents the 
logical end-point of the thought of the Frankfurt School in a way that highlighted the 
consequences of alienation for the problem of harm. The core of this process involves 
questioning what it means to utilise reason against the background of a reality that pre-exists 
and determines the situation, and thus the possibilities, of social thought and ethical 
reflection. Examining the arguments of Dialectic, therefore, gives us an insight into the close 
relationship between thought and the world that was so essential to the contribution of 
Critical Theory in International Studies. 
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While Marx had drawn attention to the received nature of history, particularly with 
regard to the situation of the working class, Dialectic traces this back to a more fundamental 
stage in which the subject finds themselves located against the background of an unknown, 
dangerous and unpredictable nature. As such, the isolation of subjective reason, and therefore 
reification, serves as a preservation mechanism that instrumentalises nature in the service of 
survival while simultaneously providing the basis for further practices of domination and 
exclusion. The history this development is one that culminates in the historical ideology of 
the Enlightenment, as the point at which the domination of nature serves to sever the subject 
from the limitations of mythical thought. In the example of Francis Bacon, the authors find 
the continuation of a rationalisation process which reveals the ‘radio as a sublimated printing 
press, the dive bomber as a more effective form of artillery’.190 The development of reason in 
the form of instrumental science can be understood only as a method of control which holds 
no boundary sacred. While developments in rationalisation can be justified in their own 
terms, Dialectic seeks to situate this against the background of the sphere of nature in order to 
contrast the increasing separation of instrumental and objective reason. 
It is precisely this process that provokes the self-destruction of the normative promise 
held out by the Enlightenment, the freedom from a world that dominated the subject in 
unknown and unpredictable ways.
191
 In locating the driver of reason in the isolated subject, 
Enlightenment reason sowed the seeds for the use of technology as a means for the 
domination of subjects over each other. In depending upon subjective reason, the subject is 
capable only of categorisation such that the essence of the object, including that which might 
form the basis for reconciliation, lies out of view. Meanwhile, the compulsion to control and 
to manipulate leads one to ever greater attempts at grasping otherness in its entirety, which 
both lends greater degrees of control and technology and haunts the process of reason 
because of its basis in unknown nature.
192
 At each stage, the subject finds themselves 
supported by another layer of myth that must be destroyed, a pressure which is driven by the 
location of reason itself within a concrete historical situation which forms an 
unacknowledged historical context lying objectively beyond the definitional activities of 
subjects.  
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 While this short outline fails to do justice to the broader themes of the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, it highlights the manner in which it is possible for concepts to fail in their 
attempt to grasp reality; the potential for object-adequate explanation becomes limited to the 
extent that the concept of harm becomes separated from the experience of suffering that it 
attempts to describe. In reasoning from the position of a supposedly-isolated subject, the 
pattern of knowledge changes from one in which objective factors are inseparable from those 
of subjective concern to one in which the possibilities inherent in the object are limited to 
those amenable to instrumental rationality. Where the ends of social action were previously 
justified through their relationship to an idea of the absolute good – whether God or an 
ordered society – the focus is now one in which individual self-preservation is the ultimate 
arbiter of success.
193
 The development of subjective reason as a guiding principle thus leads 
to subjects’ separation from the historical processes that they contribute to; while gaining the 
ability to manipulate nature, they are nonetheless tied up in practices of domination. The 
experience of suffering, in Critical Theory, therefore retains the potential to break outside of 
established categories in a way that serves to threaten the basis of falsely universalised 
knowledge. The argument of the Dialectic therefore results in a formulation of the kind of 
exclusion that we saw toward gender and indigenous groupings in the first chapter; moreover, 
it provides a generalisable framework to understand how the contributions of these accounts 
to the problem of harm are precluded. Furthermore, it suggests that by highlighting the 
genuine experience of suffering subjects, a fuller understanding of the problem of harm might 
be realised. 
 
History and Myth 
 The majority of the wide-ranging scope of Dialectic of Enlightenment is put forward 
through an analysis of myth, the themes of which can be understood as mediating between 
the attempt to provide definitions through reason and the unexamined ideas subjects receive. 
This runs parallel to the role that we have suggested social science plays in examining, and 
re-examining, our concepts of harm such that their relationship to suffering can be understood 
more clearly. After philosophy ‘missed its moment’ of affirmation, Adorno in particular 
would push his critique of concepts beyond that of Marx, rejecting any affirmation of 
concepts and attempting to demonstrate how the autonomy of the Enlightenment individual 
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was always socially determined by ritual and myth.
194
 In line with Marx’s critical theory 
however, the aim remained one of showing the historical nature of ideas that were assumed to 
be natural, and thus a destabilisation of the epistemic authority held by the status quo. In the 
context of the threefold problematic, this approach allows us to understand Critical Theory as 
a process of reflection upon the social and historical nature of our ideas of harm; despite the 
authority of scientific knowledge, it does not argue from a position of impartiality but always 
reflects patterns of domination. 
 Conceptual thought for the Frankfurt School consists of subjective reason that is 
objectified in historical context, operating as an abstraction and objectification of the aspects 
of experience that it seeks to appropriate. The essence of conceptual thought, therefore, is the 
promise of freedom from the pure determination of natural existence, but at the same time the 
developing means of domination; it is both the case that concepts free us, but also that they 
aid in our restraint.
195
 In Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of the Odyssey, there was 
nothing other than conceptual thought that could preserve Odysseus in the face of inhuman 
nature, but utilising such constitutes a renunciation of the fullness of experience in order to 
preserve the self. .
196
 This, they argue, is the prototype of the bourgeois individual, who 
recognises the rational content present in the rituals of self-preservation while denying their 
specifically exotic nature: 
“However, when he encounters primeval powers that are neither 
domesticated nor etiolated, he doesn’t find it so easy. He can never 
engage in direct conflict with the exotically surviving mythic 
forces, but has to recognize the status of the sacrificial ceremonies 
in which he is constantly involved – he dare not contravene them 
[…] The fact that the old sacrifice itself had in the meantime 
become irrational is to the intelligence of the weaker party the 
mere, acceptable idiocy of ritual. The letter of its law is strictly 
observed. But the now meaningless sentence contradicts itself in 
that its very ordinance always provides for its own dissolution. The 
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very spirit that dominates nature repeatedly vindicates the 
superiority of nature in competition. All bourgeois enlightenment is 
one in the requirement of sobriety and common sense – a proficient 
estimate of the ratio of forces.”197 
The analysis of myth here reveals the account as one that is truly dialectical; the 
bourgeois individual is one who navigates nature through progressive rationalisation while 
at the same time finding themselves constantly entwined within it, unwittingly part of the 
broader sweep of history while being concerned only with the present and particular. The 
seeds of freedom from mythology are also, then, the continuation of domination over ones 
natural basis in the form of renunciation.
198
 In elaborating upon the enlightenment as myth, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment provides us with a way of understanding the relationship of post-
enlightenment society as involved in strategies of domination that extend to concepts 
themselves. In the context of the problem of harm, a focus on the object adequacy of our 
accounts is necessary but insufficient; concepts themselves can serve as a source of 
unacknowledged suffering in light of our attempts to grasp it. This forces us to constantly 
reconsider our relationship to developmental ideas of scientific development. 
 
Situating Harm and Suffering 
 The outline of the approach put forward above demonstrates the intertwining of 
history and instrumental reason in conceptual thought; as in the first chapter, the critical 
theorists repeatedly highlighted the changing background against which the problem of harm 
occurs. While we can understand suffering as the ethical driving force of Critical Theory, the 
concept of harm is something historical, an abstraction founded on the appropriation of 
particular social relations. This starting point is evident from historical change, in which 
conceptions of harm found in different times and spaces are clearly conceived according to 
the subjective interpretation of the social form and mediated through its objectivity.
199
 The 
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critique of ideology, from Marx onwards, has served to highlight that this occurs in a 
particular way.
200
 
 The key point to make here is that the positing of a conception of harm operates 
through a process of identity thinking – Adorno’s term for definition in terms of concepts. 
This serves to reify an object by rendering it equivalent with its limited conceptual 
formulation based on the reasoning process of the subject.
201
 While the social category of 
harm is prompted by the objective experience of suffering, it does not encompass all 
possible experiences of suffering as such. The attempt to define a social category thus 
remains at the mercy of historical change through which the limitation of subjective 
concept-formation is revealed; harm develops in new ways that evades our concepts. The 
way in which subjective thought affirms itself – its positive moment – pushes beyond 
conceptual identity and necessarily incorporates that which is not permitted by its own 
definition; both the fullest content of subjective expression and the natural basis of thought 
are renounced but remain as a residuum that haunts the category as its potential 
overcoming.
202
 In this regard, having made the promise of a life free of suffering in the 
concept of harm, we are then haunted by its persistence. This bears strong parallels to our 
examination of the problem of harm in International Studies; in responding to the suffering 
caused by war, and repeatedly returning to the problem of harm, the discipline would seem 
to be orbiting around the way in which suffering changes and escapes definition. As Adorno, 
then, we might suggest that the importance of approaching the problem of harm through 
Critical Theory lies in breaking through this haunting while acknowledging the necessary 
role of the positioning of social science in this process.
203
  
 Horkheimer in particular would retain the idea that bourgeois ideas continued to hold 
some value.
204
 In particular, the enlightenment itself, despite the partial and doctrinaire 
character of its emergence, nonetheless reflects the impulse toward the rejection of myth that 
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is characteristic of the drive toward freedom.
205
 However, the limited nature of identity 
thinking ensures that the historical manifestation of a given concept cannot fulfil its content 
short of its historical overcoming. By way of example, the sociohistorical conditions that 
allow for the rise of the bourgeois conception of freedom are precisely those that repress the 
universal expression of that value – i.e. the recognition of freedom’s objective value against 
the totality rather than merely its subjective idealisation.
206
 The promise constituted by ideals, 
such as the principle that we might one day be free from harm is always betrayed by 
compromise when they come to be practically manifested.  
 Critical Theory contributes to our thinking about the problem of harm by theorising 
the way that the fullness of utopian concepts in terms of normative ambition pushes us to 
study the way in which they fall short of this promise in concrete terms. The idea of a critical 
theory is, therefore, to highlight the objective grounding that underpins the hope found in 
concepts, and to open up a space from which we can consider the ways in which they are 
disappointed. The problem of harm, in the fashion we have put forward, is an empirically 
recurrent example of this disappointment in social life. From the point of view of Critical 
Theory we therefore argue that a thoroughgoing mediation of subject and object, experience 
and abstract category, can help us understand the promise held out by the concept of harm 
and the problems with the way in which it is abstracted. This is in line with Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s emphasis on the explosion of the concept by way of truth as such, while 
famously resisting the temptation to posit the point at which the burden of suffering might be 
redeemed.
207
 In understanding the problem of harm in this way, International Studies 
constitutes a social scientific attempt to close the gap between experience and concepts; the 
continuing vitality of the problem of harm lies both in the continuous development of more 
responsive forms of harm and the changing forms of suffering to which they refer. 
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The Problem of Harm and the Universal 
 The locus of the Frankfurt School’s contribution to the study of forms of harm, and 
indeed to philosophy and social theory more generally, consists in an account of the division 
between concepts and objects, or the subject/object relationship, that is rigorously dialectical. 
Concepts of harm arising from social life can be differentiated from forms of suffering while 
still maintaining a relationship to it through a process of mediation. This allows us to 
understand the ways in which theory has attempted to grasp the problem of harm through 
ever greater complexity and attempts at revision; this is the point at which we noted the 
discipline of International Studies as involved in a conversation, rather than espousing 
entirely original positions. Pushing beyond this, we can see that the relationship of the 
resulting concepts to the world is inadequate to the fullness of experience; a division which is 
both allows them to emerge and constitutes the residuum which serves to undermine their 
permanence in the face of historical change. The impulse toward the amelioration of harm in 
this case becomes the point at which any particular historically-delimited definition or 
understanding comes to be surpassed. The way in which one might approach this pressure 
cannot operate, in the Hegelian sense, through a refinement and synthetic attitude towards 
what is known, but rather through the ‘weight’ of the partially comprehended object, the 
preponderance of which can be felt only through its haunting of what appears to be given to 
us.
208
 The achievement of Critical Theory, in this sense, is to undermine the way that any 
definition that we might put forward can perfectly encapsulate the concept of harm. 
Nonetheless, that IS continues to return to the problem of harm demonstrates its continuing 
adherence to that normative goal; rather than taking the ‘easy way out’ in defining harm 
away, it has maintained the concept of harm as a normative promise which pushes the 
discipline towards continuous adaptation to the changing object of suffering. This suggests 
that the threefold problematic is not a problem that can be answered, but rather one to be 
consistently reflected upon in order to maintain the vitality of the discipline’s contribution to 
the problem of harm. 
Despite the breadth of philosophical reflection that characterises the work of the 
Frankfurt School, a concern with how this related to the reality of social life consistently 
provided the grounds against which Critical Theory was to measure itself.
209
 While simple 
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theory-testing was not embraced, the varied work that was conducted using fairly traditional 
methods by members of the Institute certainly helped to modify and alter Critical Theory.
210
 
Indeed, while the relationship between theory and fact was the subject of debate, it was 
broadly the case that facts provided by survey and empirical investigation could be 
understood as a way of illuminating the broader totality of which they were a part.
211
 This 
element of totality indicates the extent to which the Institute considered itself subject to its 
own practical injunction for philosophy to be ‘a part of the philosophical and religious 
attempts to reinsert hopeless individual existence once again into the womb or – to speak 
with Sombart – in the ‘golden ground’ of meaningful totalities.’212In this process, we can see 
a reflection of the debate-led attitude that International Studies holds toward the problem of 
harm in which approaches always operate in a broader disciplinary context. The ‘reinsertion’ 
of academic work in this regard is the point at which theory and practice become 
interchangeable, and through which the discipline’s contribution to the problem of harm 
becomes manifest in broader social life. However, for Critical Theory, this process is not a 
straightforward positive contribution, but rather becomes part of the process of 
rationalisation through which the concepts produced in social science might contribute 
further to practices of domination. 
 The often sweeping statements by members of the Institute, including the dark and 
seemingly pessimistic prognostications of Dialectic of Enlightenment can be understood as 
tentative but totalising in a manner that attempted to reflect historical conditions in which the 
Holocaust and the Atomic bomb were within living memory. Adorno’s rigid adherence to 
epistemological investigation in a context where technology was both contributing to higher 
standards of life and becoming ever more destructive can in this regard be seen in his 
remarkably consistent impulse toward thinking with and against concepts, rather than 
attempting to explode them altogether.
213
 This strategy rests on the belief that intellectual 
effort is capable of discerning broader trends and possibilities in social life by abstracting 
from the irreducible nature of individual suffering. If this is true then the critical theorist, in 
engaging with concepts, has the role of redeeming the value that concepts such as harm hold 
for social life. While Adorno would consistently hold on to the possibility of truth in concepts 
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even if one were to happen on it accidentally, he would portray the triumphalism of Hegel – 
who claimed to know that this had been reached – as willing toward process of domination. It 
is the act of positing such a definition as a whole, immune to reflection and revision, which 
was the ultimate form of identity thinking and which could not bear out in history.
214
 The 
concept of totality, which indicates that society should be considered as a whole, does not 
automatically lead to the idea that it can be understood; rather, it operates as a normative 
injunction which prevents us from claiming absolute validity for our concepts. 
 In highlighting the relationship between historical change and the recognition of 
suffering in Critical Theory, we are able to clarify the threefold problematic that is its 
characteristic form of engagement in IS. While we have argued that IS persistently engages 
with the problem of harm as a core concern, the more general arguments that characterise 
Critical Theory in the discipline are often articulated in terms that do not feature the 
characteristic preoccupation with suffering that we have seen in the work of Adorno and 
Horkheimer. In showing the starting point of these arguments to be a concern with finitude 
and human suffering, we have therefore attempted to demonstrate that the problem of harm 
forms an irreducible element of the role that Critical Theory has played in debates more 
widely. In this sense, it clarifies the way in which the critical theorists understood the role of 
concept-formation and revision to be deeply intertwined with an ethical stance toward the 
world through which they might contribute to the amelioration of harmful practices and 
forms of social organisation. This intertwined nature can be understood in terms of the 
threefold problematic: 
-  The problem of object adequacy: In arguing that suffering was the condition of all 
truth, Adorno tied the production of knowledge the problem of harm by placing the 
value of concepts in relation to their ability to express the experience of suffering 
subjects. This means that in working toward more object-adequate concepts, Critical 
Theory simultaneously works toward a more nuanced and comprehensive 
understanding of suffering that has its corollary in the problem of harm. 
- The problem of critical value: In placing the value of concepts in their ability to 
express suffering, Critical Theory highlights the way in which their practical upshot 
consists of their utility in recognising, addressing and ameliorating suffering in social 
life; the process that we have put forward as the problem of harm. 
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- The problem of reflexivity: In emphasising the work of philosophy and social science 
as a process, rather than as simply providing answers, Critical Theory highlights ways 
in which concepts become inadequate and are revised in turn. More particularly, it 
also brings to light the idea that theory is a practice; to the extent that concepts 
become static or reified, they have the potential to contribute to the continuation of 
suffering. 
For Critical Theory, these relationships are not incidental, but express a deeper 
relationship between the necessity of thought and the suffering of subjects that arises from the 
deeply normative nature of social life. In this way, we can consider the kind of work done in 
IS to be faced with demands arising from its position in relation to suffering. The activity we 
engage in when we address the problem of harm is, therefore, explanatory and ethical at the 
same time. It is explanatory because we seek to account for the various ways in which 
suffering is caused and perpetuated, and ethical because it is targeted at a change of 
behaviour that is held as a promise by the concept itself. More generally, the problem of 
reflexivity raises the possibility that these explanatory-ethical accounts can themselves be 
suffused with the asymmetry that is associated with social relations; they have tendencies and 
affinities with regard to distributions of power. The question of how the social scientist 
should orient themselves to the problem of harm articulated in this fashion is one that is 
characterised by this close relationship between suffering and the production of knowledge. 
However, while allowing us to better understand what is at stake in the problem of harm, the 
persistent negation that was characteristic of Critical Theory takes us to the very limit of what 
is possible in epistemology. 
 
Chastened Identity 
 The dynamics that Critical Theory identified suggests that in examining the historical 
development of concepts, it may be possible to develop new ones that are better able to 
express the experience of suffering subjects. However, this process has a second aspect; 
concepts have a general tendency to contribute to patterns of instrumental control. This 
means that gains in our ability to address the problem of harm simultaneously arise the 
possibility that the discipline might contribute to its continuation. For Critical Theory, this 
rests on equivalence as the fundamental property that characterises conceptual thought. This 
problem can be seen in the concept of harm; in generalising the particularities of suffering 
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into a form that can be communicated and act as a grounds for explanation and solidarity, we 
abandon the historical specificity of suffering that is, from the perspective of Critical Theory, 
irreducible. It is this reduction of differences of kind to differences of quantity that is key to 
technical thought and measurement, allowing us to solve particular problems while remaining 
blind to others. The Dialectic of Enlightenment suggests that we can understand this as a 
property of abstraction: 
“The blessing that the market does not enquire after one’s birth is 
paid for by the barterer, in that he models the potentialities that are 
his by birth on the production of the commodities that can be 
bought in the market. Men were given their individuality as unique 
in each case, different to all others, so that it might all the more 
surely be made the same as any other. […] Abstraction, the tool of 
enlightenment, treats its objects as did fate, the notion of which it 
rejects: it liquidates them.”215 
 The role of Critical Theory in this context is to act as a constant reminder of the 
irreducibility of suffering in the face of the appropriating power of concepts. It is at this point 
that formulating the threefold problematic purely as a set of problems for knowledge 
production becomes inadequate; it is the way that these issues relate to suffering that is the 
real issue for attempts to engage with the problem of harm. However, in placing such a high 
value on the normative significance of suffering, each aspect of the threefold problematic is 
accentuated to an extreme degree. Ultimately, this leads to an understanding of the problem 
of harm as a demand that is to be redeemed in full, or not at all. 
 In the case of this all-or nothing strategy, the problem of object adequacy serves to 
highlight the experience of suffering as essentially unreachable, but furthermore becomes 
framed in such a way that suggests that any failure to reach such an impossible goal is 
nothing other than a betrayal of the promise that the problem of harm holds. Rather, 
philosophical reflection subsumes social scientific activity such that the problem of 
reflexivity – of exorcising authoritarian and violent tendencies – becomes the only possible 
activity for those who reflect on the nature of suffering. Moreover, it does so without any 
guarantee of success. This, naturally, entirely precludes the redemption of critical value due 
to the hopeless specificity of suffering and the potentially violent consequences of 
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intervention. This framing, needless to say, forces us to understand the problem of harm in 
such a way that the potential contribution that social science could make in this area becomes 
almost entirely unworkable. Indeed, the consequence is that very little of the problem of harm 
remains at all. 
 The relentless manner in which Adorno investigated ways to balance these 
commitments would push through the various layers of epistemology, leading to his 
circumscription of irreducible suffering through a process of repeatedly negating the social 
element of concepts. This was aimed at recovering the germ – the truth content – of the non-
identity of suffering such that its emphatic promise could be maintained.
216
 The culmination 
of Critical Theory lies in this critique of identity, under which philosophy both can’t and must 
go on.
217
 On the basis that we are unable ever to resolve the gulf between concepts of harm 
and the experience of suffering, engagement with the problem of harm in IS is hopeless in an 
all but absolute sense. While it may be possible to negate existing understandings in order to 
work toward more adequate concepts of harm, acts of definition serve the perpetuation of 
suffering to the same extent that they work against it.  
 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment in Historical Context 
 The pessimism of Adorno and Horkheimer leads us to a point where it may seem 
rational to abandon the problem of harm entirely. This, however, would not allow us any 
understanding of how the discipline might engage with it more productively. The historical 
context of Dialectic of Enlightenment, we suggest, provides a further perspective which 
allows us to make the most of the insights that Critical Theory provides while keeping the 
desperation of its authors in perspective. This begins with an acknowledgement that the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment does not exhaust the contribution that Critical Theory can make; 
this much is clear from the two threads of the school that follow from the work of Adorno 
and Marcuse.
218
 The culmination of Adorno’s work with the necessity of persistent negation 
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clearly leads to a sense of precarity that overwhelms the possibility of an emancipatory 
outcome, and thus the practical utility of a normative core to social science. In this regard, 
reflexivity overwhelms the possibility of critical value. Correspondingly, the willingness of 
Marcuse to ally himself with the student movement and the revolts of 1968 demonstrated the 
possibility of philosophy’s practical involvement with political and social movements. 
However, the appropriation of this movement into lifestyles and commodified social activity 
undermined the long-term or revolutionary impact that was intended. The ‘Great Refusal’, 
while inspirational to activists that took their inspiration from Marcuse’s work, failed to 
create a new solidarity that was capable of refusing the temptations of capitalist social order 
despite the best of intentions.
219
 
 These consequences can be seen as illuminating the possibility that social scientific 
work, despite being driven by motivations such as the problem of harm, can come to be 
subsumed under the broader auspices of social life, particularly capitalism. The resulting falls 
short of the promise held out by harm as an emphatic concept, but are susceptible to co-
optation, only partially fulfilling the normative content they hold out. The work of Adorno 
and Marcuse can be seen as two sides of the same coin, with Adorno operating with the 
pessimism that comes with a high level of generality, and Marcuse retaining his positive 
focus by working through the contradictions of daily social life in its more particular guise. 
The viability of Critical Theory depended on them both being present; a conclusion that is 
often omitted by the focus placed on the Dialectic of Enlightenment and Negative Dialectics 
in which the possibility of positive social action is precluded.
220
 Adorno’s focus on the self-
destruction of the Enlightenment seems to miss the converse side of its own argument – that 
there lies, in the processes of daily social life, points at which the possibility of this promise 
come to life and are accentuated. The impossibilities and demands that the void between 
suffering and the concept of harm present us with might tempt us to give up on the project of 
negotiating between the two, but the promise held out by the problem of harm, as it is present 
in social life, remains. It is, therefore, still important to consider how the problem of harm can 
be investigated at the level of empirical social science, a realm seemingly removed from 
                                                                                                                                                        
between them, see ‘Letters Between Adorno and Marcuse Debate 60s Student Activism’, Critical-Theory. For 
an introduction: Esther Leslie, ‘Introduction to Adorno/Marcuse Correspondence.’, New Left Review, 1999. 
219
 Marcuse considers the power of refusal as ‘the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period.’ 
Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 257. 
220
 The extent to which Marx’s ‘technocratic moment’, through which the contradictions of Capital would be 
elevated to the state of revolutionary possibility, remains a question of the necessary stage of the productive 
apparatus is a question still being asked today. 
82 
 
Adorno’s highly abstract ‘ontology of the wrong state of things’.221 In doing so, we can begin 
to examine the ways that more concrete investigations of the problem of harm found in IS 
operate in light of the formulation put forward by Critical Theory. Such an effort is aimed at 
examining the implications of the tension put forward in this chapter, and understanding the 
productive tensions that arise in the shadow of Critical Theory’s pessimistic speculative 
history. 
 One reason to continue the work of Critical Theory in light of the problem of harm is 
due to the susceptibility of their optimism or pessimism to the critiques that the Frankfurt 
School themselves levelled at Marx; the proscriptions that followed the philosophical 
analyses of the Institute are, in many ways, historically delineated.
222
 Such critiques aim at 
chastening the almost theological fervour with which Adorno and Horkheimer focussed on 
the fact of suffering and which informed the constellation of the threefold problematic they 
employed. While arguing that it was necessary to maintain a link between the methods of his 
forebears and concrete investigation such as sociology, Honneth would qualify the arguments 
of the early Frankfurt School as providing potentially ‘world disclosing’ arguments that 
necessitate our viewing the polemic arguments of Adorno and Horkheimer through a 
historical lens. In embedding their normative focus prior to any particular investigation, he 
argued, their ability to abstract and exaggerate was a key strategy in evoking a normative 
response. It is not that their accounts needed to be empirically true, but normatively valid 
concerns, thus allowing them to open ‘new horizons of meaning within which it can show the 
extent to which given circumstances have a pathological character.’223 In this context, we can 
understand Dialectic of Enlightenment as a cautionary text that reveals the darkest tendencies 
of modern life beyond their particular manifestations.  
In some respects, this way of thinking about the possibility of critical engagement has 
been justified by work that has also, but to a less extreme degree, sought to understand 
political extremes such as Fascism as a political outcome that is intrinsically tied to the 
patterns of domination that are facilitated by the development of capitalism and 
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individualism.
224
 As we saw in the introduction, the periodic extremes of social development 
and the harm that it produces have become increasingly more evident, despite the way in 
which liberals have neglected the harm that can be produced by social structure.
225
 Events 
such as numerous financial crises, the development of a world order in which new drugs are 
produced according to the whim of the market, nuclear proliferation and the disasters at 
Chernobyl and Fukushima were understood in Critical Theory as internally related outcomes 
of a conceptual paradigm that accepts economic growth and confrontational power structures 
as the normal order of things in international politics and the global economy. The world 
disclosing power of Critical Theory attempts to explain and reveal such tendencies in a way 
that is sensitive to the violence that can be done by fixed conceptual apparatuses. It does so, 
however, in a manner which is less practical than it is aesthetic, presenting new challenges to 
theory due to the way in which avenues for meaning are opened up in particular cases. 
However, it is also the case that the rejection of any particular solution to the problem 
of harm serves to undermine the credibility of general theorising itself. We have seen that 
Critical Theory removed many of the grounds from which a practical engagement with the 
problem of harm is possible. However, in a continuation of the pattern through which theory 
would be reassessed historically, from Kant to Hegel and onto Marx and the Frankfurt 
School, Habermas’ later contribution attempted to bypass this problem by putting forward the 
argument that progress in the sphere of communication could be discerned in the liberal 
development of the welfare state and the public sphere.
226
 Theoretically, this proceeded from 
a critique of the Frankfurt School’s focus on the sphere of labour, which he argued 
overwhelmed the drive toward truth that was inherent in communication. In this, he re-
opened the possibility of moral development within communication communities, and thus 
the idea that we saw throughout the discipline of International Studies: that it is the 
conversation, not the concept, which matters in the ethical stance taken by social science. If 
this is the case, then an examination of his framework allows us to situate the forms of 
knowledge that are produced by such interventions. 
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Habermas and the Consensual Truth of Moral Change 
 While there is little room to discuss Habermas’ considerable oeuvre here, the 
trajectory of his work highlights the recursive nature by which theory is able to reflect on 
itself in attempts to find new avenues for the development of concepts.
227
 Habermas proposed 
that the faculty of communication provided a means through which human subjects could 
understand each other as sharing fundamental interests in moral change; this would present 
an inherent interest and capacity in considering the problem of harm in an open fashion. 
This, as we shall see, can be understood as important to Linklater’s later interrogation of the 
problem of harm in the discipline of IS. This operated as a transcendental analysis that would 
locate the moral truth of accounts in their intersubjective nature, rather than in abstraction as 
a form of alienated social labour; an analysis that he termed universal pragmatics.
228
 While he 
acknowledged the importance of system integration, through which society was able to 
reproduce itself in terms of socially necessary labour, social integration serves to manufacture 
consensus based on the shared communicative interest in truth, rightness and truthfulness.
229
 
 For this to be the case, it is necessary to demonstrate the manner in which efforts at 
reflexivity can be ascertained intersubjectively and overcome the problematic limits imposed 
by the positioned and historical nature of knowledge production. Habermas characterised this 
through his study of the bourgeois public sphere, which he understood as an attempt to isolate 
free discussion and consensus building from the forces of systemic rationalisation.
230
 On this 
model, it was possible for a communicatively agreed consensus to reign in the excesses of the 
system through a communicatively achieved consensus focussed on patterns of restraint in 
social action. In this regard, such consensuses can be seen as the basis for harm conventions. 
This form of knowledge formation is characterised as emancipatory by Habermas because it 
is derived from a different interest to that of science or interpretation. His three forms of 
human interest: empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic and emancipatory are drawn from 
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the various interests that active and reflexive subjects have in the world.
231
 The empirical-
analytic function found in the various forms of what we have come to know as science are 
limited due to the now familiar critique of positivism; the struggle to dominate nature as was 
found in the work of the early Frankfurt School. The historical-hermeneutic interest operates 
as a veiled extension of this possibility, acknowledging positionality while still attempting to 
derive some degree of generalisation in support of the first.
232
 While seeking to acknowledge 
the importance of historical conditioning, it nonetheless attempts to taxonomise these 
determinations in what amounts to an extension of the scientific attitude towards the 
naturalised condition of human subjects in their many times and localities.  
 The third form, however, recognises and seeks to transcend the limitations of 
particularity based on the reflexive acknowledgement of fundamental commonalities between 
varying forms of life. In this, we find a drive toward the kind of cosmopolitan outcomes that 
would not distinguish between insiders and outsiders in formulating harm conventions. 
Located beyond instrumental control, the aim is to outline the construction of a situation in 
which the interest in normative development such as a harm principle can be bought to the 
fore. In a transcendental fashion, Habermas attempts to lay out what might be the case for 
such a situation to be possible by retreating from the individual as the site of moral 
development and a focus on intersubjective communication. This ‘ideal speech situation’ is 
the regulative ideal through which we can aim at a transcendence of particularistic forms of 
thinking. Utilising the metaphor of psychoanalytic therapy, Habermas demonstrates the way 
in which the collective denaturalisation of social conditions could operate as a force for the 
collective reconstruction of rational forms of social practice.
233
 The principle of reciprocity, 
through which Kant’s subject would render universal only those principle under which she 
would live, is demonstrated to be the basis of a truly democratic and consensual decision 
making process that would maximise the responsiveness of concepts such as harm that 
Habermas’ forebears had considered foreclosed.234 Democracy and communication, 
therefore, offer the possibility of a social science that is both capable of engaging with the 
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problem of harm and making sure that it is measured consistently against the empirical 
experience of subjects. 
 
The Impracticality of Reason 
 Habermas, as is fitting for an inheritor of the Frankfurt School legacy, of course is 
sceptical that such an ideal situation could ever pertain in practice. There are two reasons for 
this to be the case that bear on our discussion. Firstly, the idealism of Habermas’ procedural 
form of critique is not likely to pertain unless the conditions for its institution are already met 
by prevailing historical conditions – the problem we saw with his predecessors with regard to 
co-optation and subsumption under capital. In the context of a critical theory that is intended 
to orient itself toward the problem of harm, we need to examine reflexively the position that 
theory takes in the world; a position that is to some degree historically determined and path-
dependent. Cutting more deeply than this, however, is the suggestion that undamaged life 
cannot be conceptualised by life that is already ‘damaged’ or alienated in the sense that 
Adorno would claim.
235
 While Habermas would move away from the critique of alienation as 
grounds for extensive social critique, it nonetheless remains the case that an alienated 
existence is constitutive of that area of social action that is necessarily teleological and aimed 
toward the reproduction of society. That Critical Theory does not occupy such a position, and 
is able to comprehend a given historical situation in an object-adequate fashion, is by no 
means guaranteed. The practical implications of Habermas’ theory thus rest on the dichotomy 
between the system and the lifeworld, critiques of which on the basis of exclusion have been 
decisive.
236
 The thoroughgoing mediation of social relations that had been noted by the first 
generation of the Frankfurt School remains, described by Habermas in his concept of the 
‘colonisation’ of the lifeworld.  
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 Despite the internal consistency of Habermas’ argument, the contention regarding his 
theoretical apparatus is most apparent at the point where the system and the lifeworld 
intersect, and thus the way in which the form of engagement that we understand as the 
problem of harm is guided or determined by imperatives toward social reproduction. While 
he identifies a democratic situation in which we might cooperate to better understand the 
problem of harm, this only seems to work if Critical Theory occupies a social space that is 
able to transcend in some regards the imperative toward the rationalisation of knowledge 
production along the lines of system integration. Indeed, Habermas’ reformulation of the 
principles of rationalisation bears significant parallels to that of his predecessors in 
accounting for social change: 
“Capitalism is defined by a mode of production that not only poses 
this problem [that of the constant development of productive forces] 
but also solves it. It provides a legitimation of domination which is no 
longer called down from the lofty heights of cultural tradition but 
instead summoned up from the base of social labour. The institution of 
the market, in which private property owners exchange commodities 
[…] promises that exchange relations will be and are just owing to 
equivalence.”237 
 Habermas considers the beginning of modernisation as the point at which traditional 
patterns of legitimation, the beginning of patterns of domination, lose their power ‘as myth, 
as public religion, as customary ritual, as justifying metaphysics, as unquestionable 
tradition.’238 As such, a process of rationalisation is able to take place based on an immanent 
logic that may not be sensitive to something as basic as the problem of harm, but obeys its 
own functional imperatives. Residual authority structures in the system of production and 
distribution are questioned on their contribution to the achievement of such a logic, with the 
chastening effects of critique operating as a counter to this rather than an overcoming of such 
a logic itself. This may be understood as giving too much ground to the process of 
rationalisation over the area of normative concern. 
 The legitimate question would, then, appear to be the point at which this process of 
rationalisation ends and the process of intersubjective negotiation begins. Habermas 
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considers this separation as a move away from Parsons, arguing that the systems-theory of 
societal reproduction could not be self-sufficient due to the way in which ‘the components of 
the lifeworld are merely internal differentiations of this subsystem, which specifies the 
parameters of societal self-maintenance.’239 Habermas demonstrated this process of 
separation in his study of the bourgeois public sphere, which served as a way in which 
rational debate and conversation could be conducted in a manner which was not restricted by 
the action imperatives of reproduction. In such a situation, it is argued, reflexive agents can 
arrive at a consensual basis from which to address the problems posed by society, including 
that of harm, in a way that takes into account the broadest possible array of dialogic claims 
toward an idea of truth that holds ethical content. 
 However, the sociological account that describes how this might be the case is not at 
all clear. Habermas’ functionalism with regard to modes of system integration appears to be 
acceptable in the context of a socially integrative bourgeois public sphere, but appears to 
merely register protest against historical situations in which such a free dialogic situation is 
not present. With regard to this possibility, Habermas proceeds to a thesis through which the 
lifeworld can be ‘colonised’ by the system in a manner which serves to undermine attempts at 
their separation.
240
 In an important respect, therefore, we find that despite Habermas’ success 
in putting forward some moral basis for critique, he encounters the problem of historical 
conditions at the same point as did the sanguine analysis put forward by Adorno and 
Horkheimer. In short, the search for an ‘authentic’ form of communication that is 
characteristic of the idea of social science as a sphere of debate becomes increasingly 
impeded by the mounting problem that communication too operates in an already-existing 
nexus of power/knowledge relationships.  
 Despite Habermas’ attempted grounding of Critical Theory, his formulation falls 
subject to critiques that are able to demonstrate the way in which his analysis is, in turn, 
historically grounded such that it privileges particular forms of social organisation such as 
liberalism. The persistence of the problems that Critical Theory has presented, then, points us 
once again toward the importance of empirical investigations into the problem of harm so that 
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we might better ground the concerns raised by philosophy. This places great weight on our 
ability to investigate the species of historical situation that Habermas considers as raising the 
problem of internal colonisation, and to do this in an object-adequate fashion. In the context 
of social science, Habermas’ formulation of critical value and reflexivity can be seen as 
operating in a way that neglects the problem of object adequacy through which we might 
better understand the social structures and tendencies that characterise the lived experience of 
the problem of harm. As was the case with the first generation of the Frankfurt School, the 
problem of a ‘totally administered society’ in which forms of domination may not be 
apparent raises the question of whether critique is immediately prefigured by the structural 
and historical situation and its implications for the subject/object relationship, thus colonising 
our conceptual frameworks.
241
 
 
Conclusion: The Problem of Harm in the Context of Modernity 
 In presenting a reading of Critical Theory that is focussed on the implications it has 
for the problem of harm, this chapter has argued that the Frankfurt School allows us to 
understand the concept of harm as only partially accounting for the experience of suffering to 
which it often refers. This suggests that from the perspective of Critical Theory, a key 
challenge posed by the problem of harm for International Studies lies in the problems that 
arise from our attempts to produce knowledge of it. In particular, such arguments force us to 
renegotiate the grounds from which we are able to claim normative knowledge or provide 
answers to the various aspects of the threefold problematic with any certainty, and that this 
rests on our ability to comprehend social life.
242
 In this light, the problems posed by 
instrumental knowledge production and changes in patterns of global interconnection are 
uncomfortable truths for a discipline that is at least partly constituted by attempts to explain 
and ameliorate the conditions of suffering in social life. If the discipline is to contribute to the 
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problem of harm as a site of contention and negotiation, then it is important for us to consider 
how it relates to these issues such that its engagement might be better characterised.
243
  
Rather than the three strategies of contention we saw in the first chapter, Critical 
Theory holds out the historical continuation of suffering as the centre around which each of 
these issues rotate; the threefold problematic finds its vitality less in its naming of perennial 
scientific problems but in the way that suffering forces them to be considered as a whole. In 
doing so, the problem of harm offers both the opportunity for IS to engage in the amelioration 
of harmful practices, but also the possibility that it might fail or be complicit in their 
continuation. This is a complex task; the three problems are not individual lines of scientific 
development, but constitute an interconnected field of problems in which positions taken on 
one aspect have direct effects for how we might engage with the others. In addressing the 
problem of harm, approaches in IS need to formulate a response to the problems of object 
adequacy, critical value and reflexivity lest it neglect the complex demands that the problem 
of harm places on a discipline that is uniquely placed to address it. 
 These demands can be characterised through the lineage we have drawn from Marx to 
Adorno and onward, illustrating how social science might best account for social relations 
and structures that contribute to harmful outcomes. This rests on the argument that normative 
and social scientific claims – claims to critical value and object adequacy – are intertwined, 
and in addressing the causes of harm we might contribute to its amelioration. Critical Theory 
suggests that IS might serve as one avenue through which it is possible to formulate a critique 
of ideology or false consciousness; in holding up the experience of suffering as a common 
reference point, and explaining how it comes about, the discipline can aid in a process 
through which previously unacknowledged harmful practices are brought within the sphere of 
ethical concern. In this context, the priority that Critical Theory places on the experience of 
suffering provides us with a starting point from which we might begin to address more 
abstract forms of harm. 
 A further important argument lies in the way that social scientific work fulfils a 
reflexive function, seeking to articulate and reassess the qualities of the historical situations 
that it is directed toward. In this regard, the critical theorists sought to juxtapose the promise 
inherent in concepts such as harm with the actuality of the situation; on their terms, it is 
increasingly possible to address the problem of harm in an adequate fashion, but history 
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develops in the direction of ever-greater means of destruction and suffering. The constant 
return to the problem of harm in IS demonstrates a similar reflexive and utopian element – it 
promises, even if it does not fulfil, the possibility of an ethically engaged social science. 
However, it is no longer the case that we can, like Marx, consider the proletariat as the 
historical subject at the centre of our approach. In broadening a concern with exploitation to 
the experience of suffering, Critical Theory provides a theoretical basis for developments in 
the discipline that seek to expand ethical concern to marginalised groups and the 
environment, among others. This strategy, which underpins many of the strategies of 
contention that we saw in the last chapter, rests on the identification of a gulf between harm 
and suffering that social science can contribute to narrowing. In characterising IS in this role, 
Critical Theory suggests that the problem of harm constitutes a historical task through which 
different approaches in the discipline can be considered as part of a broader process aimed at 
opening up harmful practices to ethical consideration.  
 In prioritising suffering, however, Critical Theory suggests that solidarity around our 
failures to address it might be a more reliable goal than rallying around positive aims. 
Suffering, in this case, provides a common reference point for criticism more than it identifies 
positive opportunities for social change. If this is the case, then we can understand the 
concept of harm to be the social appropriation of suffering; it is this appropriation which 
underpins our ability to engage with and alleviate harmful practices. Nevertheless, this move 
is an ambiguous one, as we are forced to consider how harm and suffering are never fully 
identical. This principle of non-identity, particularly in the work of Adorno, leads us to a 
suspicion of social life as in some way fundamentally wrong due to the failure of the 
normative promise that concepts such as harm contain. 
 However, such a persistent focus on the possibility of pain and suffering leaves little 
ground for meeting halfway; any attempt to move beyond it is immediately subject to ruthless 
criticism that rests on the violence that may result and does not allow us to consider the 
problematic but necessary way in which harm conventions come about. The consequence of 
the almost theological fervour with which the Frankfurt School regarded suffering precluded 
any positive contribution to the problem of harm in wider social life, leading them instead to 
focus on a pessimistic philosophy of history characterised by the rampage of subjective 
reason. While such an approach maintained suffering as a core concern, it places the critical 
value of social scientific work in a highly ambiguous position due to the inevitable failure 
that accompanies our attempts at explanation. Nonetheless, the essential insights of Critical 
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Theory remain valuable. In presenting a viewpoint from the perspective of some of the most 
horrifying events of the 20
th
 Century, the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and others present us 
with a list of demands upon International Studies’ engagement with the problem of harm that 
are, in many ways, commensurate with the historical mission that it has set itself. By 
addressing the implications that these arguments have for International Studies more broadly, 
we aim to examine how these might best be met. 
 Having put forward the key dynamics that Critical Theory associated with suffering in 
social life, and thereby the problem of harm, we can now attempt to examine how their 
insights bear on work conducted in International Studies. The task is to consider how the 
discipline might respond to the implications of Critical Theory, and how it might best sustain 
the way in which it conceives of the problem of harm. In this context, the work of Linklater 
provides the best example, formulating a sociological approach to the problem of harm in IS 
while simultaneously attempting to maintain the normative concern that arises from Critical 
Theory.   
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Chapter 3 – Harm and Critique in the 
Sociology of Andrew Linklater 
 
 
Introduction 
In the first chapter, we saw how Critical Theory lends a perspective on the problem of 
harm that is characterised by three interconnected problems for knowledge production, and 
that its contribution to debates centred on the problem of harm lay in its ability to open up 
space for normative engagement and reflexivity. In returning to the roots of Critical Theory, 
the second sought to better characterise the threefold problematic by demonstrating its basis 
in the distinction between the experience of suffering and concepts of harm. This implies that 
engagement with the problem of harm in International Studies is fraught with difficulties that 
centre on the production of knowledge; our concepts of harm are unlikely ever to fully 
account for the normative demands that suffering puts forward. Nonetheless, in attempting to 
maintain the promise that the concept of harm holds, Critical Theory suggests that it remains 
essential that we do so. Furthermore, we saw in the first chapter that the problem of harm 
remains a source of vitality in the discipline, driving it toward new innovations and 
developments in the analysis of world politics. This ambiguity, we suggest, is at the core of 
Critical Theory’s contribution to how we understand the problem of harm as simultaneously a 
site of vital importance and of potential failure.  
Despite their negative approach to the possibilities that concepts such as harm can 
open up, the critical theorists nonetheless considered the continuation of suffering as a key 
drive toward the continuation of social scientific work. Having understood some of the 
implications of Critical Theory for our understanding of the problem of harm, we will now 
engage with the work of Andrew Linklater, whose sociology of harm conventions provides 
the best example of explicit engagement with the explanation of, and critical engagement 
with, harmful practices in International Studies. The aim is to examine Linklater’s work in 
light of the contribution that Critical Theory makes to our understanding of the various 
aspects of the problem of harm. Our argument that there is a contribution to be made in this 
area finds support in the work of Linklater himself, who suggests that sociological research 
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need not be alienated from the kind of normative concern found in Critical Theory.
244
 If this 
is the case, then Linklater’s sociological account of harm conventions may provide a way of 
sustaining the pressures that that threefold problematic gives rise to.  
 In addressing the work of Linklater, we are considering the sociology of harm 
conventions in light of, and as a response to, the hopeless attitude that the critical theorists 
held. This response is based on an empirical investigation into the history and development of 
the problem of harm. Drawing on the disciplines of Jurisprudence, Ethics, Historical 
Sociology, International Studies and Critical Theory, Linklater’s The Problem of Harm in 
World Politics: Theoretical Investigations attempts to ground a broad conception of harm 
upon the idea of historically shared vulnerabilities in a way which has affinities to the work 
of the Frankfurt School.
245
 Its core proposal – that a sociological approach to the forms that 
harm has taken can provide an explanation of the way in which individuals and groups 
negotiate the tension between the ability to harm and visions of society – is put forward as a 
demonstration of the importance of international relations to the discipline of Historical 
Sociology, a field which has often neglected its importance.
246
  The aim in this chapter is to 
consider how he carries through on these commitments, and how this reflects on the threefold 
problematic that is Critical Theory’s key contribution to the way we understand the problem 
of harm through object adequacy, critical value and reflexivity. In light of this, we can 
consider how Linklater’s investigation of concrete historical processes negotiates the 
difficulties that arise from the emphasis on suffering that Critical Theory argued for. 
 The chapter proceeds in two main sections. The first of these, harm and harm 
conventions, summarises Linklater’s approach to the problem of harm, his normative stance 
and his case for historical sociology as a way for studying it. This concludes with an 
argument for the importance of addressing social ontology as a way of understanding what is 
talked about in sociological investigation. This is taken up in the second section, which 
considers Linklater’s effort with a focus on its roots in process sociology grounded on the 
work of Norbert Elias. While agreeing with the attempt to address the development of the 
problem of harm historically, it argues that Elias’ understanding of scientific change and 
development serves to restrict the insights that Critical Theory bought to bear on the 
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relationship between knowledge and suffering. These include foundational elements of the 
accounts that we saw in the last chapter, including ideas of the subject/object relationship and 
social structure which are significant despite important similarities between the two 
perspectives. If this is the case, then we are left with an uncertain model of how the social 
sciences relate to the knowledge of harm that they are involved in producing; while Linklater 
notes the importance of this problem, it is important to clarify these if we are to understand 
the threefold problematic as an interconnected, rather than separate, set of issues as Critical 
Theory suggests we should. 
 Our engagement with Linklater’s work suggests that while the impulse toward a study 
of the historical nature of harm conventions holds out interesting possibilities for 
understanding debates centred on the problem of harm, it fails to develop the normative 
implications of this knowledge. With this in mind, the chapter concludes with a proposal for 
the reconstruction of the sociology of harm conventions that takes into account developments 
in the philosophy of science and which may allow us to better account for the threefold 
problematic and its interconnections. This approach, it is argued, will serve to negotiate the 
normative impulse of Critical Theory with the empirical contribution found in the work of 
Linklater, thus formulating a more adequate response to the problems that harm raises for 
International Studies. 
 
a) Harm and Harm Conventions 
 
The Role of the Harm Principle 
 While Linklater’s sociological method is not based on rigidly defining what does and 
what does not count as harm, he attempts to approximate the concept in social life as a 
starting point by examining the extent to which conceptions of harm can be said to be 
immanent to all societies. Thus we find: 
‘No society – not even the most cruel or violent – can survive 
unless most people internalize the principle that they should not 
inflict unnecessary harm on other members. Elementary 
socialization processes that equip infants with an awareness of how 
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their actions can harm other persons as independent centres of 
experience exist in all societies.’247 
Some form of socially-embedded harm principle or convention, he argues is a 
permissive condition for the endurance of any form of society over time. However, this 
cannot be considered as an a priori fact. It must first be negotiated and built upon, as well as 
being inculcated in individuals through a process of socialisation. This demonstrates a 
sociological approach to the maintenance of civil society against the state of nature, a motif 
which is common to liberal political philosophy.
248
 Rather than posing a hypothetical 
framework as the social contract theorists did, Linklater is proposing an investigation of the 
work that goes into maintaining these principles historically in order to move past the 
idealism, and thus the exclusionary potential, of such philosophical approaches. 
Under Linklater’s formulation, some form of harm principle is immanent to all 
societies, and those that demonstrate lower levels of violence may be said to be, in general, 
more restrained than those that demonstrate higher levels of violence.
249
 However, the 
particular forms of conduct that are restrained vary considerably in different times and in 
different places; in particular, it is worth noting that the lack of central authority in the 
international sphere ensures that harm principles, and thus forms of restraint, are somewhat 
limited at that level.
250
 In examining the way in which these processes occur, it may be 
possible to locate some common ground for solidarity between groups based on common 
experiences of pain, humiliation and suffering which could serve to move past these 
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divisions.
251
 Moreover, developments in global politics toward a greater level of 
interconnectedness and interdependence may point toward the development of a global 
civilising process concerning particular forms of harm.
252
 Here, Linklater is arguing for his 
sociological investigation to be a large-scale articulation of the problem of harm that we 
observed in Chapter 1; this would centre upon the citizen/humanity problem, which centres 
on the competing obligations between humanity and citizenry, as a core articulation of the 
problem of harm in the discipline.
253
 Adopting a sociological method would allow us to gain 
empirical evidence concerning the importance of various harm principles, but also to address 
objections that consider the ‘problem of harm’ to be so vague as to be indeterminate. 
Linklater, then, is not attempting to provide metaphysical justification for his 
conception of harm, but rather arguing that it is an anthropologically grounded feature of 
human society. This allows him to ground his argument on something more than the ‘view 
from nowhere’ that his earlier engagement with Critical Theory was so pivotal in 
critiquing.
254
 Upon this basis, there are various forms of harm and suffering to which all of us 
are more or less vulnerable, making harm an experiential phenomenon, the immediate form 
of which does not have to be justified theoretically a priori. Linklater thus sidesteps the 
problem posed by the indeterminacy of the problem by subsuming it under an ‘umbrella’ 
concept that is socially embedded and evident, grounded in lived experience. Importantly for 
the problem of harm in society, this general concept can be communicated without a 
sophisticated labour of translation; following the work of Simone Weil, Linklater argues for 
‘emotional and expressive capacities that revolve around mutually intelligible concerns about 
the vulnerabilities of the body.’255  
Appealing to suffering as a universal aspect of lived experience, Linklater draws close 
to the work of the early Frankfurt School that we saw in the previous chapter, appealing to the 
experiential content of suffering as the basis around which consensus can be negotiated. 
However, it is important to note that he draws out this consensus as not immediately 
precluded by the dictates of instrumental reason that plagued the Frankfurt School, placing 
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emphasis on common affective capacities rather than their short-circuiting through processes 
of alienation. By beginning with the shared capacity for physical suffering, one can begin to 
develop a taxonomy of harms that vary according to the relationships involved; while physical 
pain may be found in the pre-social experience of nature, the understanding of harm and its 
variations can only be found in society. It is evident that no such taxonomy of harm can be 
timeless or absolute, but as an illustrative example, Linklater uses the following:
 256
 
 Deliberate harm 
 Humiliation 
 Unintended harm 
 Negligence 
 Exploitation 
 Complicity 
 Harm of omission 
 Public harm 
 Structural Harm 
The extent to which these forms of harm and others are recognised varies from society 
to society. However, this taxonomy indicates the important point that forms of harm may be 
understood through the social links through which they operate, and thus rest on an 
understanding of what society is in the form of a social ontology. This moves beyond the 
immediate sensory experience of suffering, such as burning or starvation, and toward a 
socially mediated and intersubjectively ascertained vocabulary which is able to address the 
social nature of harm as a problem.  While the general concept ‘harm’ may be vague, 
indicating the way in which the condition or experience has come about grants an explanatory 
power that moves beyond appeal to emotive sympathies and toward a degree of shared 
historical understanding of what is at stake. Thus deliberate harm comes to denote a harmful 
experience which is predicated upon the intention involved. Negligence, meanwhile, 
indicates that the refusal to assist constitutes a positive move to implicate another in a 
harmful situation where there was some prior obligation to assist those harmed. Exploitation 
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considers forms of harm that involve the instrumental use and abuse of an existing 
contractual obligation, and so on.
257
 
While some forms of harm are readily recognised in many societies, others are not 
associated with the same moral weight. Moreover, the dynamics of a given society may tend 
toward forms of harm which cause suffering in subjects but which lie outside of established 
contexts to which the concept of harm pertains, thus being rendered ‘accidents’, ‘externalities’ 
or some other form rather than as a problem that is subject to open and critical negotiation. 
Indeed, in modern societies the rapid development of technology may seem to outstrip a 
corresponding development in critical and normative understanding. The social linkages of 
these forms of harm thus move beyond historically specific understandings of intention, 
which Linklater addresses through the distinction between concrete and abstract harm: 
‘Concrete harm involves the intention to make designated others 
suffer – most obviously, enemies in war. Abstract harm is caused 
by impersonal forces where people’s intentions are less significant 
than the global structures and processes that push them to act in 
ways that harm others, though often unintentionally or because of 
indifference rather than malice.’258 
The critical possibility that sociology holds out is the adaptation of the broader 
concept of harm to encompass the increasing complexity and form of social interactions over 
time as they become more embedded and abstract. As the form that harm takes changes, the 
emotional relationship and the way in which this is communicated to others also changes. At 
the highest level of abstraction for Linklater’s taxonomy lies structural harm, or the claim that 
people are ‘vulnerable to the ways in which they are tied together in lengthening social 
interconnections.’259 Throughout history, then, Linklater is suggesting that there is a socially 
mediated vocabulary that is developed in order to communicate and negotiate the experiences 
and consequences of harm in society. Such a vocabulary develops in ways that may increase, 
decrease or alter the ways in which it is possible to communicate the experience of harm to 
another, and is dependent on core concepts such as intention, cause and affectedness that are 
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at the centre of what we understand society to be. In this regard, we can see similar 
associations being made as in Critical Theory, where the form of the explanation is a key 
aspect of its moral force. However, at the core of this, for Linklater, is the essentially human 
balancing of interests between the freedom to do, and the injunction to minimise the harm 
done to others that he grounds upon common conditions of human vulnerability. 
While it may not be possible to specify the ways in which this should be negotiated in 
advance, it is possible to argue for particular forms of the negotiation of harm conventions to 
be superior to others on the basis of their point of reference. While reductions in tax may 
reduce the immediate harm to an investor’s profits, for instance, it may be at the expense of 
others that could have benefited from that tax revenue in the form of welfare programmes or 
other such benefits. Such decisions lead naturally to a historically placed notion of right that 
is socially mediated in order to resolve potential conflicts in notions of harm. While we may 
be hesitant to draw out developments such as human rights as definitively and immediately 
positive in terms of reducing overall levels of harm, considering these an empirical question, 
Linklater is able to claim that the forms of recognition that they embody may be superior to 
other forms on the basis of the way that they are inclusive of a broader array of suffering 
subjects.
260
 In order to do this, he draws upon the ideal speech situation, developed by Jurgen 
Habermas, as a way of grounding the normative benefits that are granted by particular forms 
of society and thus to illustrate the critical value that arises from the sociology of harm 
conventions.
261
 
 As indicated above, the process of negotiating the harm principle is a social one, and 
as such the critique of this process can be based upon the way in which this negotiation 
occurred. Thus Linklater argues: 
‘On the basis of tanget onmnes, all people have an equal right to be 
represented in decision-making arenas, or in some way consulted 
about decisions that may affect them adversely; they are entitled ‘to 
refuse or renegotiate offers’, and to convey dissatisfaction with the 
larger political context in which decisions are made […]. The 
corollary is that the dominant institutions and practices should be 
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assessed by the extent to which they are answerable to all those 
who ‘stand to be affected’ by them.’262 
 The injunction to minimise the harm that we do to others is thus extended 
opportunities to anticipate it through discursive consensus formation. It is possible, then, for 
us to distinguish between harm conventions that are merely a representation of particular 
sectional interests, and those that may be considered emancipatory on the basis of whether or 
not they distinguish between insiders or outsiders in their process of negotiation and 
implementation. This is an important move beyond conventional state-based politics, where 
the pacification of internal borders between communities often leads to the elevation of this 
problem to a new level of abstraction such as between states or regions.
263
 
With regard to applications to international politics, Linklater argues that such a 
distinction constitutes the essence of the difference between harm conventions and what he 
calls ‘cosmopolitan’ harm conventions, which are predicated upon their not distinguishing 
between insiders and outsiders.
264
 Such harm conventions are not based on a cosmopolitan 
political project that advocates strong forms of global citizenship or the priority of 
humankind over particular communities, but rather on the belief that ‘the differences between 
insiders and outsiders are not always relevant reasons for treating them in a different 
manner.’265 Such an obligation requires the recognition that standard conceptions of bounded 
identity are not identical with those of moral responsibility. While the basis of Linklater’s 
project focuses on harm conventions as a universal feature of real societies, cosmopolitan 
harm conventions move beyond this in that their adoption reveals the extent to which 
humanity is able to transcend particular societies in the process of moral deliberation. As 
such, and if harm conventions are a permissive feature of society, the development of 
cosmopolitan harm conventions may reveal the large scale negotiation of harm principles that 
could underpin evidence for a global civilizing process.
266
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The basis of Linklater’s examination of a universal feature of social life allows him to 
develop this critical strategy at a near-universal level. The proposed universality of the harm 
convention is not based on the advocacy of a particular sectional interest but rather is located 
by abstracting away the particularities of individual experience in order to reveal the common 
core of harm as a problem in social life. It is not that every person would recognise the 
particular form of suffering that another is experiencing, but rather that the experience of 
suffering holds a universal element such that it can be expressed and recognised in a general 
sense. Therefore, while the content may differ, it is possible for Linklater to move from the 
common principle of suffering to the problem of harm as a general feature of society.
267
 The 
negotiation of harm conventions that takes place throughout society becomes based on an 
essentially communicative form that allows for this negotiation takes place. The resulting 
development highlights Linklater’s critical strategy; the ideal speech situation rests upon a 
core notion of affectedness as its empirical starting point, but differs in emphasis from the 
critical theorists by focussing on the recognition, as much as the the experience, of suffering. 
This sociological orientation – through which we might explain the harm conventions present 
in different societies – demonstrates a potential for critique based on the level of 
inclusiveness characterised in ideas of harm and which pushes societies to aspire to harm 
conventions that take on a cosmopolitan, rather than sectional, character. 
Linklater’s argument can be understood in critical-theoretical terms as follows. 
Firstly, the ability to generalise the problem of harm in social life, grounded upon shared 
vulnerabilities, provides the basis upon which it is possible to build a more general synthetic 
account of harm that encapsulates a wide variety of physical and emotional experiences. This 
provides a critical standard that bears strong similarities to Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
concerns with the social mediation of suffering. In arguing for the universality of this process, 
the analyst of harm conventions can incorporate a wide variety of outcomes at different levels 
of analysis and investigate the broad and wide-ranging negotiations concerning the problem 
of harm in society, The harm principle provides a critical standard that allows the 
identification of harm conventions as a potential site for the fostering of more inclusive forms 
of political community. Such an account, as we have seen, is predicated on the actual 
accounts that the sociology of harm conventions is to produce, to which we now turn. 
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The Sociology of Harm Conventions 
 The sociological focus of Linklater’s account consists of an investigation of the way 
in which notions of harm have influenced and changed social interaction across history. 
Given the way in which societies rest on conventions concerning ethical issues, the 
possibility of a sociology of global morals arises which could inform our strategies of 
critique: 
‘The principal objective is to build on previous endeavours to 
construct a distinctive mode of comparative sociological analysis 
that examines the extent to which basic considerations of humanity 
have not only influenced the conduct of international relations in 
different historical eras but may yet acquire a central role in 
bringing unprecedented levels of global connectedness under 
collective moral and political control.’268 
 While in principle such a sociology could be applied to any normative concept, the 
foundational nature of harm conventions indicates that harm presents a potentially high level 
of critical value for such a project. It is not, however, the only necessary foundation stone for 
Linklater’s cosmopolitan orientation. Moreover, such a project should not attempt to 
encompass or dominate its subject matter – the forms of harm that operate in society – and 
thus needs to remain open to reflexivity. The Problem of Harm in World Politics, he stresses, 
is not a theory of harm, but rather an investigation of the problem of harm in society through 
a theoretical lens.
269
 As such, he at no point claims that harm is the predominant problem, 
merely noting that ‘the harm principle has an important role – no more than that – in any 
cosmopolitan ethic’.270 
 This involves less a theorisation of harm as such as a study of the way in which harm 
is dealt with and articulated in social interaction. The sociology of harm conventions is a way 
of examining the historically placed ways that the expression of harm occurs, and opens up a 
possibility of comparison and critique precisely because it is permissive towards what can be 
counted as harm: 
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“There is probably nothing more fundamental in social life than 
how people deal with the problem of harm in their relations with 
each other – how they protect themselves from the various forms of 
suffering to which they are susceptible by virtue of their mental and 
physical vulnerability, and how they deal with those who are 
prepared to kill, injure, exploit and in other ways harm them.”271 
 The aim of the sociology of harm conventions is to provide an account of the 
processes by which the problem of harm is negotiated in society, and incorporates several 
elements. Firstly, it considers the ways that societies conceptualise the forms and causes of 
suffering as harmful, and how this occurs through communicative and power relations. 
Secondly, it examines the way in which this is maintained in society over time, and the way 
in which they are reflected back on social life through socialisation and processes of 
integration. The evaluative stance that Linklater argues for, in this context, serves to highlight 
ways in which such harm conventions can be rendered more inclusive in the way discussed 
above. 
 In order to develop the comparative perspective that would underpin such an 
evaluative process, Linklater draws on the process sociology of Norbert Elias. Particularly in 
On the Process of Civilization, Elias had developed a sociological method, indebted to Freud, 
which dealt in particular with the relationship between instincts, needs, and the way in which 
they were mitigated by the process of civilization as one of restraint.
272
 The parallel with a 
sociology of harm conventions lies in that both attempt to address the way in which it is 
possible for emotional responses, whether disgust, shame or empathy, are fostered in the 
process of socialisation. At the level of society, both also attempt to understand the ways in 
which this socialisation process is subject to change. Linklater argues that relationships 
between societies played, unusually for sociological accounts, a significant role in the way 
that Elias understood the development of long-term patterns of social change, raising the 
contribution that IS can make to historical sociology.
273
 A global sociology of harm 
conventions, then, can serve to overcome the false divide that has been instituted between 
sociology and international relations, as well as providing an empirical ground for areas of 
moral or ethical concern in the problem of harm. 
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 Elias utilised the term ‘civilising processes’ in order to indicate the interconnected 
ways in which sociological and psychological change come about. Linklater considers this a:  
‘modern variant on a universal theme since no viable society is 
uncivilized in the sense of lacking conventions for regulating 
violent and non-violent harm, or socializing institutions that instil 
respect for basic standards of behaviour as well as the socially 
valued patterns of individual self-restraint and emotion 
management, or coercive mechanisms that can be brought into play 
when the mechanisms that deal with ‘drive formation’ fail to 
secure compliance with relevant norms.’274 
The universal nature of civilizing processes highlights the way in which earlier concerns 
regarding the moral basis of society may be subject to social scientific analysis. Linklater 
finds Habermas’ contention ‘that the very first speech act contained the promise of the moral 
and political unity of humankind’ at the normative core of the attempt to reveal the value of 
the civilizing process fully understood.
275
 Furthermore, a focus on civilizing processes aids in 
understanding the way in which all societies are constantly vulnerable and susceptible to 
processes of change. No society can therefore be said to lie at ‘the end of history,’ or to have 
fully achieved the domination of nature but are constantly involved in efforts at civilisation of 
which the negotiation of harm conventions is an essential aspect.
276
 
 It is possible to see a convergence between the projects of Linklater and Elias in the 
latter’s contention that with the European civilising process that he primarily focussed upon, 
some level of internal pacification had decreased the level of explicitly violent behaviour that 
was acceptable to society as a whole.
277
 This was linked to patterns of state formation that 
reduced the necessity for individuals to rely on themselves for personal security. More 
abstractly, more complex chains of interconnectedness had increased the reliance of the ruling 
strata on those that provided the means of their survival, a phenomenon labelled ‘functional 
democratisation’.278 It is clear that the processes involved in such changes were not 
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monocausal, but implicated in a complex relationship between agents, institutions and 
structures that varied according to power gradients and dynamics over time. Strict dualisms of 
structure and agency do not bear out in real life, and a more adequate explanation must be 
sought in the combination of micro and macro processes, materialist and idealist explanation, 
and psychological change.
279
  
 Despite the unfortunate choice of words in the term ‘civilizing’ processes, Linklater 
goes to great effort to indicate that there is not teleology involved in Elias’ account.280 Given 
that all societies engage in the civilizing, in some form, of their members, such changes are 
not unique to the societies that Elias examined in particular. The civilized condition denotes 
the self-image of having undergone such a process, the direction of which is in no way 
proscribed. Indeed, running counter to the development of civilizing processes are the 
decivilizing processes which accompany it. These are processes that run counter to civilizing 
processes but are nonetheless immanent to the extent that they are made possible by the 
current state and material capabilities of society. Elias offered such an explanation in The 
Germans for the rise of Nazism in Germany.
281
 Following up on studies regarding the use of 
rationalised production processes and techniques in killing, it is argued that the holocaust 
was, in a sense, much more efficient precisely due to the way in which it was decoupled from 
‘mass hatred and collective frenzy’.282 
 The task of the sociologist of harm conventions lies in examining the way in which 
these processes occur, and to attempt to understand the way in which the interplay of 
civilizing and decivilizing processes plays out in particular historical contexts with respect to 
attitudes toward harm. Such examinations should not, despite their attempt to illuminate 
emancipatory potential, engage in the opposition of morality and power, but rather should 
look at the way in which the two are, in any given society, highly intertwined and subject to 
change. Moreover, it allows the development of a critical theory that does not fall into the 
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Marxist pitfalls of espousing the dominance of production or the teleology of history which 
were discussed in the previous chapter and which Linklater has argued against.
283
 
 While highlighting the problems that arise from Marxism, the task of integrating the 
sphere of material reality and ideas remains. Linklater argues that thus far, most approaches to 
international politics have analysed either the ideational or material realms, rarely bringing 
them together.
284
 Those that do often pose a fundamental issue that pushes the analysis one 
way or the other, placing ultimate limits on what can be considered within the ideational or 
material realms due to the ‘final instance’ decisiveness of the other in advance.285 Having 
earlier argued that the two are intertwined, it becomes necessary to develop a holistic 
‘historical social psychology’ that analyses the way in which state-formation, urbanization, 
marketization and so forth [are] viewed in conjunction with changing ‘drive structures’ and 
everyday emotions.’286 
 This synthesis would seek to understand, by combining ‘emotionological’ and material 
approaches, the way in which responses to suffering has changed over time and in different 
contexts. Examples might include the culture of human rights and charitable responses to 
natural disasters, both of which are particularly familiar to liberal writings on justice theory.
287
 
However, just as important for social cohesion are attitudes toward shame and guilt, which 
Elias argued were fundamental to the development of social conformity.
288
 Without such an 
understanding, a more materialist analysis would have difficulty in identifying the basic act of 
recognition from which all forms of community develop. Linklater notes that positive changes 
in responses to scenes of harm and suffering over distance have been uneven and subject to 
competing logics of justification.
289
 This highlights the importance of a historical social 
psychology in accounting for the moral deficit that lies between materially based stimuli 
(television, the internet, greater ability to witness different cultures through travel) and the 
bystander phenomenon, whereby the readily available presentation of forms of suffering is 
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mediated by moral distancing.
290
 Indeed, it may be the case that a form of desensitization is 
just as prevalent as the development of cosmopolitan empathetic responses. It remains the 
case that, for global advocacy groups, a causal account remains a significant element in 
promoting a given cause, demonstrating that a reliance on such emotions may still rely on a 
demonstration of material proximity or causal responsibility according to chains of 
interconnectedness.
291
 This becomes increasingly difficult as causal linkages become more 
abstract and harm is likely to be distanced from the paradigmatic case of mental and bodily 
anguish.
292
 The point is that sites of potential harm that are less visible due to their 
incremental nature, such as the economic, may be less easily articulated by lay subjects in 
such terms, providing an avenue for the critical work of the sociology of harm conventions. A 
lack of functional democratisation – the process through which the power-balance of society 
gradually evens out – as was present in the emancipatory struggles of the 19th Century may 
mean that critiques arising from social science, however, face problems when it turns to 
address highly embedded structures of power and decentred global social relations.
293
 
 Such an impasse in the historical development of harm is therefore the point at which 
the critical intention of Linklater’s process sociological framework comes to light. In the first 
chapter, we saw the way that the problem of harm could be understood as core to many 
developments in IS due to their attempt to make new or changing forms of harm intelligible 
through theoretical innovations with a view to their critical value. If it is the case that the 
empathetic response to forms of suffering offer paradigm cases through which people can 
interpret and respond to the needs of others, then the critical task of the sociology of harm 
conventions is to adapt these understanding to a changing world; it is necessary to both 
broaden understandings to encapsulate new forms of harm, but also to deepen them such that 
understandings can become more nuanced. The sociology of harm conventions thus attempts 
to inform normative deliberation such that more realistic responses to the problem of the harm 
we do to others can be formulated. In doing so, it aims to perform a labour of translation 
between immediate experience and knowledge that can be shared with others, contributing 
new concepts to the negotiation of harm conventions that are adequate to the complexities of 
global interconnection and interdependence. 
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 It is at this point we can see that two principles of the threefold problematic, those of 
object adequate historical sociology and the critical value of the concept of harm become 
linked, providing the ‘emancipatory intent’ that Linklater claims.294 In this vein, Linklater’s 
sociology might contribute to the development of ideas of harm focussed on, for example, 
imperialism or structural adjustment, bringing them within ethical deliberation in a way we 
have argued is characteristic of IS.
295
 This, as we have seen, requires the development of 
concepts that are able to express abstract forms of social interconnection; as an example, 
criticisms of the intensification of global capitalism often focus on the way that harmful 
practices lie at the feet of large transnational corporations rather than any one specific 
individual, violating the pervasive tendency toward a focus on the individual in liberal ideas 
of justice.
296
 However, if one of the key points at which International Studies can contribute 
to the problem of harm lies in its provision of concepts that express the complexities and 
interconnections of social life, then it is important to understand how such concepts can be 
formulated. While there are several ways in which this might be considered, we will examine 
Linklater’s approach to structural harm as symptomatic of this process due to the way in 
which it lies at the intersection of the kinds of critique levelled by Marxism, green theory and 
gender theory, as well as sitting at the more ‘abstract’ end of Linklater’s concrete/abstract 
continuum. This position, we argue, ensures that categories like structure occupy key points 
at which International Studies is able to contribute to understandings of harm that are not 
immediately visible but are, nonetheless, becoming more important as global interconnection 
becomes more complex. 
 
Structural Harm 
 As we have seen, Linklater’s taxonomy presented the problem of harm as the linking 
of two elements; the embodied experience of suffering and the social appropriation of this in 
the concept of harm. The link between these two is made according to a descriptive process; it 
depends on the ability to describe the interconnections and processes underpinning harmful 
practices. Linklater’s suggestion that the sociology of harm conventions can contribute in a 
way that is sensitive to the problems raised by Critical Theory thus rests on the kind of 
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account that he envisions as being produced by this approach. If we understand the way that 
the problem of harm arises as the interplay between a generalisable recognition of suffering 
and a historically-delimited vocabulary through which it is articulated, then the critical task of 
the sociology of harm conventions is to render the latter more adequate to the former. 
However, we have seen that while many of the forms of harm presented may be reinterpreted 
in terms of agency, structural harm in particular would appear to require a greater labour of 
translation; it both requires a more complex account of social life that is able to take into 
account abstract phenomena, and has to fight for the recognition of accounts that are not 
reducible to personal responsibility. In particular, the latter has been a problem for advocacy 
networks who have often been let down by the individualist hegemony over jurisprudence.
297
 
 It would be folly to suggest, however, that there is some form of structural harm that 
cannot be described at least partially in terms of the way in which it affects subjects.
298
 
Rather, attempts to highlight the consequences of social structure in general argue for a 
structured or repeated way in which concrete outcomes in the lives of agents are bought about 
or influenced by forces that reach beyond the knowledge or intention of the agents 
themselves. It requires, therefore, that the (mis)understandings that agents labour under are 
contextualised against the real, potentially unrecognised processes that constitute social life. 
In this regard, arguments concerning social structure and its tendencies are a common feature 
of work, such as that of the Frankfurt School, which we examined last chapter. In that context, 
theorists from Marx to Adorno have based their normative injunction against suffering in 
society upon the existence of structured social development. In this vein, and recalling the 
critical potential of the sociology of harm conventions, Linklater argues: 
‘Structural harm is no less dependent on high levels of 
institutionalization that make people vulnerable to the ways in 
which they are tied together in lengthening social interconnections. 
As noted earlier, Marxist and neo-Marxist analyses of global 
dominance and dependence in the capitalist world economy have 
highlighted harms that have less to do with the intentions of 
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particular people than with structural compulsions and 
imperatives.’ 
 ‘[…] one purpose of highlighting structural harm is to increase 
awareness of the ways in which certain actors consciously take 
advantage of the vulnerable while others are complicit, often 
unwittingly, in perpetuating harmful practices across the globe 
[…]’ 299 
Structural harm, for Linklater, is therefore those harmful practices which are driven 
less by intention than they are by structural pressures, and thus may underlie other forms of 
harm that he presents. In this regard, we can understand Linklater’s account to be moving 
beyond a general idea of structural harm, and toward an understanding of social structure as 
presenting a vital component of various forms of harm; the role of structures in harm allows 
us to understand this factor as providing the essential social ‘stuff’ that allows harm to take 
place at various levels. In an argument which parallels those of Marx, Linklater seems to 
agree that there are forms of harm which are engaged in relatively freely, in a discretionary 
fashion, but also those that are structured and are less amenable to reflection being opened 
up by process of social scientific investigation. Just as Marx attempted to investigate the 
‘objective conditions’ that confront man, Linklater hopes to open up harmful practices to a 
greater degree of deliberation through their explanation.
300
 
The reason these forms of harm are so important is because they open up to ethical 
deliberation an entire sphere of social behaviour which cannot be understood by a constant 
recourse to human subjects’ motivation or intention. It is important to note that despite the 
polemical power of the term ‘exploitation’, for example, Marxists maintain that a direct 
intention to harm does not need to be a necessary condition in the mind of the capitalist. As 
such, the ability to explain structures in harm allows us to understand forms of harm that are 
conducted knowingly or unknowingly, with or without malice. In the case of negligence, the 
harm occurs in the abandonment of a previously existing duty of care. Exploitation involves 
pushing or breaking the boundaries of a prior agreement. Complicity involves ‘standing by’ 
in the face of a particular form of harm. What they all bear in common is the existence of a 
                                                 
299
 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics, 73. 
300
 Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’. 
112 
 
prior contract that may or may not be considered as harmful, and the sociology of harm 
conventions can contribute to our understanding of whether it should be.  
It is therefore important that Linklater’s explanation of harm conventions within 
society, that they ‘intercede between the capacity to injure and the condition[s] of 
vulnerability’, is able to account for both subjectively recognised and unrecognised aspects of 
harmful practices if it is to have a strong critical purpose.
301
 In particular, a lot rests on the 
way that material and ideational processes come to be interwoven, and how forms of 
knowledge come about in a more or less object-adequate fashion at various points in the 
development of society. One point at which the importance of accounts of social structure 
becomes apparent is in the blurring of the distinction between intention and unintentional, or 
concrete and abstract harm. This can serve to challenge the conventional liberal sensibility 
that cruelty is the worst thing we do, and lends the study of harm an important role in 
highlighting forms of harm that persist in the context of power dynamics that resist our 
questioning of their moral status.
302
 The challenge lies precisely in the way that it brings to 
light the problematic nature of the liberal focus on individuals and the hard distinction 
between self- and other- regarding actions in the process of explanation. Cruelty is a 
necessary but insufficient aspect to consider if it is the case that ‘the majority of harms are 
structurally determined’ in some fashion.303 The point is not to defend a structurally 
determined form of harm a priori, but to ask after how engagement with the structural and 
conditioning aspects of social life are possible objects of knowledge from the point of view of 
how social science addresses them. 
 In the sphere of harm conventions, the moment at which we register concern for the 
other and respond to them is faced by a potentially opposing tendency; that of the structured 
organisation of society which may push toward the satisfaction of some goal other than the 
amelioration of harmful practices. This highlights the way in which the critical value of the 
sociology of harm conventions, particularly in a complex interconnected world, lies in its 
ability to provide explanations that go beyond existing understandings to highlight the ethical 
implications of unquestioned social action. However, while we have seen what accounts of 
structural harm might offer, we are uncertain as to how we might arrive at them, or what is 
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involved in the claim that a particular structure exists or tends in a particular direction. In 
short, it is necessary for us to address the kind of knowledge that is produced by Linklater’s 
sociology, and how empirical investigation under this paradigm can contribute to normative 
or ethical deliberation. This task requires us to examine Linklater’s social ontology in order 
to address the question of how the practice of social science can contribute to our practical 
engagement with the problem of harm in the vein that was argued for by the critical theorists. 
 
b) Theoretical Foundations 
 
Figurational Sociology 
 The theoretical basis for the sociology of harm conventions arises from Linklater’s 
engagement with the work of Norbert Elias. This engagement results in Linklater adopting 
many of Elias’ reformulations of classic sociological debates, including the structure/agency 
and insider/outside distinctions, which restrict the possible dynamics sociology was able to 
address in its classical guise.
304
 This highlights the danger of fixed concepts in a similar way 
to Critical Theory; the theorist becomes responsible for perpetuating a reification that cannot 
bear the weight of reality and which may ultimately become complicit in the problems they 
seek to address. Against this, Elias attempted to put forward a reality-congruent sociology 
that understood the fabric of social life as a nexus of interacting processes which are 
constantly subject to change. Key to this was a focus on the processual nature of many of the 
objects of sociological investigation. Fixed designations, such as ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘informal’ 
for Elias are better understood as ‘bureaucratisation’ or ‘informalisation’. This process of 
inherent change ensures that it is only ever possible to consider distinctions in our 
sociological explanations as relational properties. 
 This section will expound upon Linklater’s engagement with Eliasian sociology in 
order to examine its implications for the sociology of harm conventions and the normative 
issues that arise from this. The aim is to address the way in which Linklater’s approach to the 
sociology of harm conventions is able to account for the implications of Critical Theory with 
regard to the problems that harm raises. In doing so, it will engage with several aspects of this 
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sociological framework, and in particular the concept of figuration and its consequences for 
our approach to the problem of harm. Given the importance that our theoretical apparatus has 
for our ability to address harm, we will be placing particular focus on the points at which 
Linklater’s sociology can relate object adequacy and critical value, particularly in light of the 
clear normative purpose that the sociology of harm conventions holds.  
 
The Figurational Approach 
 The foundation of Elias’ research programme can be seen in his reaction against the 
philosophical and sociological debates that had characterised his own education.
305
 These 
issues, including the structure/agency debate, the notion of time, and the philosophy of 
history, in Elias’ eyes served to hold back the development of a practical and testable 
sociology particularly under the influence of Kantian philosophy. Against the reification of 
substantive categories, whether the Kantian a priori or the determinism of social structure, 
Elias would argue that there was little benefit in philosophical modes of enquiry, putting 
forward the empirical testing of sociology as a counterpoint to the dangerous state-
reductionism that is carried out by frameworks that attempt to precede their object of 
enquiry.
306
 In this regard, while Elias and Critical Theory would be in agreement concerning 
the way that concepts overruled the actual reality of social life, his process sociological 
framework would be suspicious of the focus on instrumental reason that characterised the 
work of Adorno et al. and instead focussed on the development of an empirically testable 
sociology.
307
 By focussing on a historical sociological method, rather than extrapolating from 
an all-consuming focus on suffering, Elias’ approach offers a way to bypass the totalising 
conclusions that we saw arising from accounts such as Dialectic of Enlightenment while, 
Linklater suggests, maintaining the kind of normative interest that Critical Theory 
provokes.
308
 
 Elias claimed that the Kantian-influenced system of a priori assumptions and 
transcendental arguments underpinned an approach to sociology which took for granted a 
particular model of man as an ‘adult’, isolated from his position within society and thus 
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having essentialist consequences. This model, which he labelled homo clausus, was to be 
opposed as a violent abstraction from the truth that individuals and society were 
inconceivable except with regard to each other: 
“What actually binds people together into figurations? Questions 
like this cannot be answered if we start by considering all 
individual people on their own, as if each were a Homo Clausus. 
That would be to stay on the level [which studies] the individual 
person. […] In other words, all specifically sociological problems 
are reduced by these means to problems of social psychology. 
There is a tacit assumption that societies – figurations formed by 
interdependent people – are fundamentally no more than congeries 
of individual atoms.”309 
Rather than the model of the isolated person, sociology should consider people as 
interdependent; Homines Aperti rather than Homo Clausus. As an example to illustrate this, 
Elias argues that the interdependence betrayed by the pronouns ‘you’, ‘we’, ‘he’, or ‘she’ 
showed that the ‘I’ of the Cartesian subject could not exist in isolation. Sociology, therefore, 
must take into account the inevitability of multiple perspectives that are mutually constitutive 
in social life. 
 Given this inseparability of viewpoints between subjects, it also becomes evident that 
the ‘outside’ in individually oriented sociology, that of ‘society’, demonstrates a false 
dichotomy that is reified by this approach in social science. By contract, structuralist theories 
such as Marxism had thrown the baby out with the bathwater in overemphasising the 
dominance of structure. Both variants of sociological theory are guilty of a reductionism that 
is centred upon their attempts to provide a focussed investigation and which belies their 
political commitments.
310
 Taking the homines aperti model as foundational allows a more 
flexible and objective approach to the explanation of social processes in a form that Elias 
labelled ‘figurations’: 
“If four people sit around a table and play cards together, they form 
a figuration. Their actions are interdependent. In this case, it is still 
possible to bow to tradition, and to speak of the ‘game’ as if it had 
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an existence of its own. […] But despite all the expressions which 
tend to objectify it, in this instance the course taken by the game 
will obviously be the outcome of the actions of a group of 
interdependent individuals. It has been shown that the course of the 
game is relatively autonomous from every single player, given that 
all the players are approximately equal in strength. But it does not 
have substance; it has no being, no existence independently of the 
players, as the word ‘game’ might suggest.”311 
 Such a model addresses the weaknesses in structuralist or individualist 
conceptualisations of society by conceiving of the figuration as the relationships between the 
‘players’ of the game in the round.312 Any attempt to abstract from this complex web of 
interactions must be consciously analytical and avoid the reification of substantive categories. 
The concept of figuration, furthermore, highlights the importance of power as a relational, 
rather than something a subject can possess. In doing so, it allows significant insights into the 
importance of social position with relation to power, allowing complex analyses that are far 
more fluid than structuralist or individualist frameworks. 
 It is this difference in vocabulary that allows Elias to move beyond the problem of 
structure and agency. Indeed, we find that ‘what we call ‘figuration’ with reference to the 
constituent parts is identical with what we call ‘structure’ with reference to the composite 
unit.’313 Such a reorientation brings to light the nature of the structure/agency debate as a 
historical phenomenon that is characterised by a particular form of self-understanding with its 
roots in the enlightenment.
314
 By instead focussing on the adequacy of a theory to its object, 
Elias’ framework requires a synthesis of materialist and idealist explanation that defies 
conventional sociological tradition. Core to this effort is a relational approach that places 
supposedly autonomous objects with regard to each other, thus resulting in accounts that are 
more faithful to the reality of social life and, in the process, reflecting more clearly the 
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complex process of mediating between structural determination and creativity in subjects’ 
creation and re-creation of the problem of harm. 
 Elias’ use of simple game models as heuristic devices demonstrate the import of a 
relational concept such as figuration.
315
 Contrary to the determinism that we saw in the 
critical theorists’ concern with instrumental reason, Elias’ analyses focussed on balances of 
power and social function that are able to demonstrate the power relations that pertain 
between a child and their mother, or slaves and their masters. It also provides a basis from 
which we can begin to understand the disorientation that arises from complex and abstract 
forms of interconnection; high degrees of specialisation lead both to a greater functional 
dependency of subjects upon each other as each performs tasks that are a progressively 
smaller part of the whole, but this also leads to a corresponding lack of authoritative sway 
over large-scale outcomes or states of affairs. This seems to bear directly on the forms of 
harm, and particularly structures in harm, that we have noted. In particular, the kind of 
collective action problems that we saw at stake in Green Theory in the first chapter, are 
rooted in precisely this kind of disorientation – what the Frankfurt School may have 
considered a kind of collective irrationality. To use Elias’ example of the game, the 
proliferation of players and number of layers at which the game is constituted becomes 
complex to the point that disorientation and a lack of relative influence with regard to the 
whole figuration begins to become apparent.
316
 It was Elias’ aim to allow people to orient 
themselves within these figurations in a way that could help them gain a greater awareness of 
their relative position within society; a position which is reflected directly in Linklater’s 
understanding of the critical value the sociology of harm conventions provides.
317
 
 In line with this problem of disorientation, Elias maintains a clear focus on the 
unintended outcomes of social action.
318
 The figurational framework highlights the way in 
which the actual direction of change in societies can only be understood in the form of a 
complex, even impenetrable nexus of interconnection and interpenetration for which the 
conventional concept of causation was hopelessly inadequate.
319
 The idea that there was a 
prime or first mover cannot be applied to sociology on the basis that there never was a ‘first 
man’ that was not already a social being. Elias instead utilised the concept of function as a 
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way of indicating the ‘existence of nexuses in the observable world’ at which point processes 
encountered each other.
320
 The culmination of this reformulation lies in acknowledging that 
society is always in a process of becoming, and gives rise to consideration of issues such as 
the problem of harm as long-term processes of negotiation and contestation across which any 
individual contribution forms only a part. Indeed, Elias’ understanding of his own work was 
as one part of the ‘chain of generations’.321 The role of sociology under this concept of 
society is one of relatively detached evaluation, attempting to understand the processes that 
figurations take part in through an understanding of the various perspectives and social 
positions that exist within it. 
 Elias’ work also holds appeal for Linklater due to its focus on the direction of long-
term social processes, of which we have seen the problem of harm is one.
322
 The expansive 
time-frames of Eliasian studies dwarf many studies of social change; comfortable with the 
physical sciences and theories of evolution, Elias adopted long-term perspectives that are 
more familiar in the context of geology or cosmology: 
“If humankind does not destroy itself, if it is not destroyed by a 
meteor or another cosmic collision […] the natural conditions of its 
existence will give humans the opportunity to tackle the problems 
of their life together on earth, or wherever, for a very long time to 
come. A future of 4000 million years should give humans the 
opportunity to muddle their way out of several blind alleys and to 
learn how to make their life together more pleasant, more 
meaningful and worthwhile. In the context of humanity’s future, 
short-term perspectives are necessarily misleading.”323 
 The outcomes of such long term processes are likely to be beyond the imagination of 
humanity as we currently know it; Elias pointed out how humanity, looking back from a time 
far in the future, would be likely to consider us as ‘late barbarians’ whose means of reality-
congruent orientation were limited.
324
 Such statements highlight the role of the detached 
sociologist in focussing on the direction of processes in society without becoming involved in 
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the projections of individuals – entanglements that betray theories such as Marxism and lead 
to their having a partial or ideological approach to social enquiry.  
 The combination of a focus on long-term processes of social change and the way in 
which they are manifested through complex nexuses of causes and functions, however, 
ensures that the normative aspect of the concept of figuration is somewhat unclear and hard 
to grasp. Indeed, contrary to the way in which normative claims are often drawn from 
concepts of structure or agency when applied to particular cases, Kilminster argues that 
‘What must be emphasized, though, is that ‘figuration’ is not a load-bearing structure in the 
Eliasian conceptual framework.’325 This ambiguity finds support in critiques which draw 
upon the specific claims of sociology to relative detachment. In particular, the specific 
contribution of sociology is unclear if a tendency toward greater relative detachment is a 
process societies are to undergo more broadly.
326
 From such arguments, it is hard to draw out 
the critical value that the sociology of harm conventions might hold; if structuralism and 
individualism in explanation both had significant normative consequences, then it is probably 
the case that figurations do too, particularly given the situated and historical nature of social 
science that Elias highlights. Indeed, historical sociology more broadly has made significant 
contributions to International Studies precisely along these lines; how we understand the 
changeability of the international system is at least partly influenced by our judgements as to 
its novelty or immutability.
327
 It is clear that the long-term approach provides a valuable 
perspective on the development of society and the problem of harm which is a part of this 
process, but in developing figurations as a concept, their normative consequences remain 
unclear. We will now attempt to address these consequences in order to clarify how 
Linklater’s Eliasian turn relates to the problems raised by Critical Theory in the context of the 
problem of harm. 
 
Involvement and Detachment in a Scientific Sociology 
It is clear that the formulation Elias developed is intended to result in a nuanced and 
testable sociology that provides a long-term perspective on processes of social development. 
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Furthermore, this involves the ‘sociologising’ of various academic endeavours, including that 
of process sociology itself, in order to evaluate the extent to which they were ‘involved’ in 
ways that might preclude the relatively autonomous investigation of social life. These process 
of involvement clearly impact upon the ability of social science to provide object-adequate 
explanations of the ways in which the problem of harm plays out. Explanation is not a 
straightforward endeavour, however, and a process of reflexive self-monitoring is as much a 
feature of society of large as it is in the sphere of knowledge production; Linklater draws 
attention to the problem of the ‘double bind’, a key Eliasian heuristic, as a key problem in 
international politics.
328
 How social science goes about this, then, is an issue of considerable 
importance if the critical value of the sociology of harm conventions is to contribute to the 
problem of harm more broadly. The process by which subjects project images of high 
fantasy-content in order to preserve its identity is a key point at which a process of 
detachment can contribute to a greater understanding of how we are situated with regard to 
the problem of harm; more broadly, it brings to light the way that ethically pressing concerns 
can quickly overwhelm the reality-congruence of our understandings. In order to illustrate 
this, Elias puts forward the attitude of a doctor toward his patient, demonstrating how the 
immediate empathetic response to suffering is less desirable than is a detached and more 
adequate approach to the problem.
329
 In doing so, he detaches object adequacy from critical 
value, arguing that their eventual re-connection will ensure a stronger position for scientific 
enquiry in the long run. 
The balance between involvement and detachment cannot be resolved firmly in either 
direction, but Elias argued that the role of the sociologist was to take a ‘detour via 
detachment’ that would result in more reality-congruent knowledge about the world and 
society. The culmination of this detour – the return to secondary involvement – is the point at 
which this knowledge can be understood as having a public-political role.
330
 From the point 
of view of our investigation, this is the point at which the object-adequacy attained by the 
sociology of harm conventions comes to ‘pay out’ in critical value. On Elias’ formulation, the 
critical value of knowledge is related to the degree of its object adequacy or reality 
congruence; the detachment achieved by the contemporary natural sciences is in this regard 
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far greater than that so far achieved by the social sciences. Importantly, relatively 
autonomous judgements are rarely emotionally comforting in the manner that social myths 
are, but are essential in steering our way through the manifold dangers that confront human 
social life, particularly in the era of nation-states and highly destructive weaponry that 
Linklater highlights.
331
 As harm confronts us in ever more abstract ways, it is clear that on 
this understanding of the conduct of scientific enquiry a commitment to detachment can 
operate as the basis for a scientific sociology that is better able to address these issues over 
the very long term.
332
 
 The idea that knowledge is formulated across a chain of generations is clearly a key 
aspect of this strategy. Elias’ arguments demonstrate a belief that knowledge can be more or 
less adequate to its object, and thus that the arbiter of its utility must be the testing of 
knowledge claims against the world from which they have been drawn. However, this raises 
concerns regarding how this is to be the case; while Elias would note knowledge loss as well 
as knowledge-gain as a function of various social processes, it is clear that his normative 
preference is for a stock of knowledge that is gradually built and refined over time.
333
 In this 
sense, when encountering the problems posed by the unobservability of particular forms of 
harm, we are encountering deficiencies in the current stock of available knowledge, methods 
and techniques.
334
 In this case, it is uncertain whether the return to secondary involvement is 
ever possible with any degree of confidence in the adequacy of knowledge; in this sense, our 
ability to imbue explanations with critical value is impeded by many of the criticisms levelled 
by the Frankfurt School concerning faith in science and instrumental rationality. 
 This is not to suggest that the knowledge produced by Eliasian sociology is purely 
instrumental, but rather that its relationship to practices of instrumental control is ambiguous. 
The scientific status of the sociology of harm conventions, when developed along Eliasian 
lines, seems to maintain many of the uncertainties that we have seen in approaches to the 
problem of harm so far; in many cases, we are unclear as to the potential ramifications of a 
given explanation in the way that the threefold problematic lays out. The Eliasian response to 
this uncertainty consists of two pillars. Reality congruence is the extent to which a given 
stock of knowledge is able to grasp its object in its complexity. Detachment is the process by 
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which the production of knowledge is conducted in a way that moves beyond a tendency 
toward heteronomous or biased evaluations. Both, conceptualised as processes that develop 
over time, give us an understanding of the role of science in approaching the problem of 
harm, but are nonetheless likely to be found wanting in one way or another at any given 
point. While indicating the attitude that the sociology of harm conventions should take, this 
formulation provides us with little insight into the ethical call that the problem of harm 
constitutes, and in doing so rests on the development of the scientific enterprise as a core 
value. 
 In this way, the gradual development of reality-congruent knowledge can be 
understood as the normative core that is at the heart of Eliasian sociology. It is not necessarily 
the case that this has to be identified with ‘progress’, as has often been noted by his 
defenders, but the idea of progress certainly pertains to sociology as a discipline, and 
knowledge production  more broadly.
335
 The return to secondary involvement is to occur 
once sociology has amassed a sufficient degree of reality-congruent knowledge such that it 
can contribute to the orientation of people toward each other in ways that are able to 
overcome the problems faced by the species.
336
 In other formulations, this is put forward in a 
rather more ‘scientific’ manner, in the service of control.337 While it would be facile to 
engage in questions of when this culmination would occur, it suffices to say that it is not now. 
As such, the critical import of the knowledge produced by figurational sociology is 
consistently deferred due to its incomplete nature, resisting the linking of object adequacy 
and normative concern that is core to how Critical Theory suggests we understand the role 
that International Studies can play in elucidating the problem of harm. This is most apparent 
in the way that the detour via detachment is described as being a useful endeavour ‘assuming 
that one does not get lost on the way’, a statement that clearly reveals the political implication 
of such a removal from political issues.
338
 While it may be possible to cleave somewhat 
closer to an understanding of science based on the gradual gathering and formulation of 
knowledge, in claiming critical value for the sociology of harm conventions, Critical Theory 
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would suggest that it is important to consider the political implications of what is being 
proposed. 
 
The Politics of Process Sociology 
 Elias’ figurational approach provides a framework for Linklater’s sociology of harm 
conventions that that is suited to the investigation of the changing forms that the problem of 
harm takes over time. However, the approach to knowledge formation in figurational 
sociology reveals a disparity between scientific and normative questions that cannot be 
resolved due to the deferring of such attachments being at the core of Elias’ theory of 
detached knowledge.
339
 Given the key normative issues that the problem of harm provokes, it 
is clear that the articulation of the problem of harm from the perspective of Critical Theory 
does not allow a straightforward adoption of Linklater’s sociological framework but must 
begin with an examination of the normative status of sociological investigation as a key point 
of contention. The tension between ‘getting things right’, on the one hand, and interventions 
based on normative standards means that the utility of the sociology of harm conventions 
must find a way to occupy this precarious position. Within figurational sociology, the 
consequence of this tension is that attempts to respond to the problem of critical value and 
demonstrate a strategy of practical involvement are in many cases rejected.
340
 
 This tension is most clearly seen in Elias’ understanding of the natural sciences, 
which the social sciences were in some regards to aspire to, whereby greater reality congruent 
knowledge is attained by a ‘detour via detachment’. When applied to sociology, this detour 
involves a movement toward greater self-restraint, psychologisation and rationalisation on the 
part of the social scientist.
341
 As such, scientific activity is not linked to the values we hold 
beyond their role in determining the often vague direction of scientific enquiry. Despite the 
eventual political role of sociology in helping to orient people in a way that allows them 
greater control over the processes they are caught up in, there is little to indicate what values 
this political role might embody. This is contrary to the practical drive of the critical theorists, 
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and serves to defer the important question of critical value until sociology is capable of 
articulating a body of reality-congruent knowledge with critical import.
342
 
 This approach raises two problems that can serve to orient the place of empirical 
investigation with regard to the broader questions asked in this thesis. Firstly, as has been 
indicated at various points above, academic drives toward detachment are always part of 
broader political processes due to the way in which they can only be considered through their 
relationship to a wider social background.
343
 In general, the answer from approaches that 
adhere rigidly to a sociological attitude would be the necessity of a ‘sociology of sociology’ 
in order to examine this problem. This, however, contributes to the deferral of the problems 
posed by social involvement at a yet-higher level, and does not successfully negotiate the 
ethical issues that come with this involvement.
344
 This deferring of political concern, in the 
long term, does not move beyond issues of philosophy in the way that Elias hoped.
345
 Such 
‘transcendental hangovers’ are necessary at some point if one is to ask what sociology should 
look like if it is to contribute to the political and normative life of the species.
346
  
 In response to this, Eliasian scholars have argued that figurational sociology, in 
detaching itself from the short-term ideological struggles of the day, does not resolve the 
problems that philosophy attempts to address so much as it dissolves them, reformulating 
them ‘on a higher level’. Such an argument is often presented by Kilminster, arguing that this 
reformulation marks Elias’ work as structurally different to philosophy.347 The danger of such 
a response is that it leaves political or normative commitments free to enter by the back door. 
Despite his evident commitment to detached social enquiry, Elias maintained particular areas 
of focus in his work that can be understood as a normative commitment to secular 
humanism.
348
 It remains the case, then, that the return to secondary involvement maintains 
some philosophical or normative core that is permissive of it. Based on some of Elias’ 
arguments concerning the approach of sociology, we can get a sense of what this normative 
core might involve. 
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 Of particular interest in this regard is the focus of Eliasian sociology on the 
development of long-term social processes. In attempting to escape the retreat of sociology 
‘into the present’ which served to reinforce historically-placed notions of individuality and 
subjectivity, the work of Elias often focussed on timescales that were substantially longer 
than most.
349
 Such an approach, of course, has the benefits that come with an expanded 
scope, including the ability to render a complex nexus of causes as historical processes. 
However, unless one is to negotiate the ethical problems that come with the return to practical 
involvement, it must do so through a neglect of present political struggles such as those we 
observed motivating engagement with the problem of harm in the first chapter. In doing so, 
one runs the risk of ‘smoothing over’ events that constitute a rupture or break with previous 
states of affairs.
350
 It thus projects a particular picture of the society that is the object of 
sociological enquiry. Given that processes can be stopped, started and reversed, the eventual 
designation of this or that process can only be pragmatically articulated. The point of the 
‘return’ or critical moment, or the public role of sociology as a ‘destroyer of myths’ is to 
bring these processes within the realm of intention and political discourse; the long term view 
thus does not exhaust the questions that may be asked of sociological knowledge.
351
 In this 
case, the Eliasian sociology that Linklater employs can interrogate the problem of harm, but 
not in a way that articulates clearly the normative commitments that are inherent to social 
scientific activity, either in general or deriving from its historical limitations. In this vein, we 
argue that it does not provide us a complete account of how we might navigate the link 
between scientific investigation and normative goals that Linklater suggests following the 
contributions of Critical Theory, and in doing so does not account for one of the key issues 
raised by the threefold problematic.
352
 
 These ambiguities ensure that the clearest aspect of Elias’ strategy for the return to 
secondary involvement lies in a focus on control and mitigation as the social function of 
scientific knowledge.
353
 While it is the case that Elias’ research programme was ‘structurally 
different to philosophy’ in the sense that his was a project of empirical research, the argument 
that it has transcended it seems premature while the question of critical engagement still 
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remains.
354
 This is not to suggest that process sociology does not have a role; indeed, we 
argue that in some form it is essential. However, in the context of the problem of harm, and 
particularly the strong source of normative engagement that it has held for International 
Studies, the power dynamics inherent in any answer to this question are important. 
Furthermore, who is to control or be controlled, how that is to be the case, and what form that 
control should take are questions that raise significant normative alarm bells following the 
critique of instrumental reason arising from Critical Theory, and does not lend much insight 
into the process of transitioning from scientific and detached knowledge to the ethical world 
of thinking subjects.
355
  
 
The Sociologist in Society 
 Having argued that Linklater’s adoption of the Elias’s approach to sociology does not 
fully account for the way in which critical value might arise from social-scientific accounts, 
we can begin to frame the key issue that the remainder of this thesis will address. This 
concerns ways in which we might occupy the space between an answer to the problem of 
object adequacy and a normative orientation toward suffering in a way that maintains the 
contribution of social science in light of the problems raised by Critical Theory. While the 
critical theorists put the possibilities that come with social science in an ambiguous but vital 
position based on its potential relation to the normative demands of suffering, we have argued 
that Linklater’s Eliasian sociology prioritises object-adequacy while the normative questions 
that the problem of harm provokes remain somewhat ambiguous. In working through this 
tension, the aim is to formulate an understanding of social science that is responsive to the 
demands of both camps and thereby validating the problem of harm as a source of normative 
concern for International Studies. 
 While Elias would never claim that he was, or could be, completely detached, the 
ideal of sociological knowledge production maintains detachment as a key point of reference. 
A faith in scientific development and a focus on empirically testable models come together to 
mask rather than expunge a normative foundation which is open to critique.
356
 If we 
acknowledge that the sociologist must be located within, and relative to, the society that is 
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being studied as well as to the world in general, it is all the more likely that this critique is 
pertinent to the further development of the sociology of harm conventions. Despite Elias’ 
tendency toward formulating a specifically scientific and thus relatively detached sociology, 
the extent to which scientific knowledge is socially embedded and derives its normative goals 
from the broader social totality have been demonstrated repeatedly.
357
 This problem is 
embedded in the threefold problematic that the problem of harm provokes as the problem of 
reflexivity, and has been one of the key contributions of Critical Theory to International 
Studies specifically.
358
  
 With regard to these objections, it is clear that Elias considered the knowledge that he 
was engaged in producing as a contemporary possibility that was to be superseded at some 
point in the future by the development of new methods and paradigms that were more reality 
congruent, in line with the reproducibility and falsifiability of scientific experiments. The 
prospective sociology of sociology that is one way of addressing the normative aporias that 
accompany this approach merely continues this pattern of ambiguity in relation to normative 
concern. While the empirical focus on long term and unplanned social processes can be seen 
to be an important area for sociological investigation, the relationship of such knowledge to 
normative value and critique leads us to suggest that we might develop an account of how the 
knowledge produced by sociology can engage with the sphere of ethical reflection and 
intentional action.  
 In grounding the sociology of harm conventions on an Eliasian basis, Linklater does 
not fully relationship between object adequacy and critical value that we have seen was the 
result of – and key challenge to – Critical Theory’s concern with the problem of harm. 
Sociological knowledge performs the role of informing subjects’ awareness of their 
involvement in the world in such a way as to orient them toward a greater degree of control 
over previously unintended outcomes. However, the commitment to detachment that is 
intrinsic to Eliasian sociology, which provides it with a great deal of purchase on the 
processes that culminate in the problem of harm, operates in a way that removes the 
production of sociological knowledge from this process of normative deliberation. At 
minimum, the point at which such investigations may have an impact on the way that we 
                                                 
357
 The development of the sociology of science following the work of Kuhn has served to highlight the social 
nature of scientific knowledge production. This is not to suggest that Elias was unfamiliar with this – he 
certainly was – but to highlight the way in which his vision for a detached sociology raises questions concerning 
the status of his own normative reflections. 
358
 Linklater, ‘The Achievements of Critical Theory’, 45. 
128 
 
expand our understanding of the problem of harm only makes the leap into the sphere of 
politics once a sufficient body of knowledge has been inaugurated; moreover, the criterion for 
such a leap are ill-defined beyond an interest in the increase of technical control. We are left 
with an understanding of social scientific activity that may only engage in a normative 
fashion at an indeterminate – and possibly never present – point in the future. Under these 
conditions, it is entirely possible that normative value arises from sociological work, but the 
shape that this takes with regard to the problem of harm is unclear. 
 Nonetheless, there are aspects of Linklater’s sociology that give rise to interesting 
possibilities for how we might investigate the problem of harm on an empirical basis, 
particularly with regard to time scales and process-oriented thinking. More generally, if 
sociology is to return to a public-political position, then the value that Eliasian scholars such 
as Linklater place on the production of sociological knowledge cannot be entirely exhausted 
by the formulation of that knowledge. The argument is that we can consider the preconditions 
for the return to secondary involvement in light of the uncertainty provoked by Elias’ 
account, and ask what kind of knowledge allows us to make that move. This would constitute 
a linking of object adequacy and critical value in the way that Critical Theory suggests should 
be the case. Such an examination is possible, we will argue, by considering the contribution 
of empirical and sociological knowledge in light of developments in the philosophy of 
science. 
 If this is to be the case, the first question that we must ask regards the position of 
sociological knowledge in relation to the broader social world; a question that is necessitated 
by the way in which Elias’ work consistently expresses such a relationship in the form of 
object-adequate or reality congruent accounts. The second concerns how we go about 
rendering intelligible these accounts for the day-to-day critical activity of subjects, a question 
of utility that requires an examination of their critical value. In this context, sociology 
provides a way of linking the concerns highlighted by Critical Theory with the wider social 
world; furthermore, it provides a context in which the experience of suffering places demands 
on International Studies to combat problematic modes of scientific engagement. In doing so, 
it allows us to better understand what is at stake for International Studies in the problem of 
harm, and why it feels the need to return to it as often as it does.  
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Conclusions  
The previous chapter concluded by demonstrating the way that Critical Theory had 
succeeded in presenting the problem of harm as a key area of normative concern, but did so 
in a way that placed great pressure upon attempts at social scientific activity that were 
oriented toward social change. This chapter addressed Linklater’s sociology of harm 
conventions as an attempt to address this problem; in terms of the threefold problematic, the 
aim was to understand how the link between object adequacy and critical value was 
formulated, and how this might sustain an empirical approach to the problem of harm. The 
conclusion was that Linklater’s sociology holds an ambiguous position toward how the two 
might be related in contrast to the critical theorists’ insistence on the absolute priority of 
suffering. In doing so, it is able to provide an account of long-term social processes which is 
in keeping with developing patterns of global interconnection and the harmful consequences 
that may result. However, we argued that important philosophical questions remain; an 
understanding of how figurational dynamics give rise to social entanglements does not 
exhaust the question of how sociological knowledge can come to be involved in the 
amelioration of harmful practices. In this regard, the Eliasian argument for greater relative 
detachment in sociological knowledge does not fully move beyond important issues in the 
philosophy of science that centre on the kinds of objects that the social sciences refer to. The 
further development of our argument, therefore, rests on the idea that Linklater’s democratic 
normative standard can be supplemented by another, which arises from the relationship 
between the sociology of harm conventions and the problem of harm to which it refers.  
Linklater’s sociological approach, as we have seen, makes a strong argument for the 
historical study of harm conventions as a contribution to the critical project. This holds 
immediate intuitive appeal in the context of Critical Theory, particularly given the similar 
way that each perspective accounts for the relationship between suffering and the problem of 
harm. However, the relationship between process sociology and the philosophical issues 
raised by Critical Theory remains a point of contention, a debate to which this thesis hopes to 
contribute. This issue is, we suggest, ever more pressing in the context of developing patterns 
of global interconnection; the development of new forms of harm in a complex global setting 
pushes us to consider the way in which the discipline might formulate viable accounts of 
abstract and structural harm and the normative consequences that may result. In doing so, the 
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sociology of harm conventions might better engage in the normative debate concerning 
particular forms of life that Linklater suggests it should.
359
 
This assessment raises the possibility of a reconstruction of the sociology of harm 
conventions that might, as a preliminary task, attempt to clarify these issues and in doing so 
gain a greater insight into what is involved in the ‘return to secondary involvement’. The 
tradition of reconstruction, characteristic of the reflexive efforts undertaken by Critical 
Theory throughout its history, operates in two ways.
360
 Firstly it seeks to make the 
assumptions and normative commitments of theoretical endeavour more apparent. Secondly, 
where problems or tensions are found, it serves to reformulate these in a manner that is more 
adequate to the underlying impulse; in our case, this impulse is the consistent engagement 
with the problem of harm that we found in International Studies. In order to do this, we will 
aim to address the underlying assumptions and philosophical commitments that were at the 
core of Linklater’s project and proceed to situate this reconstructed sociology with regard to 
Critical Theory.  
The starting point for this reconstruction will be involve a re-examination and 
development of some of the ambiguities that arise from Linklater’s account, foremost among 
which concerns the relationship between sociological knowledge and its normative 
standpoint. As we have suggested, the main point at which the process sociological account 
attempts to make this link rests on the relative detachment that sociology can achieve in its 
focus on long-term social processes. However, it is important to understand the normative 
implications of greater or lesser degrees of object adequacy in the relationship between the 
sociology of harm conventions and the problem of harm more broadly. In doing so, we might 
better understand how knowledge stands in relationship to the objects of sociological 
investigation in addition to its validity in the eyes of other subjects. The aim of our account, 
therefore, is to outline the way in which the relationship between the scientific drive toward 
object adequacy and the critical value of normative engagement can be related.  
The following chapters will deal with the various aspects of this reconstructive effort 
in order to work toward a conception of empirical enquiry that is better able to address the 
implications of Critical Theory for the problem of harm in International Studies. Chapter 4 
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will consider the question of object adequacy in the sociology of harm conventions, drawing 
particularly on a Critical Realist philosophy of science that we argue is suited to further 
developing the Eliasian perspective. This serves to both provide an understanding of the drive 
toward object adequacy and relate it to critical value. Chapter 5 will then put forward the 
approach to reflexivity that arises from this account, and demonstrate the consequences that it 
has for our negotiation of the threefold problematic that Critical Theory understands as 
central to our engagement with the problem of harm. In doing so, we argue that it is able to 
maintain the important insights of process sociology within a framework which is attentive to 
the normative and philosophical questions that Critical Theory suggests should be central to 
processes of social scientific investigation. 
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Chapter 4 – Ontology and the Sociology 
of Harm Conventions 
 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter concluded with the argument that Linklater’s sociology of harm 
conventions provided a descriptively rich way of addressing the processes that give rise to 
ideas of harm, but contrary to its aims did not fully formulate an approach to normative 
concern compatible with the demands of Critical Theory.
361
 In particular, two of the 
implications of Critical Theory for our understanding of the problem of harm – the problems 
of object adequacy and critical value – were not linked in a fashion that would allow us to 
understand the normative implications of social scientific investigation. From the viewpoint 
of Critical Theory then, Linklater’s approach leaves us unsure of the value that arises from 
the way that the sociology of harm conventions relates to the objects to which it seeks to 
refer. We argued that this ambivalence arises from the failure of Eliasian sociology to engage 
with normative issues, leading to an unclear articulation of the value of social scientific 
explanation. In response, we suggested that a reconstruction of the sociology of harm 
conventions might better account for this ambiguity, and in doing so provide an account of 
what the Eliasian return to secondary involvement might look like. 
 This raises problems for the normative promise that an engagement with the problem 
of harm presents for International Studies. In the first chapter, we saw that engagements with 
the problem of harm served the social function of rendering forms of harm more intelligible 
and clarifying their nature in order to open them up to critical engagement; Linklater’s 
approach can be seen as an explicit attempt to provide a sociological basis through which the 
normative that harm presents can be redeemed. Without an understanding of the values 
inherent to social scientific work, we are unable to clarify what contribution International 
Studies can make to debates centred on the problem of harm. This is particularly the case in 
situations where explanations in the interest of disadvantaged or outsider groups run up 
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against embedded understandings that operate in the service of harmful practices such as 
structural inequality. In the case of Eliasian sociology, a lack of engagement with 
philosophical questions leads to an unclear account of the kinds of social change that 
sociological knowledge contributes to; the critical value of particular social situations 
becomes subsumed under a focus on long-term processes that are not amenable to subjective 
intention when it is precisely the role of the sociology of harm conventions to bring them 
within this sphere. Our ability to engage with these processes in a more active fashion 
remains an important philosophical question which, we will argue, rests on the kinds of 
objects that social science refers to in its explanations. These normative issues are further 
underpinned by Elias’ rejection of involved normative enquiry in the service of an 
undertheorised ‘return to secondary involvement’ that takes place once sociological 
knowledge is sufficiently developed.  
This chapter is an attempt to negotiate the relationship between normative content and 
object adequacy in social science through a reconstruction of the sociology of harm 
conventions. In particular, it starts from the idea that it is possible for us to examine the 
preconditions of the kind of ‘return to secondary involvement’ that Elias lays out through an 
engagement with the philosophical questions that we found to be neglected in the last 
chapter. It will therefore attempt to demonstrate how we can make the connection between 
‘explicit normative commitments’ and ‘reality congruent knowledge’ with regard to the 
problem of harm, as Linklater suggests that we should.
362
 In this regard, we will address some 
of the foundational critical and political implications of empirical knowledge in a way that is 
linked directly to the activity of IS as it approaches the problem of harm. 
The fulcrum around which this effort turns concerns an account of social objects, in 
particular social structure, and a formulation of how this can serve as an object of knowledge 
for social scientific engagement in particular. This arises from our engagement with the idea 
of structural harm in Linklater’s work, an idea that we suggested highlighted the necessity for 
an investigation of ontological issues that are central if the sociology of harm conventions is 
to address forms of abstract harm that arise from new patterns of global interconnection. 
Furthermore, this to be formulated in a way which avoids the reification that Elias and the 
critical theorists were so cautious of.
363
 We will argue that that the possibility of combining 
the sociology of harm conventions with a critical strategy involves an attempt to analytically 
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separate aspects of society from the broader processes that is a part of – in other words, to 
abstract from the complex causal nexuses that characterise social life. Furthermore, this 
practice involves a particular form of critical activity that arises from the practice of social 
science itself and operates in a way that is separate from, but not incompatible with, the 
normative standard Linklater adopts.  
Central to this reconstruction will be an examination of Critical Realism (CR) as a set 
of philosophical commitments that vindicate the critical and development of social scientific 
practice, and IS by corollary. Critical Realism presents a valuable contribution to the effort 
undertaken here; it has both been influential in the development of work in IS and has key 
affinities with Eliasian process sociology, although such relationships have not been explored 
fully.
364
 The starting point for the position taken by CR is the transcendental question of what 
the world must be like for social science to be possible, a question which introduces a 
subject/object aspect to investigation that is rejected in Eliasian sociology.
365
 The 
characteristic conclusions that follow from this question, that the subject exists in the context 
of a relatively mind-independent reality that is susceptible to scientific investigation, raises 
the possibility of a reflexive and systematic form of sociological investigation that is centred 
on causal enquiry.
366
 In the context of the sociology of harm conventions, Critical Realists 
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argue that an understanding of how reality is not always immediately apparent allows us to 
conceptualise social science as functioning in a situation which does not allow unmediated 
access to the social world. Explaining these social strata at various levels, as well as their 
interconnection, allows us to better account for the structural element of harm claims as well 
as structural harm per se, thus clarifying some of the ontological questions raised in the last 
chapter with regard to the value of engaging with the problem of harm in IS. Furthermore, it 
gives some hints as to the value of social scientific knowledge in clarifying, explaining and 
bringing to light harmful situations such that it can contribute to the problem of harm in a 
productive fashion. 
The resulting reconstruction of the sociology of harm conventions demonstrates an 
approach to the problem of object adequacy that circumscribes society as a sui generis object 
of knowledge which is in key respects separate from the way that we talk about it. As such, it 
contributes to a form of enquiry that contributes to the critique of existing social conditions. 
More particularly, it is able to acknowledge its own limitations in a way that was not built-in 
to the Eliasian approach, locating this in a failure of the subject/object relationship rather than 
just as a failure of detachment and accounting for the way this is presented in the formation 
of scientific knowledge. As such, it offers an account of the role of social structures in our 
accounts of the problem of harm, as well as their fallibility, by decoupling of our knowledge 
of structure from its causal effects. In doing so, we are able to maintain the importance of 
accounts of structural harm, particularly where asymmetric power relations may serve to 
disguise its prevalence and effects. This leads us to suggest that the subject/object axis 
rejected by Eliasians in fact constitutes an important point at which social science can 
contribute to developing understandings of harmful practices.  
In performing this reconstruction, we are able to clarify several points that remained 
ambiguous in Linklater’s approach to the problem of harm in a way that provides an essential 
link between the problems of object adequacy and critical value, thus remaining responsive to 
the demands of Critical Theory. This link rests on the Critical Realist idea of explanatory 
critique, through which beliefs and social institutions such as social structure become subject 
to criticism based on the development of scientific knowledge. As such, we are able to locate 
a second normative standard that compliments Linklater’s and which inheres in the way that 
social science is related to its object of enquiry. However, the necessarily provisional nature 
of knowledge production under this framework, as well as the social limitations that it 
requires us to acknowledge are part and parcel of scientific activity, still need to be 
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considered in light of their potential contribution to harmful practices. How the 
reconstruction put forward here relates to the problem of reflexivity, as the third aspect of the 
threefold problematic, is to be considered in the final chapter. 
 
Social Structure as a Discrete Object of Knowledge 
 In our examination of Linklater’s Eliasian sociology, we encountered several claims 
that concerned the way in which figurations become objects of knowledge for us, and which 
lead to the necessity of an account of ontology that can underpin the sociology of harm 
conventions and its relation to practice. This, we argued, demonstrated the need for a greater 
understanding of the objects that social science refers to if we are to understand more fully 
the way in which it relates to the problem of harm. This relates to the linking of object 
adequacy and critical value that Critical Theory insists on in our understanding of the 
threefold problematic. In the first instance, the explanations that the sociology of harm 
conventions provides necessarily makes reference to the forms of social interconnection that 
they refer to; we saw some of these in Linklater’s taxonomy of harms. Furthermore, in 
formulating knowledge of this social background, some forms of social life may require us to 
abstract in order to identify deeper patterns and structures.
367
 These social interconnections 
are not entirely reducible to the concepts held by agents but instead are conceptualised and 
renegotiated in a reflexive fashion. This raises the question of what it is the sociology of harm 
conventions refers to in its critical engagement with the problem of harm.  
This section aims to address this question, arguing that the project of the sociology of 
harm conventions implies the necessity of a discrete analytical object in the form of social 
structure. In doing so, it serves to resituate the practice of sociology with regard to the 
philosophical reflection on ontology and epistemology that Elias was so reticent to engage in. 
Such a relationship between Eliasian sociology and the Critical Realist (CR) philosophy of 
science addressed here has been hinted at several times both within and without the key 
authors in process sociology, but has remained a limited debate. The aim is to engage in a 
process of underlabouring through which we can begin to make sense of the critical import of 
the sociology of harm conventions, and which, as we saw in the last chapter, is precluded in a 
process-focussed approach to sociology. 
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Linklater’s contribution to our understanding of harm in IS was to reformulate it 
sociologically as the problem of harm. Rather than strictly defining harm, the sociology of 
harm conventions shifts our focus toward the changing set of social interactions that are 
recognised as harmful, and which are arrived at through a historical process of social 
negotiation. They are, therefore, emergent from social and historical circumstance due to the 
way in which their possibility is historical and transitive; they may not have been possible in 
different times or in different places. Elias was, in all likelihood, correct in arguing that such 
changes are likely to lie in the realm of unintended consequences.
368
 However, in the last 
chapter we saw that the critical value of the sociology of harm conventions lies in how it 
might mitigate these such that possibilities for the amelioration of harmful practices might 
result. It is necessary, then, for us to account for the way that knowledge relates to the object 
that it attempts to account for. Without such a process of investigation, it becomes difficult to 
clarify the implications of the control or orientation that Elias espoused as a generalised 
normative goal for sociology.
369
 
This attempt, however, takes place in the context of the concerns raised by both 
Critical Theory and figurational sociology with regard to reification, and more generally the 
problem of object adequacy in the context of the problem of harm. In this case, rather than an 
objectively existing real and emergent object, concepts become a useful but also dangerous 
reduction on the part of the social scientist through which social objects are rendered static 
rather than fluid. While the critical theorists understood reification as a process that arises 
from a dependency upon instrumental reason in the struggle against nature, Elias made the 
parallel sociological argument that reification constitutes part of a narrativising process 
through which people simplify complex phenomena in order to live their lives in a stable 
fashion.
370
 The potential violence that such reifications can be complicit in means that the 
question of whether we are committed to reification when we discuss social structure is of 
great importance. If, on the contrary, social science is engaged in discussing something 
ontologically separate from its accounts of social reality, then such understandings may serve 
to open up areas of social life to critical evaluation that would not be accessible otherwise.  
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Debates in the philosophy of science have reflected upon these issues with a view to 
understanding the values implicit in the practice of science. In considering whether an 
analytically viable concept of social structure is possible in a way that is not merely 
reificatory, Harre and Bhaskar have debated whether social structure is real beyond the 
concepts that subjects use when they engage in speech acts. Harre argues: 
“It is only a change of discursive conventions that changes the 
lived narrative that is a social order. Where does political action 
start? It starts in the everyday stories that you [people] tell, […] 
how they live their lives, but not in terms of grand taxonomic 
concepts. Real change, that is permanent amelioration of the 
conditions of life, occurs on a very small scale.”371 
Social structure is one of the key ‘grand taxonomic concepts’ that Harre is addressing. 
When we utilise the concept of structure, we apply a taxonomy that is an object of thought, 
both immaterial and non-causal beyond this. The social realm can be understood as the 
discursive construction of agents and the way that they comprehend the world. Emancipation 
and social change are thus to be found in a kind of grammatical reform, with the failure to do 
so being located in the maintenance of forms of discourse that are not cognisant of the 
processes and potentials of social life. Such a categorisation is clearly amenable to Linklater’s 
project, particularly in the context of Elias’ argument against state-reductive or difference-
insensitive thinking. 
The idea that language may have to fundamentally change in the process of 
emancipation may be the case, but this assertion does not appear to exhaust the causal 
potential of social structure. The speech act, which is the basis of Linklater’s broader 
evaluative standard for harm conventions in its Habermasian form, does not operate in 
isolation from a social background, but nor is it merely reflective of it; in the critical 
arguments we have seen from the critical theorists and Elias, it is necessary to do justice both 
to the conditioned and creative aspects that the process of social negotiation involves.
372
 The 
most immediate response to Harre’s constructionism is to argue that there is in all cases some 
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restriction on what can be proposed in circumstances of normative deliberation, as evidenced 
by the restrictive causal impact of material distribution. Our understanding of these 
restrictions is precisely what makes the sociology of harm conventions necessary in the first 
place, and was one of the failings of Critical Theory in its tendency toward generalisations. In 
this spirit, Bhaskar notes the availability of particular ingredients on the ability of a cook to 
perform his work as evidence of this causal impact.
373
 While it may be the case that 
reificatory practice may be one limit on what people might think or do, it is also the case that 
reference to particular material distributions demonstrates the existence of something that is 
more than contingent, a necessary relationship that is the essential background against which 
subjects are historically positioned. The utility of such a reference point is evident given the 
way in which the organisation of material capabilities often presents us with situations in 
which the distribution of discursive power is decidedly asymmetrical; in the last chapter, we 
saw the impact that this may have on agents’ abilities to gain acknowledgement for particular 
forms of harm. Furthermore, the debates in International Studies in the first chapter showed 
this struggle for recognition operating within the sphere of social scientific activity. In these 
contexts, more than will is required if change is to be brought about. 
Harre’s response distinguishes between causing and conditioning in these forms of 
negotiation, effectively isolating the play of language games from such historical features. 
However, Bhaskar contests this distinction, revealing both the close relationship between 
subjects and their environments and the beginning of an account of sociological knowledge 
that is sensitive to their interplay: 
“Social structures can certainly enable as well as constrain. In that 
sense, they are positive as well as negative. It is correct to argue 
that nothing can happen for those structures to maintain themselves 
in being without human activity. But that is trivial. I can’t see the 
point in distinguishing […] except if you want to say that positive 
causality is just human intentional causality. But that seems totally 
arbitrary.”374 
And goes on to claim that structure, as a taxonomic category: 
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“Is not only a taxonomic category, it is a taxonomic category with 
a referent.”375 
Bhaskar’s argument holds strong similarities to that of the critical theorists, 
particularly with regard to the potential consequences of the accounts we give of society. The 
idea of social construction that Harre defends is essentially self-referential in that freedom 
lies with the ability of a person or group to reinvent themselves and their relationship to each 
other. However, when structures become institutionalised or abstracted and rendered present 
in social action, they are capable of causal impacts recursively, taking a role that Harre is 
incapable of recognising outside of language. To this extent, the fact that we cannot observe 
structures in an empirical manner does not inhibit our interaction with them. This runs 
parallel to Marx’s critique of political economy; people refer to abstract structures in both 
their inner and outer lives, and they may have an impact both on the way in which people 
think and the way they act, labour and organise the material world. This was certainly the 
case for various green, gender and postcolonial theories that we saw in the first chapter. If 
this is the case, then they are an object of knowledge for us, and have impact that go beyond 
what we might immediately recognise in our descriptive accounts of social life. If this is the 
case, then we require a way of addressing them in order to work against the kind of 
reificatory thinking that Critical Theory puts forward as an ethical imperative arising from the 
problem of harm. 
The question becomes how we might articulate those features of the social world that 
come about in a fashion that is more than merely contingent, a key feature of scientific 
activity. If all social situations are characterised by relationships of mere contingency that the 
theorist binds together narratively, they would not be real relationships at all, and social 
science would be impossible to consider. In general, this holds for the methods of science 
more generally; Archer considers that the methods of science, broadly construed and 
including those of falsification and induction, would be rendered unintelligible if contingent 
events pertained in a complete lack of internal relationships.
376
 However, it is clear that 
science does work, and is intelligible given the clearly effective role it has played in the 
development of instrumental knowledge and production. As we have seen, Bhaskar indicates 
the way in which the social world may be amenable to similar (but not identical) methods, 
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thus leading to a social science in which the assumption of some level of social ordering is 
justified and necessary. The argument is that sociology can make the assumption that 
structuring forces are a relevant feature of the social world.
377
 
If it is the case that social science makes the assumption of a structured reality that is 
not merely apparent, then its role with regard to the problem of harm is to make these 
structures more intelligible to subjects. This requires an engagement with the ontological 
question of what these structures are; if we do not know, any attempt at engaging normatively 
with the problem of harm would have no traction. In addressing the Critical Realist argument 
that the reality of social structures consists in their having causal powers that are relatively 
autonomous from the actions of individual agents, we are therefore engaging with the 
possibility of a link between the problems of object adequacy and critical value that was not 
resolved in the work of Linklater, and which could underpin an approach to social science 
compatible with the demands of Critical Theory. 
 
Causation as a Key Aspect of Social Structure 
 In engaging with the existence of concepts such as social structure, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that there is, contrary to Harre’s taxonomic categories, some way in which they 
exist historically such that the world would not be the same if they did not – that is, that they 
present an object of knowledge that exists objectively outside of our accounts. Arguing that 
structures emerge from patterns of social interaction, Archer claims: 
‘But what is it about X which leads us to attach the concept of 
‘emergence’ to it rather than simply viewing X as the name given 
to the particular combination or permutation of A, B, C, N’? The 
crucial distinguishing property is that X itself, and itself being a 
relational property, has the generative capacity to modify the 
powers of its constituents in fundamental ways and to exercise 
causal influences sui generis.’378 
 Key parallels between the background elements of socialisation that were noted in the 
previous chapter and the ontological distinctiveness of social structure emerge from the 
                                                 
377
 Ibid., 167. 
378
 Ibid., 174. 
142 
 
Critical Realist account. Social structures hold causal power due to the way that emergent 
properties are alienated from any particular individual or group; in Bhaskar’s terms, there is 
an ontological hiatus between societies and people.
379
 This is a key difference from the 
Eliasian argument in the previous chapter, and one that makes an idea of structural harm 
possible. While Elias’ emphasis lay on the inseparability of people from social structures, the 
Critical Realist account emphasises their relative autonomy and causal power upon their 
constituent elements. While noting the importance of relational thinking, social structure is 
understood as an additional level of social life; not merely a conditioning factor, but an active 
component in causal complexes. 
 In terms of the game-metaphors that Elias was fond of, but contrary to his focus, the 
Critical Realist account notes that there are ways in which chess, or the waltz, persist over 
time as possible objects of knowledge even when they are not being played. Account for the 
way in which structured patterns of social behaviour are relatively durable over time 
demonstrates the necessity of an account of how subjects and structures relate in settings 
where their relative timescales are markedly different; there are features of society which pre-
exist and post-date the lives of particular subjects that engage in the social activities they 
underpin. Characteristic of this mode of thinking is the Annales School of history, which 
focussed in a distinctive fashion on social life as a series of interaction across different 
objectively grounded frames of reference.
380
 This kind of approach seems to offer one way 
that we might move past some of the problems that came with the Eliasian approach, in 
which the subsumption of shorter timescales under the longer had the consequence of 
potentially missing moments of great normative significance in the lives of subjects.  
 However, and in line with the insights Linklater’s sociology offers, this ontological 
distinction can only ever be considered relatively autonomous due to the way that social 
structures are ultimately constituted by subjects and exist as a result of their activity. In this 
regard, the individualist focus criticised by both Elias and the Critical Realists retains some 
truth due to the way in which the statement ‘no people, no society’ still holds.381 However, in 
engaging with the problem of harm, subjects conduct themselves through a society that is 
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pre-given to them, whether in the form of artefacts, resource distributions or prior forms of 
knowledge; more broadly, they operate in the context of the actions of others, many of whom 
are long dead.
382
 In this case, subjects refer to an objectivation, or real abstraction, of social 
forms that are structured in particular ways. In Linklater’s argument, we saw that a capacity 
for recognising suffering played the role of a structured universal upon which the rest of the 
problem of harm was based; similarly, we can see the Rosetta Stone, or a library, as objects 
that require conceptualisation in order to decipher (and these conceptions can of course be 
wrong), but which hold and inherently structured form that dictates the potentials that they 
contain over time.
383
  
 These real abstractions are essential to the sociology of harm conventions, as it by 
engaging and labouring with them that it comes to contribute to the way that the problem of 
harm plays out in social life. More particularly, addressing generational problems across 
differing timescales such as climate change, oil stocks and biodiversity are central to the way 
that social science can contribute to normative deliberation.
384
 In formulating an ontology 
suited to the way that society pre- and post-dates particular subjects, Bhaskar claims: 
“Now if society pre-exists the individual, objectivation takes on a 
very different significance. For it, conscious human activity, 
consists in work on given objects, and cannot be conceived as 
occurring in their absence. […] For all activity presupposes the 
prior existence of social forms. Thus consider saying, making and 
doing as characteristic modalities of human agency. People cannot 
communicate except by utilizing existing media, produce except by 
applying themselves to materials which are already formed, or act 
save in some other context. […] Even spontaneity has as its 
necessary condition the pre-existence of a social form with (or by 
means of) which the spontaneous act is performed. Thus if the 
social cannot be reduced to (and is not the product of) the 
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individual, it is equally clear that society is a necessary condition 
for any intentional human act at all.”385 
 Social structure cannot be observed independently of the way in which it is tied up in 
the activities of particular subjects, and can only be understood as real through the way in 
which it acts, causally, upon those subjects. As we saw above, the distinction between 
‘causing’ and ‘conditioning’, particularly with regard to social structure, does not undermine 
the ultimately causal nature of the argument. This bears strong similarities with Elias’ 
rejection of linear causation for a focus on nexuses of multiple causes.
386
 The fact that a given 
social structure or set of structures, by virtue of their pre-existence, are able to define the 
background against which a subject acts demonstrates the essential importance of 
understanding how these causal powers come to be exercised; in Linklater’s terms, we are 
attempting to understand the ways that the problem of harm emerges historically.
387
 
 
The Critical Realist Approach to Causation 
 Thus far, this chapter has made two key arguments. Firstly, the ontological hiatus 
between agents and structures demonstrates the possibility of structures as a discrete object of 
knowledge for the sociology of harm conventions in a way that can contribute to its critical 
value. Secondly, our inability to observe social structure outside of its interaction with agents 
ensures that any explanatory attempt must account for the way in which the two interact, 
which is necessarily causal in operation. Critical Realism attempts to develop the notion of 
cause so that it might operate more in line with the Eliasian understanding of multiple and 
complex causation. Contrary to the Humean argument that articulated causation as constant 
conjunction between atomistic events, this section will argue that the concept of causation 
requires extension into the non-empirical realm in this manner if it is to be of utility to the 
sociology of harm conventions. The attempt to move beyond empiricism is key to Bhaskar’s 
critique of the epistemic fallacy, or the reduction of society to our knowledge of it.
388
 If it is 
possible to move beyond the constant-conjunction model, it may be possible for the sociology 
of harm convention to contribute to debates concerning the problem of harm in a world where 
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the constant conjunctions that would allow the formulation of causal laws are not apparent.
389
 
In doing so, it can begin to account for the kinds of contribution that, we have seen, various 
critical perspectives offer to the problem of harm; in highlighting the constitutive role that 
structures play in knowledge and practice, we can come to recognise the deep implication of 
many everyday practices in producing and reproducing harmful structures that preclude our 
understanding of the presuppositions upon which it depends. 
 As we have seen, there are many aspects of social life which lie outside of their 
immediate conceptualisation; ideas of structural harm articulate the way in which society 
continues to act upon us whether or not we know about it. In this context, Marx commented 
that there would be little need for science if there were no distinction between essence and 
appearance in social life.
390
 As Elias’ and Linklater’s focus on unintended outcomes reveal, 
there are more consequences to social action than we know, and it is in this context that social 
science must address the nature of such unobservables. Our argument is that the Critical 
Realist framework can provide a basis for this in a way that the influential Humean viewpoint 
is unable to, particularly given the empiricist scepticism toward the ontological reality of 
causal claims.
391
 This scepticism is grounded on the understanding of causation as a 
fabrication of mind; an epistemic leap that is made when constant conjunctions of 
observables are experienced in some way.
392
 It is only this regularity that allows a a causal 
claim to be made, limiting the Humean argument reliance on a strict empiricism.
393
 In 
restricting the foundation of knowledge to what it was possible to know about the world, 
Hume’s approach to science restricts its basis to an epistemological one, with an 
understanding of the deep causal nature of the world remaining ultimately unknowable.
394
 
 The arguments put forward by Critical Realism attempt to demonstrate how scientific 
activity can address unobservable structures, thus providing a way that the sociology of harm 
                                                 
389
 Ibid., 125.  
390
 criticalrealism.com, ‘Roy Bhaskar Interviewed (Transcription)’, The Website for Critical Realism. 
391
 Kurki argues that the rejection of causal arguments in social science by the hermeneutic tradition has served 
to reinforce the Humean understanding of cause as the only game in town. Milja Kurki, Causation in 
International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis, 1
st
 Edition. (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 60. 
392
 A cause is defined by Hume as ‘an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects 
resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects which resemble 
the latter.’ Cited in Ibid., 35. 
393
 It is worth noting here that there is a debate in the literature regarding the distinction between what has come 
to be known as ‘Humean arguments’, and those things that Hume himself believed. For an appraisal of these, 
see Hidemi Suganami, ‘Causation-in-the-World: A Contribution to Meta-Theory of IR’, Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies 41, no. 3 (1 June 2013). 
394
 Kurki, Causation in International Relations, 37. 
146 
 
conventions might come to buttress contentious accounts of abstract harm that run counter to 
received understandings. This rests on a transcendental argument that, through an 
understanding of the practice of science, seeks to decouple the equivalence between 
‘unobservable’ and ‘unknowable’ in philosophy. The reducto ad absurdum that this 
equivalence leads to is made clear by Bhaskar: 
‘What distinguishes the phenomena the scientist actually produces 
from the totality of the phenomena she could produce is that, when 
her experiment is successful, it is an index of what she does not 
produce. A real distinction between the objects of experimental 
investigation, such as causal laws, and patterns of events is thus a 
condition of the intelligibility of experimental activity. And it can 
now be seen that the Humean account depends upon a 
misidentification of causal laws with their empirical grounds. 
Notice that as human activity is in general necessary for constant 
conjunctions, if one identifies causal laws with them then one is 
logically committed to the absurdity that human beings in their 
experimental activity, cause and even change the laws of nature! 
The objects of experimental activity are not events and their 
conjunctions, but structures, generative mechanisms and the like 
(forming the real basis of causal laws), which are normally out of 
phase with the patterns of events which actually occur.’395 
 This understanding is in line with the Eliasian argument for scientific detachment, and 
rests on the acknowledgement that the world operates regardless of the historically-
contingent observability of a given scientific object. However, it also has consequences for 
Elias’ focus on empirical testability as a way of combatting reification.396 The model of open 
persons adopted by Linklater tends toward the acknowledgement of the stratification of 
people, but does not outline the way in which they are so. Understanding that object-adequate 
sociological knowledge must push beyond what we are able to observe indicates that 
sociology as a scientific endeavour needs to engage in far deeper analyses of the causal 
powers involved in social formations and open systems. In particular, it presents the 
possibility of investigating the potential causal powers of social structures that does justice to 
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their influence beyond the concepts held by agents, thereby allowing us greater opportunity to 
account for forms of harm that lie outside of status quo narratives. This is achieved through 
the rejection of the constant-conjunction model for one in which the idea of cause is 
characterised by a unity of things, powers and properties and which centres on the 
mechanisms through which causation can be understood.
397
 In doing so, it provides IS with an 
understanding of causation through which new concepts of harm might arise, making it 
particularly suited to the clarification of abstract forms of social interconnection.  
 Ontological monovalence – the single-level atomist ontology of the Humean 
philosophy of science – is replaced with an ontology that posits a stratified reality as a way of 
analytically separating the appearance of things from their essence. Science investigates these 
stratified properties and the relationship between them in a way that is real, and not merely 
imposed by an imaginative observer. This situates the process of observation against a reality 
in which causal powers can be real, actualised or empirical, thus restricting the empiricist 
case to a limited (and in the case of open or complex systems, very limited) domain when 
considered against the actual properties of objects. This accounts for the way that causal 
powers can be real but unexercised, exercised but unobserved or precluded, and exercised 
and observed. The real causal mechanisms that are observable in closed systems are those 
that inhere to the object, not merely a function of what we know about it. The domain of the 
actual takes this into account, attempting to demonstrate the multifaceted interaction of causal 
powers that occurs within open systems, such as society, where they are inevitably forced 
together in complex and little-understood ways. The empirical, however, is the point of 
Hume’s prohibition of deep causal statements and can be considered as the point of 
experience through which the other domains may be indicated and point from which the 
epistemic fallacy proceeds.
398
 In Bhaskar’s argument, the domains are organised such that the 
domain of the real is greater than or equal to the domain of the actual, which is greater than or 
equal to the domain of the empirical.
399
 
 In line with the Eliasian focus on situating human knowledge against a broader 
context, Critical Realism argues for the removal of causal powers from their observability in 
a way that drastically undermines the scientific observer as the central tenet of 
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experimentation, instead putting them in a relational position with regard to their object of 
study. The aim of scientific engagement is to distinguish between internal and external 
relations between objects such that the discrete causal characteristics of emergent objects 
such as social structure can be uncovered. This process attempts to identify the aspects of an 
object that are necessary and internal to a given thing, or contingent and external.
400
 Internal 
relations are those that are necessary for something to be itself and not another; whether 
symmetrical or asymmetrical, their continued existence is necessary to the reality of a thing. 
External relations are those that relate to the exercising of powers that it has by virtue of 
natural necessity; while inherent to the particular form through which a structure can be seen 
or experienced, their reality in a particular situation is not inherent to the thing as such. The 
differentiation between internal and external relations forms a foundational moment of 
critique; while the negative evaluation of class is something external to the argument as such, 
Marx’s demonstration that class was internally related to the social formation of capitalism is 
the point which underlies the broadening of the critique of capital from individual instances 
of exploitation.
401
 It is at this point in the Critical Realist argument that scientific knowledge 
of structures can contribute to the object-adequacy of our explanations. In bringing to light 
those causes that were not previously permitted by our ontology, it is therefore able to 
highlight new avenues for exploring social interactions as harmful including the forms of 
abstract harm that Linklater suggests.
402
 
 Causal enquiry therefore consists of an effort that aims at grasping the real causal 
powers and properties that constitute objects by abstracting from those elements that are 
contingent to it. However, in abstracting from contingent elements, we are also abstracting 
from important elements that characterise particular forms of exploitation. This exercise of 
judgement can only be advanced through means of a qualitative inquiry – what is it about x 
that allows y to happen? Such questions are given in a sociohistorical context that forms one 
basis for epistemological relativism in scientific enquiry due to the way in which it 
incorporates the position of the investigator relative to the object of concern.
403
 Science 
remains limited by the technology and possibilities of particular historical eras, thus limiting 
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any notion of absolute truth. However, in deepening the notion of cause in this way, we begin 
to see the outline of how we might account for complex elements of social background within 
the sociology of harm conventions in a way that begins with a relatively universal concern 
with suffering. This allows us to emphasise the implication of social structures in day-to-day 
life in a way that articulates some of the core concerns that Linklater’s idea of structural harm 
gives rise to.
404
 
 
Broadening the Notion of Cause to Include Social Structure 
 Having put forward the Critical Realist argument for considering social structures as 
real, we can now situate this argument with regard to the effects of social structure in order to 
situate what is at stake in paying attention to the role of structures in harm. Typically, 
explanations of international politics have focussed most heavily on efficient causation, the 
pushing or pulling that is characteristic of understanding states as ‘billiard balls’.405 However, 
we have argued that the essential causal powers of objects ensures that our empirical 
experience of their interaction – most easily observable through the efficient cause – is not 
sufficient to provide a broader picture of causal powers and their interaction. The Critical 
Realist understanding of causation provides a basis for this broadening that does not fall into 
this pitfall. 
 Kurki provides an explanatory framework that is focussed on the nexus of causes, 
drawn from the work of Aristotle. The four-cause model encapsulates the oft-used efficient 
cause while also incorporating the material, formal and final causes in a way that holds 
potential for dealing with the complexity of open systems. The taxonomy given in the 
diagram below is useful due to the way in which it accounts for, and moves beyond, 
regularity theory as the basis for causal statements. The dichotomy presented between 
intrinsic and extrinsic causes demonstrates the way in which empiricism operates as a 
limitation on how we understand real objects. Through the adoption of a stratified ontology, it 
becomes possible to incorporate a broader notion of cause which may better articulate the 
relationship between the relative autonomy of agents and the social facts that are incorporated 
in their understanding of the problem of harm; furthermore, it incorporates the ‘conditioning’ 
and ‘causing’ dichotomy raised by Harre above.  
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Fig. 1 Kurki’s Aristotelian causal model.406 
 
 In the four-cause model, we also find an elaboration upon Bhaskar’s claim regarding 
the inadequacy of prioritising human intentional causality, a key issue in approaching the 
myriad other factors that influence the course that ideas of harm take over time.
407
 To the 
extent that social science is accounting for real causal powers that are exercised in the world, 
they operate against some background (material cause), and through some action (efficient 
cause). As social action is, furthermore, dependent on the concepts that agents hold and work 
with, this operates according to some pre-given (formal) idea, and for the sake of some 
reason (final cause). Rather than pure action, or even action pushing or pulling against some 
constraint, we find a more nuanced conception of how human intentional causation is able to 
operate in a world where both material and ideational forms are pre-given and causally 
efficacious, but at the same time are able to preserve the element of creative agency which 
characterises human activity and labour on worldly objects. In this regard, it does justice to 
Elias’ model of open persons and provides a way that we can account for the disparity 
between potential sites of harm and actors’ knowledge of them. 
 The attributing of causal powers to social structures in this way bypasses the objection 
that structures do not have agency by drawing a distinction between agency and causation 
that makes it possible to discuss society that does not reduce it to an aggregative collection of 
individuals. The idea of accounting for persons ‘in the round’ suggested by Elias attempts to 
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draw attention to the way in which people are bound together, and in this formulation is laid 
out in a way that these relationships are complex but knowable. Furthermore, it maintains the 
avenue of causal enquiry by virtue of the incorporation of elements through which ‘the ties 
that bind’ are outlined on an ontological level which lends itself to social scientific 
observation. The use of a depth realist ontology leads to a way in which we might begin to 
isolate and explain causes in society, and not merely describe empirical phenomena. By once 
again beginning with the concept of social structure, the following sections will outline a 
basis for the reconstruction of key aspects of Linklater’s historical sociology that is attentive 
to the concept of object adequacy and its link to critical value. In doing so, it seeks to 
formulate a way in the objects referred to in the sociology of harm conventions comes to have 
normative content. 
 
The Critical Realist Concept of Social Structure and the Sociology of Harm 
Conventions 
 In reformulating Linklater’s social ontology the chapter so far has defended a deep 
ontological understanding of causation that is intended to incorporate structural conditioning 
and meaningful human agency and, importantly, the relationship between them. The 
importance of this lies with the ability of social science to render intelligible sites of harm 
that are abstract with respect to the understanding of historically-placed subjects. Doing 
justice to these abstract factors rests on an acknowledgement of causation that goes beyond 
subjective intention and is based on the ontological properties of real things, i.e. their causal 
powers. This section seeks to lay out this relationship in the context of the sociology of harm 
conventions. 
 The onus of this question lies with the way in which we are able to speak of society 
beyond individuals in sociological discourse, and whether this is defined pragmatically by the 
theorist or in terms of a stratified and ontologically variegated whole which is not reducible 
to individuals. Thus far, our argument for this has rested on the differentiation in temporal 
terms between structures and agents. In this sense, the manner in which structures pre-exist 
agents and remain structured over time demonstrates this; the structure by which the factory 
worker come to be exploited pertains regardless of whether that role is fulfilled by Diane or 
by David. However, this section will argue that the broader and deeper notion of causal 
powers developed above links our attempts to reach object adequate articulation of the ‘stuff’ 
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of figurations directly to the critical import of social scientific knowledge. As such, it serves 
to link these two sites in a way that flows directly from the activity of scientific enquiry. 
 By positing the criteria of causation as the arbiter of the reality of objects, Critical 
Realists aim to move past the structure/agency debate and demonstrate that in the return from 
the peaks from abstraction, the theorist finds their analysis immersed in a complex world of 
causal forces and ontological differentiation that allows for a non-reductive account of the 
relationship between structure and agency. This form of explanation puts forward social 
structure as having internal tendencies that are of a particular form through which we can 
understand them as being not some other thing; this pattern marks the Critical Realist 
approach as placing ontological value on the concept of social structure that refuses to reduce 
the import of sociological knowledge to just another form of discourse. In short, it is not just 
that science produces knowledge, but that it produces knowledge of something and can be 
understood through its relationship to that thing. That this relationship is one of relative 
autonomy marks knowledge as transitive with regard to its relatively intransitive object.
408
 It 
is in negotiating the relationship between transitive knowledge and intransitive knowledge 
that Critical Realism promises to articulate the possibilities that scientific knowledge presents 
for the problem of harm, allowing us a better understanding of how the knowledge produced 
in IS relates to its object. 
 A key aspect of the reconstructed sociology of harm conventions is its requirement of 
a concern with social structure as an objectively existing causal influence on the development 
of the problem of harm and the way it is addressed. This concern arises from the centrality of 
the concept of emergence in the Critical Realist account; while social structures and agents 
are real, the former are not autonomous but emerge from the actions of the latter. This 
provides an explanatory contrast to Elias’ pragmatic concept of processes, incorporating that 
understanding of change over time but being more willingly to analytically separate elements 
of these according to the ontological properties of objects. That objects arise from other 
objects but are not reducible to them is described by Sayer: 
‘In such cases [of irreducible phenomena] objects are said to have 
‘emergent powers’, that is, powers or liabilities which cannot be 
reduced to those of their constituents. This phenomenon suggests 
that the world is not merely differentiated but stratified; the powers 
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of water exist at a different stratum from those of hydrogen or 
oxygen. Emergence can be explained in terms of the distinction 
between internal and external relations.’409 
Internal relations are those that must maintain if the object is to remain qualitatively 
what it is, as opposed to some different kind of thing; this maintains as much at the level of 
the social as it does at the realm of the natural science. As real things operate relationally to 
each other with regard to their causal powers, then it becomes necessary to acknowledge that 
there is some quality to the shape of those relationships through which distinct and particular 
sets of emergent powers may arise. Humans in particular warrant attention for the way in 
which the referentiality of social structures is capable of modifying behaviour, and the way 
that this can come about in a conscious manner.
410
 The sociology of harm conventions, in its 
critical role of bringing to light new and unacknowledged forms of harm, can serve to explain 
these relationships in a way that highlights the structured nature of these relationships. 
The insufficiency of Harre’s taxonomic categories is insufficient due to the way that 
these emergent powers and properties are relatively enduring and do cannot merely be 
‘wished away’. The decisive move beyond the theorists of structure as ‘virtual until 
instantiated’ is made in Critical Realism is made when it is acknowledged that, within 
history, references to structure are always more than present-tense constructions. Due to 
human activity being reliant on already-existing materials, social structures are always 
constructed, as it were, out the materials of the past including the actions of the long dead.
411
 
However, contrary to the Eliasian argument, the reality of social structures opens up the 
possibility of our investigating them as sui generis objects and opens them up to evaluation 
with regard to the problem of harm. The concept of emergence, furthermore, is a 
presupposition of any form of social investigation whatsoever; in finding society as it is given 
to us, and being reliant on the actions of actors but also some broader social background, the 
process of emergence that the empiricists shied away from becomes much less mysterious.
412
 
The density of relationships that we are studying when we examine the problem of 
harm can be understood through the model of internal relations with reference to Kurki’s 
model of Aristotelian causes. Through this it is possible to characterise agency within society 
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through the common example of the sculptor, requiring each of the four causes if the block of 
marble is to become something else according to his or her intention. In this relationship, 
structurally emergent properties (SEPs) are those that are emergent from relationships 
involving some predominant material element that is pre-given, such as a distribution of 
resources or power relations.
413
 In this way, the possible actions that an agent can take are 
limited due to the constraints given by these properties; it is not merely that one can ‘wipe 
away’ climate change or collectively ‘wish away’ the threat of nuclear weapons, but rather 
that they act in the context of climate change or the threat of nuclear weapons as real, abstract 
objects that exist in a structured way over time and with regard to some socially mediated 
concept. While recognising the implication of subjects in various harmful practices, the 
Critical Realist argument therefore allows us to account for the way in which intention 
constitutes only part of the problem of harm; in paying attention to the way in which 
structures contribute to harmful practices, we are able to account for the recalcitrance of 
structural influence in the face of our goals. 
 
The Relative Autonomy Thesis 
In considering the ways that structures can be said to pre-exist the actions of particular 
subjects, we encounter a claim that runs counter to the descriptive content put forward by 
Elias concerning the nature of figurations. The idea that structures (or games, to use Elias’ 
analogy) do not have existence independently of the players can only be true to the extent that 
a structure is composed entirely of the actions that constitute it. This can be seen not to be the 
case, as the concepts held by subjects can be held separate to particular interactions; it is, for 
example, one possible outcome of the sociology of harm conventions to explain exploitation 
in general, and this does not require any particular person to be exploited and can be 
understood without taking part in the process of exploitation itself. While the process is 
perpetuated or transformed through the actions that take place during its enactment, the 
concept-dependency of social action requires that there is some further pre-given resource 
upon which the communicability of the actions we are referring to is based. 
In order to take part in the process of contestation that we have termed the problem of 
harm, subjects must refer in an abstract sense to what constitutes it in order to render it 
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intelligible to others. While it may be the case that forms of harm do not exist, or are not 
enacted, where agents do not engage in them, they nonetheless continue to exist as abstract 
structures through the rules according to which it is constituted, and thus remains real in the 
Critical Realist sense but in a way that is not actualised. As such, these structures can be 
analytically distinct objects of knowledge that have a causal impact on the ways that agents 
engage with the problem of harm.
414
 Furthermore, these objects of knowledge hold power 
over how, where and when behaviour is organised into particular fashions; agents refer to 
them in order to make sense of their social location and implication, and the problem of harm 
as described by Linklater lends an ethical quality to this engagement.
415
 
It is this that forms a basis for the relative autonomy of social structure in a world 
where contingency often masks their deeper causal nature – the accounts of harm that we 
examined in the first chapter attempt to articulate this in a way that makes forms of harm 
clear despite the way that they do not occur 100% of the time. However, as their ultimate 
reality is to be based on the natural necessity of their internal relations, there is, in any case, a 
long list of actions which may call upon a structure without changing it at any deep level. The 
nature of social structures is therefore defined by a level of relative autonomy from the levels 
of stratification from which they emerged, and which is further complicated by the way that 
causal powers may be non-apparent or non-actualised. On this basis, Critical Realists have 
put forward the transformational model of social activity to describe the interaction between 
analytically distinct structures and agents. From Bhaskar’s contribution to this area, Archer 
develops a morphogenetic approach in which: 
‘Society is not a simple cybernetic system, which pre-supposes a 
particular structure capable of carrying out goal directed, 
feedback regulated, error-correction. All of these are special 
kinds of system and society is another, which is only like itself 
and is itself because it is open, and is open because it is peopled, 
and being peopled can always be re-shaped through human 
innovativeness. Hence the use of the term ‘morphogenesis’ to 
describe the process of social structuring; ‘morpho’ indicating 
shape, and ‘genesis’ signalling that the shaping is the product of 
social relations. Thus ‘Morphogenesis’ refers to ‘those processes 
                                                 
414
 As Margaret Archer argues for the Rosetta Stone. See Ibid., 99. 
415
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which tend to elaborate or change a system’s given form, state 
or structure’.416  
The critical realist approach moves beyond conflationist theories inasmuch as it holds 
that society is both a necessary condition, and the outcome of, human agency in history. The 
circularity in Archer’s statement above, that society is only like itself and can always be 
reshaped, rests on an understanding of the outcomes of human agency as the elements upon 
which the next cycle of human intentional activity is conducted. Thus agents engaging with 
the problem of harm both receive understandings through convention and socialisation, as 
well as interrogating the actions of past agents and reacting in light of their reflections. 
Participation in social life under this conception becomes a labour of production in a very real 
sense, as society provides the means for its reproduction through the very means which 
constitute it in the form of agents with the capacity for innovation and concept-led action.  
The basis provided by the relative autonomy thesis allows forms of historical and 
sociological explanation that decentres the priority given to processes in the Eliasian account. 
This approach, labelled ‘analytical histories of emergence’ by Archer, works by drawing 
upon the essential Critical Realist question of what it is that makes a given social order 
possible, and is thus directed toward the constellations of internal relations that underlie 
contingent historical events. The stratification of society in analytical histories of emergence 
is further predicated on the relative autonomy thesis due to the way in which knowledge, as a 
historically changing product, need not be object-adequate for it to be practically adequate. 
Bhaskar’s formulation, of the agent who often unknowingly produces and reproduces the 
social structures that form historical context is often not reliant on object adequate knowledge 
so much as a performative minimum that may be underpinned by mistaken understandings.
417
 
This offers significant support for accounts of abstract harm that, as Linklater notes, often 
operate in the context of unfavourable distributions of power in their attempt to highlight the 
legacy of, for example, colonial exploitation or the continued development of intensive 
production in the context of climate change.  
As such, it remains a possibility that the direction of the causal tendencies held by a 
social structure may be quite different from those that it is understood, or believed, to have. 
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The necessary participation of actors, therefore, does not preclude the relative autonomy of 
social structures in terms of their tendential direction and consequences.
418
 Rather than the 
insufficient category of ‘unintended consequences’ which was utilised by Linklater to situate 
the direction of society as relatively independent of our expectations, Critical Realism allows 
us to implicate the causal basis of this direction in explanation. By placing the agent of such 
consequences in a world that exists relatively autonomous of them, we maintain a place for 
conceptual and creative action while not requiring that these concepts are object-adequate. 
Archer’s morphogenetic sequence allows us to lay this out in more detail such that we can 
elaborate on the relationship of this knowledge to society further. 
 
The Morphogenetic Sequence 
 Archer’s formulation of the morphogenetic sequence provides us a way in which 
social science might analytically distinguish between agents and structures on the basis of 
their temporal differentiation and their relative historical transitivity.
419
 In the sociology of 
harm conventions, this allows us to understand the way in which people contribute to the 
prevalence of particular harm conventions, but also receive others in a way that they have 
little part in initiating. This requires us to acknowledge the possibility that multiple actors can 
contribute at different times to the same social structure, or at least the same causal sequence. 
This process is demonstrated by Archer in the following diagram:  
 
 
 
 
Fig 2: Archer’s morphogenetic sequence420 
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 The analysis proceeds through three timespans, each of which represents a pattern of 
interaction that pertains between different ontological strata. Each of these are considered as 
different orders of emergent properties, with first order emergent properties being the results 
of previous actions, second order the results of those results, and so on.
421
 The ‘tails’ between 
T
1
 and T
2
, and T
3
 and T
4
,  demonstrate the necessary pre-existence of structural conditions and 
the necessity of structural elaboration. Given that the process is a cycle (and therefore the 
‘tails’ are the beginning/end points of other cycles), there is no point at which structure and 
agency are manifestly separated except for the sake of analytical distinction. Due to this, 
there is no way for the structural elaborations that agents engage with except in the context of 
material conditions which may restrain it, just as there is no structural conditioning that takes 
place in a concept independent manner. Development through different strata from the first 
order emergent properties that define pre-existing structural conditions to the elaboration of 
these conditions at the third order in morphostasis or morphogenesis demonstrates the 
importance of engaging with the generative mechanisms that constitute social structure. Such 
a formulation extends the way in which we are able to consider structural determination by 
reformulating it as the structural element that underlies all social activity; the study of 
structure in the sociology of harm conventions thus focusses as much on structures in harm as 
it does on structural harm per se. 
 An essential element of Archer’s formulation lies in the way that there is no point at 
which society is un-structured.
422
 In transposing the theoretical underlabouring of Bhaskar to 
the realm of sociological investigation, we find the basis for a social theory that transcends 
the debate between determinism and individualism by situating them relatively on different 
ontological strata. The object of sociology is not, therefore, to find results that reside on the 
level of agency or of structure, but rather to examine the real relationships between them.
423
 
This serves to highlight that any particular engagement with the problem of harm can only be 
understood as being continuous from, and preceding, other cycles. The process of structural 
elaboration, through which morphogenesis or morphostasis become actualised is 
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simultaneously a process through which processes become part of the force of history, and 
allows us to recognise the way in which seemingly harmless everyday practices might 
contribute to broader forms of abstract and structural harm. 
Paying attention to structure in this way allows us to formulate a response to critiques 
of determinism that have plagued many structuralist accounts of history and of society, in 
particular in light of the claim that men make a history that is not of their own choosing.
424
 It 
is precisely that which pre-exists us that constitutes a determining force on agents in society 
while ensuring that they have the potential for creativity at all. While a certain level of 
determinism is pervasive due to the imperative of social reproduction, the relative autonomy 
of social structures allows such determining forces to operate at varying levels of 
stratification; while this force might be contingently or tendentially influential, it is equally 
true that they may be out of phase. On this basis, Potter defends Bourdieu as a kind of limited 
determinist who is both willing to acknowledge the importance of structural determination 
but also the creativity inherent in agency.
425
 It is not that structure has to account for every 
actual outcome, but rather that agents make reference to things outside of themselves in their 
acts of spontaneity and creativity; even acts of spontaneity make reference to, and account 
for, a social background which is at least partially determined. 
 Archer’s framework provides a rich concept of social structure that allows an 
acknowledgement of tendential influence in open systems. In engaging with, creating and 
recreating ideas of harm, agents are not reduced to the demands of internal relationships or 
social roles; indeed, the long and complex biographies that are carried with us are themselves 
emergent properties that react in various ways to the positions we find ourselves filling. In 
most cases, this nexus of emergent properties is exponentially more complex than what is 
required or defined by the role as such, introducing tensions and points of conformities that 
are far from mechanically or functionally defined. Within the Critical Realist framework this 
does not mean that structures do not exist, but rather that they continue to exist in a way that 
is either non-actualised or not empirically accessible; nonetheless, they provide a continued 
object of knowledge that can be factored into our sociological accounts. In examining the 
various forms of structural conditioning, we will see that its subtle effects upon social 
interaction may be flouted or moved beyond, but in a way that holds reference to the causal 
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powers involved as real and which is important for our accounts whether they are manifested 
or not. As such, the ability to provide accounts of such structures is one of the key points at 
which International Studies can contribute to reflection on practices in social life. 
 
From Conditioning to Social Action 
 To further elaborate upon this claim, it is important to note some of the ways in which 
structure may influence the behaviour or agents and provides the preconditions of social 
action such that it always takes place with reference to structured historical conditions. This 
allows us to understand social structure as a key aspect of the kind of social explanation that 
the sociology of harm conventions engages with. Once again, the key points to be made are 
the analytic differentiation of structure and agency and the stratified nature of social reality. 
While the differentiation of structure and agency permits an analysis of the way we might 
account for structures when engaging with the problem of harm, it is the broadening of the 
concept of causation that provides our ability to flesh this out empirically. The four-cause 
model addressed above thus provides us with a way of accounting the complex ways in 
which social structure becomes implicated in daily life. 
 The argument thus far has highlighted that the world into which we are thrown is 
characterised by the pre-existence of structures that are the result of actions that have gone 
before. It is this that is the ‘stuff’ of society that is given to us, with all its consequent 
emergent powers and history, as the basis for social interaction and which may go beyond our 
knowledge of it; failings in our knowledge may concern the nature of this inheritance and its 
tendencies.
426
 Applying this idea to the concepts of harm that actors elaborate, we can 
understand agents as proposing them in the context of their position, and reflections upon this 
position, within various social structures. This process of reflection is what we have 
suggested is the role of International Studies with regard to the problem of harm. It may be 
the case that a given agent can move from one social position to another, thus adopting a 
different stance with regard to society, but such a move is always from one set of objective 
conditions to another.
427
 This is what Bhaskar understands as the position-practice system, or 
the point at which we can understand contributions to the problem of harm to be actualised in 
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the bridging of structure and agency.
428
 The relational nature of such a system ensures that 
the received aspect of what people understand as harm does not merely reflect what they have 
received, but places it in relation to a set of historically mediated interests that are drawn 
from their position within history. 
 Developing the position-practice system further, we can see that the pre-given nature 
of a social position is likely to incur costs should one, in the process of structural elaboration, 
choose to move between positions. This can be clearly seen, in a monetised form, in the ‘Fair 
Trade premium’ that a consumer pays when deciding to consume Fair Trade goods.429 Such 
constraints are emergent from previous actions undertaken, themselves arising from previous 
actions, and so on. More particularly, the structuring of possible movements within the 
position-practice system outlines these opportunity costs in a general sense by mapping the 
paths it is possible to take through society. The sociology of harm conventions can be seen as 
aiming toward an ethical dimension to this process of mapping centred upon the problem of 
harm. In cases such as these, the costs associated by consuming Fair Trade goods – in this 
case, monetary – are a function of the consumer being able to shoulder the additional 
financial burden or adjust their pattern of consumption to suit; this, of course is a function of 
the position of the actor vis-à-vis the cost of the goods, of which competency in ethical 
decision making can only be understood as a part. 
 While the above examples lay out some basic ways in which a subject may be 
conditioned with respect to the objective position they find themselves in, the positon-
practice system also provides some insight as to positional dispositions with regard to other 
actors in society. While conflict, negotiation and others are not purely a function of structural 
conditioning, it is not easily possible to separate out, from the point of view of social science, 
the system from the lifeworld; the question is one of objective and ontologically given 
properties that are presented to, and woven into the being of a given subject. Indeed, with 
regard to Fair Trade, the rendering of the ‘Fair Trade Premium’ as a monetary cost with a 
definable price tag is one form of adaptation to modes of decision making already familiar to 
the consumers the products are targeting. In this regard, the position and trajectory of actors 
at least partly contributes to their dispositions in social interaction, and so strategic action is 
at least partially pre-conditioned by the situational logic that reflections on social structure 
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can reveal.
430
 While this may be seen as a kind of ideal-typification, the key point to be made 
is that there is a strong historical basis that underpins contemporary outcomes. In particular, 
the ability to negotiate the problem of harm, indeed to comprehend the ways in which it is 
possible to negotiate it, is the result of previous morphogenetic sequences and structural 
elaboration, as well as being related to other external and contingent relationships. 
 Taking the structuring of social life as a real factor to be accounted for by the 
sociology of harm conventions allows us to enquire into the nature of these relationships, 
which can be demonstrated through four ideal-typical examples. The first of these, internal 
complementarity, can be understood as a necessary relationship that serves to reinforce the 
integration of social order. This leads to a disposition toward protection in the strategic action 
of agents.
431
 In the example of Fair Trade, its adoption of a market pricing mechanism that 
rests on the consumer choosing to pay a premium can be understood as compatible with the 
broader market system, although this relationship has in no way been a simple one.
432
 
Nonetheless, it is in harmonising its basic principles with those of the market that Fair Trade 
became widely acknowledged ethical movement.
433
  
The second of these is internal incompatibility, in which the state of the social form is 
reliant on a particular underlying tension, as in the case of Marx’s conception of class 
struggle. Antecedent sequences, in this case, form the prior distribution of resources upon 
which the current state of the struggle is based with behaviour being influenced by the power 
gradient that pertains at the time.
434
 The pattern of strategic interaction in this case has the 
potential to reveal ruptures in the social fabric in a way that is self-revealing to a far greater 
extent than the other situational logics, and which can serve as the basis for historical action 
aimed at moving beyond the structured status quo. This, furthermore, is what leads Bhaskar’s 
argument for the methodological primacy of the pathological which, in the case of the 
sociology of harm conventions, leads directly back to the possibility that the social sciences 
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might operate as an interlocutor with suffering subjects and their engagement with the 
problem of harm.
435
 
While the first two examples rest on ideas of harm being internal to a given social 
form, external relations also pertain that are causally efficacious but not necessary for a social 
system to be what it is. As such, accounts of social structure need to be open to potentially 
radical change which can be reinforcing (compatible) or disruptive (incompatible). The first 
of these leads to a situational logic of appropriation, through which the portrayal of factors as 
falsely internal can reinforce the action underpinning society more broadly. The second leads 
to a situational logic of elimination on the part of vested interests due to the potentially 
disruptive way in which it can impact upon pre-given structural relationships.
436
  
These examples are given in order to demonstrate that the lack of an object-adequate 
conceptual framework on the part of actors does not necessarily derail the integrative 
capacity of social action. While actors in most times and in most places have needed a 
concept of harm in order to hold society together, as Linklater notes, we would argue that the 
scientific correctness of this concept does not matter as much as its practical adequacy.
437
 In 
short, the performative minimum that is required of actors in highly integrated societies does 
not just through the social inculcation of concepts but is inherent to the structured life of a 
society and the relative positioning of its actors. As such, the process of social interaction that 
we understand as the problem of harm is not merely a discursive construction, but a broader 
negotiation that shifts the constitution of subjects habitus’ with a degree of reflexivity with 
regard to agents’ social position, and it is the role of the sociology of harm conventions to 
enhance that degree of reflexivity in an object-adequate fashion. In this regard, it becomes 
clear that gaining an understanding of the deep seated structural positioning and historical 
trajectory of actors requires a concept of structure if it is to fully articulate the stratified layers 
of social being. This is not to prioritise one structure over another, but merely to put forward 
the way in which they may interact in complex ways that require disentangling if the political 
consequences of our social accounts are to be made clear. 
In expanding on the idea of social structure, the Critical Realist account provides a 
way for us to investigate the points at which the homo clausus subject is necessarily 
underpinned by involvement in social structures but also, through abstraction, is able to 
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engage with them in a positive sense. It should be emphasised once more that the objective 
positioning of social structures is not determinist, but serves to represent causally-efficacious 
dispositions that may be followed, overcome or altered in the process of structural 
elaboration. This is in line with the character of Eliasian dispositional concepts such as 
functional democratisation but shoulders an additional burden due to the way in which it 
highlights avenues for potential social strange in the activity of abstraction. While the 
Eliasian method tended toward the destruction of myth by demonstrating the links between 
subjects and their interdependence, a further push is needed toward an attitude that serves to 
critique the position of a subject within society as an ontologically distinct object, a task that 
is fulfilled in Bhaskar’s framework through the category of totality.438 As was indicated in the 
final stages of the previous chapter, it is only in examining the quality of the links between 
subjects that we can understand sociological knowledge as having critical value based on its 
object adequacy, and thus make the link between the two that our reconstruction has aimed 
toward. 
 
Processes, Critical Realism and the Problem of Harm 
 The Critical Realist approach argues that processes are real in the sense that they are 
causally efficacious along the lines of Kurki’s diagram above. While the aim of sociological 
accounts is not prediction, the understanding of processes as causal is necessary if it is to 
have any explanatory value other than that of mere allegory; the sociology of harm 
conventions thus makes processes intelligible as a way of highlighting avenues by which they 
might be maintained or deviated from. From the forms of structural conditioning examined 
above, we can see that this operates in a context in which social forms may promote or resist 
forms of change in ways that are irreducible to the actions of agents. This is in line with 
Linklater’s argument that engagement with the problem of harm may be somewhat more 
difficult when it concerns issues that are stabilised by particular concentrations or gradients 
of power, but also highlights a possible avenue for bringing them within the realm of 
intentional activity.
439
 While it would be impossible to conceive of a society without people, 
the key point to be made lies with the fact that any conception of reality must be more than 
those people themselves, lying in their relative emergent properties; any understanding of 
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process must operate in a broader relationship to the social totality than the changing 
characteristics of agency over time. 
 As with the earlier distinction between structures and agents along temporal lines, the 
analysis of process must be understood according to its dimension in time as a necessary 
element of explanation. Causal explanation, in its Humean form, is rightly rejected by both 
Critical Realists and Eliasians under these circumstances due to its ‘time slice’ presentation 
of temporally differentiated social situations and reliance on constant conjunctures of events. 
Without a definite link, the processes explained in the sociology of harm conventions would 
necessarily be limited to the mind of the theorist and are therefore limited to aesthetic 
judgements; by adopting the Critical Realist framework, it is instead the case that causal 
explanation can be taken seriously in an ethical sense because the objects it refers to are real. 
We can therefore distinguish between empirical processes and real processes such that their 
utility can be understood along the lines of the Realist idea of transitivity/intransitivity. 
Empirical processes, as per the Humean argument, are necessarily constructed in the mind of 
the observer and are apparent to us in the domain of the empirical. In this regard, they form 
part of knowledge which is transitive with regard to its object. The Eliasian framework is 
limited to this domain due to its modelling of object-adequacy as a function of the 
‘involvement’ or ‘detachment’ of the social scientist. Real processes, by contract, necessarily 
operate along causal lines and require a mode of explanation that is not limited to the 
empirical domain; it is this insight that the Realist reconstruction of the sociology of harm 
conventions offers. This insight, it should be noted, is not possible without introducing 
‘transcendental hangovers’ that enquire as to the nature of unobservables in a way that we 
saw Kilminster reject in the previous chapter.
440
 
 This allows us to consider the element of change that is at stake in process-based 
thinking. In particular, the relationship between processes of qualitative and quantitative 
change is heavily linked to what has been described as the morphogenetic sequence; the 
quantitative proliferation of a new idea of harm always occurs in the context of some 
previous distribution of ideas and material capabilities, taking up a stance with regard to them 
in a more-or-less creative fashion. Importantly, this may occur at various ontological levels 
that are not necessarily directly observable or conscious. The tendency for structures to 
provide a basis for their own re-enactment in terms of knowledge recalls Marx’s claims 
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regarding the proliferation of needs as they are conditioned by the positioning function of 
social structures.
441
 Indeed, this process is one component of the cultural, geographic or 
technological specificity that the problem of harm takes on in different historical situations, 
and which leads it to vary so widely.
442
 The disjuncture between subjective viewpoints and 
real economic processes lies at the heart of the Marxist critique of capitalist society with 
regard to the essence and appearance of the commodity form, an insight that is carried into 
the Critical Realist understanding of how social science operates.
443
 Again, the sociological 
enterprise in this formulation concerns a clarifying of the relationships that constitute society 
and social action. In this, it relies on the distinction between structure and agency, and the 
accompanying difference in methods and modes of knowledge formation, to the extent that it 
considers ‘society’ an object of knowledge at all. 
 In reformulating the sociology of harm conventions along Realist lines, the rejection 
of Humean causal enquiry does not lead to the rejection of causal enquiry per se. However, 
and acknowledgement of causation as an important issue in social science necessitates a 
broader acceptance of the broader Critical Realist agenda, including the taking of structure as 
having objectively real causal powers and potentials. This provides a ground upon which the 
sociology of harm conventions is able to consider categories of structural harm, and also to 
consider the role of structures in harm as part of a broader strategy of explanation. 
Structurally focussed theories gain their salience through an explanation of practices that 
move beyond what is empirically observable toward an understanding of the objective 
consequences of adherence to particular social forms. In doing so, however, they necessarily 
acknowledge process due to the way that historical enquiry is located in and focussed on the 
relationship between particular outcomes and the more general form to which they relate; it is 
not, however, necessarily the case that they are focussed on all processes. Indeed, claiming so 
was a key drawback of the Marxist legacy.
444
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Critical Realism and Scientific Practice 
 Having highlighted some of the differences between the Critical Realist 
reconstruction put forward here and Linklater’s sociology of harm conventions, it is possible 
for us to highlight the key condition that permits the Critical Realist framework to make a 
link between object adequacy and critical value in its engagement with the problem of harm. 
While Linklater’s evaluative standard of discourse ethics remains a feasible (though highly 
formal) formulation of the ideal standard for the negotiation of harm conventions, a focus on 
these negotiations draws attention away from the critique of social structures that the 
sociology of harm conventions seeks to inform. In arguing for this second axis, we are 
arguing for the contribution of social scientific knowledge to the way in which the problem of 
harm is engaged in; it is not merely another voice in the debate, but a particular perspective 
with its own set of values and problems. By demonstrating the way in which knowledge of 
social structures is possible, if tentative, the Critical Realist approach provides us with a new 
perspective on the threefold problematic, in which the problem of harm is considered from 
the viewpoint of knowledge production. The result, we will argue, is to complement the 
intersubjective focus of discourse ethics with a mode of critical engagement that arises from 
the knowledge produced in processes of social scientific enquiry. 
 Contrary to the ‘hard’ dichotomies that characterise traditional International Relations 
(domestic/international), Critical Realism puts forward a stratified and emergent reality 
according to which these distinctions make sense only at the analytical moment and in 
proportion to the underlying reality.
445
 Substantively, the power of social scientific 
explanation lies in the ability to trace the real causal powers and relations between complexes 
and entities, the relatively autonomous spheres of which are capable of causally efficacious 
and mediated interpenetration. In this context, the redescription and reformulation that is part 
and parcel of scientific practice takes on the role of expanding world-views in a way that 
challenges our categories through a confrontation with what previously escaped them. The 
first form in which scientific knowledge contributes to the Eliasian ‘destruction of myth’ is, 
therefore, the way in which explanations sit in relation to other explanations, and which can 
be considered critical by definition. This is in line with Linklater’s approach to the sociology 
of harm conventions which highlights the necessity of informing engagement with the 
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problem of harm through less involved explanations.
446
 In accounting itself to the properties 
of objects first and foremost, Critical Realism allows us to understand the hunter-of-myths in 
ontological, rather the purely epistemological, terms. 
 This practice, through which the formulation of empirical knowledge allows the 
passing from empirical statements to statements concerning values, is intrinsic to explanation 
in Critical Realism due to the way in which beliefs form a constitutive element of the object 
of social scientific study.
447
 This forms a further point at which the destruction of myth 
occurs, and where Critical Realism draws a critical edge from the values inherent to scientific 
activity. If the reproduction of social structures requires concept-dependent action, then the 
production of more object-adequate explanations can be understood as critiquing and aspect 
of them directly.
448
 It is possible, therefore, for empirical claims not merely to improve the 
engagement with institutions, but to critique those institutions as such. This point is clarified 
by Collier with regard to particular social institutions or real abstractions, such as the wage-
form, which themselves are involved in the reproduction of false belief either contingently or 
internally to the social form.
449
 In light of explanations that are false or inadequate, it 
therefore becomes necessary to produce better explanations and thus follow a critical strategy 
of explanation with normative content.
450
 In addition to Linklater’s orientation of normative 
engagement toward the democratic negotiation of the problem of harm, this reconstruction 
argues that work following Bhaskar draws attention to the values inherent in scientific 
practice which lay rest on the subject/object axis. In general, the contribution of Critical 
Realism to the sociology of harm conventions lies in its decentring of the object, as opposed 
to the decentring of the subject that occurred with intersubjective-focussed ontologies.
451
 
 However, there are points at which the work of the social sciences is more complex 
than the natural sciences – the former necessarily engages with society as an open, rather than 
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a closed system subject to experimentation.
452
 Bhaskar’s argument leads to a process 
consisting of four stages. The first of these is the resolution of an event into its components, 
consisting of causal analysis. The second is the redescription of component causes. Thirdly, 
retroduction and the development of analogies is used to move to possible antecedent causes 
of components via normic statements, finally followed by the elimination of alternative 
possible causes.
453
 This process, in proportion with the plurality of possible causes, can be 
understood as articulating the importance of new concepts for understanding harm and which 
rest to some extent on the historical and hermeneutic basis of such theorising. The result is a 
model which remains open to challenge both the objective and intersubjective levels, but 
most importantly carries ontological import due to its world disclosing character; the values 
at stake in the contribution that the sociology of harm conventions makes are not arbitrary, 
but drawn from the real experience of the marginalised in society. The similarities between 
the realist account and that provided by Elias is apparent once it is realised that this can 
‘increase the range of real non-utopian) human possibilities which may, of course, also mean 
decreasing the range of imagined ones, by showing certain of these to be purely 
imaginary.’454 This is functionally identical to Elias argument for a relationship between 
detached and object-adequate knowledge, but in addition offers a broader ontological account 
of the kinds of objects social science can make a difference to.
455
  
 There are three major characteristics of scientific activity found in the Critical Realist 
framework that bear directly on the position of social science with regard to the problem of 
harm, and which are put forward by Collier. Firstly, the social sciences are explanatory 
sciences and do not make pretence concerning their predictive potential. Secondly, they are 
sciences without closure. Thirdly, they carry hermeneutic premises.
456
 Each of these can be 
related directly to the problem of harm as it relates to knowledge production in the threefold 
problematic: 
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- The problem of object adequacy: There is a hard limit on object adequacy placed on 
the social sciences by the complexity raised by society as an open system. The 
discipline is, therefore, fundamentally limited in its approach to the problem of harm 
in a predictive sense, and instead should place its focus on rendering the preconditions 
of forms of harm in a more intelligible fashion. In particular, this activity rests on the 
important task of elucidating the structured elements of social life, thus clarifying the 
role of social structure in harmful practices. 
- The problem of critical value: Attempts to ‘make the leap’ to critical and normative 
value that arises from the social sciences should be understood to have a fundamental 
limit based on object adequacy. Given historical limits, critique cannot be understood 
as final or definitive, but instead offers a provisional account upon which strategic 
action can be formulated and which begins with the priority of suffering. 
- The problem of reflexivity: The problem of harm constitutes a site through which 
subjects can reflect on their orientation toward ideas of harm and their relation to 
those of others. This permits greater object adequacy in our ideas of harm because, 
under the Critical Realist formulation, the causal effects of particular practices 
become understood in a less subject-centred and more detached fashion. 
The development of science, on the Critical Realist model, takes place within historical 
processes and can only be understood as a social activity. Given the changing nature of 
scientific knowledge over time, the necessary corollary of ontological realism is 
epistemological relativism. This is not to indicate that one explanation is as good as any 
other, but rather that given the ontological import of scientific practice, a final principle of 
judgemental rationalism is employed to mediate the historical relationship between subject 
and object.
457
 As such, it does not seek to replace the involvement/detachment balance in 
sociological enquiry, but provides a further axis upon which we can understand the kinds of 
accounts that International Studies produces in its engagement with pre-given concepts and 
ideas of what harm is or should be. 
The social scientist who engages with the problem of harm, as we have argued is 
often the case in International Studies either explicitly or implicitly, is engaged in formulating 
transitive knowledge, or concepts of harm, against the background of a relatively intransitive 
object, that of suffering. Key aspects of judgement are called upon in this process, 
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necessitating a form of reflexivity that relates back both to the self, the object of study and 
other subjects. What is gained in this formulation is a form of ideology critique that lacks 
Marx’s economic focus, and through which both other explanations and social institutions, 
structures and so on can become the object of critique.
458
 While the scientific and normative 
enterprise – object adequacy and critical value respectively – were found to be separated in 
Linklater’s account, under this reconstruction they are internally related such that values 
bearing on the problem of harm are maintained as central to scientific activity. 
 In presenting this model of science, striking parallels arise with Elias’ research 
program as it was presented in the third chapter. While the philosophical basis adopted by 
Critical Realism runs counter to much of Elias’ rejection of that form of enquiry, we saw that 
this merely pushed the problems placed by philosophy back into an unreachable future. 
Adopting the ontology put forward here results instead in us being able to articulate the ties 
that bind in a way that incorporates a nuanced and shifting causal analysis at the core of our 
sociological enterprise while still retaining a theory of normatively engaged social action. 
This allows us to highlight once again our understanding of International Studies as engaging 
with the problem of harm; it is not that this is an extension of this form of ethical concern to 
the social sciences, but rather that the social sciences carried this ethical concern all along. 
Contrary to the detachment put forward by process sociology, the Critical Realist position 
reveals an emancipatory impulse inherent to scientific activity which we have identified as 
key to an engaged approach to the problem of harm. This approach, rather than treating the 
‘correctness’ of scientific accounts and their normative value separately, relates them so that 
the investigatory activity of the social sciences constitutes an ethically charged engagement 
with the world. 
This illustrates the way that the ontological questions provoked by Critical Realism 
bear directly on the problem of harm as it has been discussed throughout this thesis; the 
concepts of harm it is possible for us to have is related directly to the question of the objects 
that constitute social reality. Being attached to any number of social meanings, objects and 
power dynamics, the problem of harm is therefore deeply related to our understanding of 
social life, and relies in turn upon the properties of its constituents.
459
 Ontological problems 
are therefore deeply political due to the way that they fulfil the preconditions for forms of 
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social engagement, making it the role of the social sciences to engage with and disclose these 
elements of background understanding and their ethical implications. The critical task of 
process sociology focuses on the presentation of the world and its interconnection in a similar 
way such that people might become better attuned to the circumstances they find themselves 
in. In parallel to this, Sayer argues: 
“In response to this kind of endless fact-gathering about behaviour, 
radicals often echo Marx by protesting that ‘the point is to change it’. 
But they do not mean the social engineering kind of change but an 
internal process of reduction of illusion and emancipation. As long as 
knowledge is estranged from people and seen as externally descriptive 
rather than constitutive of human action, the radical reply will seem 
obscure in its justification and hence appear as mere assertion. […] 
But if we recognize that ‘science’ itself is a practice – and one 
dependent on adherence to certain values – and that social objects 
include other knowing subjects, the emancipatory goal cannot in 
principle be denied without contradiction.’460 
The critical aspect of science is inherent to its activity due to the way in which a given 
explanation, in improving upon one previously given, necessarily criticises and transcends it 
predecessor due to the way in which it occupies the same objectively given world. Moreover, 
if scientific endeavour is considered as a social practice, the task of science is one of world 
disclosure; its results are not merely some new truth, but some new truth that operates in a 
relationship to its real object of study.
461
 Inasmuch as normative concepts are embodied in 
and performed by arrangements and institutions etc., it is entirely possible for explanations to 
perform a critical function in taking up a position relative to them. Due to its ontological 
basis, there is a ‘weight’ to the explanations provided under the Critical Realist model which 
operates as more than ‘just another voice’ in the debate, but which can serve to renegotiate 
the ground upon which our epistemological processes and judgements depend. 
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Conclusions 
 The Critical Realist approach to social science puts forward ontology, or what there 
is, as an essential aspect of enquiry and in doing so resists the a priori dominance of the 
knowing subject in a way that parallels the arguments of the critical theorists. In doing so, it 
highlights the possibility that a distinction between suffering and our knowledge of it can 
serve as a ground for social scientific engagement in International Studies from which it 
might contribute to the amelioration of harmful practices. Following this, we argued that the 
sociology of harm conventions can benefit from this form of enquiry as a way of 
understanding the role that the ‘weight of history’ plays in the negotiation, formation and 
maintenance of harm conventions, in particular with regard to structural and abstract social 
forces. This allows a more adequate explanatory strategy that is sensitive to the needs of key 
marginalised subjects, particularly in the context of situations where an embedded status quo 
ensures the asymmetry of the way the problem of harm plays out. Despite the problem of 
reification that we saw in Chapter 2, it remains the case that social science is an important 
avenue through which the stratified relationship of subjects to various aspects of historical 
processes can be better understood, if only asymptotically. While it may be the case that 
suffering is, in this regard, incommunicable in an absolute sense, it is precisely an 
understanding of stratification and historical position that allows some, however limited, 
translation between contexts in social scientific explanation. 
 This approach arises from a reformulation of two major points in Linklater’s 
sociology of harm conventions. Firstly, the Eliasian approach to relative detachment as a key 
aspect of scientific knowledge was supplemented by an ontological stance that seeks to 
account for the broader social world as much as it does the qualities of our knowledge of it. 
In doing so, it attempts to move beyond the epistemic fallacy identified by Bhaskar.
462
 This 
approach maintains the recalcitrance of the world in the face of our goals while not then 
assuming the strict determinism of structural forces; such causal powers are always relational. 
The second is to argue that the knowledge produced in the social sciences is always 
knowledge of something. The use of sociological knowledge always operates in an 
intersubjective context, as Patomaki argues.
463
 However, it is important to account for the 
way that knowledge develops in relation to the object to which it refers; as such, ontological 
questions such as those raised by the role of social structures in harmful practices, and how 
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we account for them, constitute important avenues for sociological enquiry. These points, 
taken together provide a deeper understanding of the way that the sociology of harm 
conventions relates to the world by more adequately characterising the objects that it refers 
to, and opens up the possibility that International Studies can contribute to debates centred on 
harm by providing accounts of structural determination. In doing so, it once again links object 
adequacy and critical value such that the way in which IS can contribute to the problem of 
harm becomes formulated as a form of explanatory critique; both an enhancement of 
Linklater’s normative standard and a way of including engagement with the difference 
between harm and suffering as one of the key contributions of Critical Theory to the way we 
understand the problem of harm. 
 This approach also has a more general impact on the way that we understand the work 
of social science, which holds out a further contribution to Linklater’s Eliasian approach. The 
Critical Realist formulation puts forward the activity of science as being a form of production 
that is both socially and historically delimited. If the production of knowledge is relatively 
transitive with regard to its object, and objects can be relatively independent from our 
knowledge of them, then we are forced to accept the relativity of our beliefs concerning the 
problem of harm and how it relates to suffering. The knowledge produced in social scientific 
activity, therefore, cannot be understood as having absolute value, but rather operates as one 
value among others in the negotiation process that we have put forward as the problem of 
harm. This is in line with Linklater’s understanding of how the problem of harm operates as 
one value of the many that would comprise a cosmopolitan ethic.
464
 In this regard, any ethical 
implications that arise from scientific activity are tentative and subject to historical conditions 
in their expression; proscription can only be led by context.
465
 While we have argued that the 
problem of harm in IS pushes us toward a strategy of actualising critical value in order that 
we might ameliorate of harmful states of affairs, the relationship between critical value and 
‘the facts of the matter’ is not an easy one, taking place in a broader context subject to power 
relations. Bhaskar notes this difficulty in adjudicating between the truth of statements and 
their referents beyond what is invoked in practical activity: 
 A proposition is true if and only if the state of affairs that it 
expresses (describes) is real. But propositions cannot be compared 
with states of affairs; their relationship cannot be described as one of 
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correspondence… There is no way in which we can look at the world 
and then at a sentence and ask whether they fit. There is just the 
expression of the world in speech (or thought).
466
  
 This constitutes an ontological reformulation of what the Critical Theorists considered 
to be the historical limits of social science, which was essential to our understanding of the 
threefold problematic as engaging with the problem of harm from the perspective of 
knowledge production. Furthermore, it parallels Eliasian ideas of reality congruence while, as 
we have suggested, maintaining the importance of the subject/object relationship to 
sociological enquiry.
467
 In broader philosophical terms, the problem concerns the way that 
‘truth’ as a normative value is accepted, an assertion that has come increasingly under fire 
following post-structuralist approaches in the discipline due to its potentially violent and 
totalitarian implications.
468
 Numerous authors, not least Adorno, have highlighted the 
violence inherent in any particular claim to truth due to the way that it may close down 
potential interventions. Nonetheless, that there are limitations on what it is possible to 
consider as harmful in the context of an asymmetrical power relationship does not exhaust the 
importance of scientific knowledge in its eventual overcoming, as Adorno recognised.
469
 In 
discussing the relationship of knowledge to the problem of violence through reification, as a 
key aspect of the problem of harm, we are more often than not describing the relationship of 
truth to power, rather than the qualities associated with truth as such. In this regard, the 
metatheoretical account of the Critical Realists constitutes an important intervention, but one 
that requires further qualification if is to answer the problems Critical Theory raises in the 
context of the problem of harm. 
 This relationship remains as a tension in the account we have provided due to the way 
in which our reformulation of the sociology of harm conventions requires, to some degree, a 
pattern of abstraction and reification if it is to function; it remains the case that the result of 
this form of production results in concepts of harm that remain subject to the critiques 
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levelled by Critical Theory on the grounds of reification and non-identity. However, it is 
important to note that Critical theory at no point denies the positive value that arises from 
conceptually guided activity, considering it to be the point both of the perpetuation of harm 
and of our potential amelioration of its various forms. Furthermore, we will see that the 
model put forward here is sensitive to the democratisation of scientific knowledge production 
that Linklater implies should be a goal of our strategy for addressing the problem of harm, 
but once again in a way that maintains the subject/object axis that is so important to our 
understanding of the role of social structure. 
 The tension between the production of knowledge as simultaneously tending toward a 
democratisation of the problem of harm and toward complicity in harmful practices is one 
that will be decisive for the arguments that follow. In the final chapter, we will see the way in 
which the intersection of Critical Realism and Critical Theory pushes us toward 
understanding the relationship between critical value and object adequacy both in the object 
of investigation – the problem of harm – and reflexively in their own practices of social 
scientific enquiry. In this context, the next chapter will consider the problem of reflexivity as 
the final aspect of the threefold problematic and evaluate the implications that placing 
Critical Theory at the core of how we relate to the problem of harm has for the production of 
knowledge in International Studies. 
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Chapter 5 – The Demands of Harm on 
Worldly Theorising 
 
 
Introduction 
 The last chapter sought to reconstruct the sociology of harm conventions based on an 
ontology that was able to maintain link between critical value and object adequacy, a step that 
was necessary if we are to understand the problem of harm as a practical issue for 
International Studies in light of the concerns that Critical Theory raises. In this regard, it 
operates as an approach that can account for the kind of empirical investigation that Linklater 
wishes to undertake while maintaining the value of insights from Critical Theory concerning 
the normative implications of social scientific work. This chapter will complete the 
reconstruction undertaken there by considering it in light of the problem of reflexivity. It does 
this by considering how the ontology of CR can be understood as providing a compliment to 
the negative epistemology of Adorno and the opportunities and problems that this provokes. 
The aim is to put forward an approach that can circumscribe the problem of harm in historical 
context while maintaining a reflexive attitude toward the contribution that social science can 
make. In order to do this, we will find ourselves mediating between two factors: the problem 
of reification in the process of thought, and the objective historical demand toward the 
conceptualisation of suffering that the problem of harm provokes in IS. 
 The key arguments that have led to this point first arose from our analysis of the role 
of Critical Theory and the problem of harm within the discipline of International Studies. In 
conducting a reading of the discipline’s development that focussed on its engagement with 
the problem of harm, we argued two things; firstly, the discipline holds an ethical stance that 
raises the problem of harm as a core concern of the discipline and, secondly, that Critical 
Theory reformulates this concern into problems for the production of knowledge. These 
problems – the threefold problematic – consisted of a concern with object adequacy, critical 
value and reflexivity, and serves to highlight the close relationship between scientific enquiry 
and ethical value that has characterised the discipline’s engagement with the problem of 
harm. 
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 This led us to focus on the implications that Critical Theory had for the problem more 
broadly, particularly in the work of the Frankfurt School. The close relationship between the 
threefold problematic and the problem of harm lay in the distinction between suffering and 
the recognition of such that is registered in the concept of harm; Critical Theory therefore 
understands harm to be the social appropriation of suffering. This conceptual distinction is 
one of the key implications of Critical Theory for the way that we understand the problem of 
harm in IS, not just as a core focus of the discipline, but as a core component of the way that 
it produces knowledge.  
We then proceeded to investigate the possibility that empirical studies of the problem 
of harm might be conducted on the basis of these insights. Chapter 3 argued that Linklater’s 
sociology of harm conventions, while having a great deal to contribute to our empirical 
understanding of the problem of harm, was conceptualised in a way that did not account for 
the normative aspects of social scientific enquiry and therefore does not account for all of the 
problems provoked by our investigation of harm in social life. In Chapter 4, we formulated a 
reconstruction of Linklater’s sociology that introduced Critical Realism as a way of 
incorporating both recognised and unrecognised causes in society and which did not reduce 
society to our knowledge of it. Moreover, in doing so, we linked object adequacy and critical 
value by highlighting the way that the critical content of explanations is dependent on their 
position relative to the object of society and the harm conventions that it is reliant upon. 
 However, despite being predicated upon an orientation to the world, the theories 
produced by the Critical Realist approach to investigation rely on the abstract concepts that 
Adorno was so cautious of. A key problem highlighted by CT – that knowledge tends toward 
a domination of its object – remains a key issue with for our account, and is addressed in this 
chapter through the problem of reflexivity as the third and final aspect of the threefold 
problematic. In particular, we will address the power relations that International Studies both 
studies and is subject to, as well as the more general concerns provoked by instrumental 
reason that were raised by the Frankfurt School. The challenge is that despite our beginning 
with good intentions in focussing on the problem of harm, social investigation is tied to – and 
constituted by – particular forms of what Adorno would call ‘identity thinking’ and which 
demand a sociological account of its origins and development. Our aim is therefore to 
understand whether the approach laid out here can be developed in a critical and reflexive 
manner or whether such an attempt is doomed to commit itself to a project based on biased 
judgement and unexamined ideological commitments. 
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 The argument of this chapter will focus on the way that both the normative critique 
deployed by Critical Theory and the reconstructed sociology put forward in the last chapter 
have circumscribed the problem of harm, and how it relates to the experience of suffering. In 
examining how this is the case for each approach, we will see how they chasten each other 
due to the interdependency of their modes of engagement.
470
 In this regard, the positive 
claims of sociology and the practices of negation that we saw in Critical Theory can be 
understood as aspects of a broader vocational approach to social science which is not 
comprehensively determined by the positing of any particular value but nonetheless 
maintains a strong link to the ethical demands that the problem of harm provokes.  
 While this formulation does not put forward any particular proscription for ideal 
forms of political community, it does lead us to consider the political qualities that arise from 
the process of science when it is understood as working in the space between structured 
reality and concept-formation. The characteristic object-orientation of realist theories serves 
to push beyond subject-centred understandings of historical interpretation by engaging in a 
practice of world disclosure, interrogating a world that is both ontologically pre-given and 
meaningful in particular ways. In this case, the labour of scientific investigation expands on 
the possibilities that inhere in the objects it studies, engaging the world critically through 
concepts rather than attempting to bypass this problem through some deeper idealisation.
471
 
In line with Adorno’s argument, our attempts at understanding are situated in a historical 
fashion that forces us to rely on an understanding of history that places the development of 
knowledge in a position with regard to broader power relations. However, our reformulation 
allows us to develop the kind of sociological project that Elias would argue for while still 
maintaining the normative commitments that Adorno put front and centre. 
 The chapter concludes with some reflections on the contribution that our investigation 
has for International Studies. Broadly speaking, this centres on the extent to which the kind of 
object-orientation argued for here provides a common ground for discussion between 
different theoretical points of view, as Linklater has suggested might be the result of a focus 
on the problem of harm.
472
 In particular, it argues strongly against the identity-foundations 
that characterise the current state of disciplinary pluralism, instead putting forward a 
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commitment to the ethical possibilities that unify social scientific investigation and which are 
a hallmark of the realist approach. While this seems to run counter to the concerns of Critical 
Theory due to the way it identifies possible grounds for ethical action, this is not the case. 
Rather, we argue that this commitment functions as a constant reminder of the ethical 
problems that are raised whenever one engages in social scientific activity, and persists as an 
impossible demand that underpins the ceaseless shifting of position that characterises the 
reflexive development of knowledge. In terms that would be recognised both by Critical 
Theory and Critical Realism, it is the distinction between essence and appearance that renders 
social science necessary in the first place, and this demand is not one to be assumed away or 
shied away from as a social task. 
 
The Idea of a Historical Sociology with Objective Foundations 
 As we saw in the third chapter, a key insight of the Eliasian approach to sociology lies 
in its acknowledgement of the thoroughly historical object of social enquiry; Linklater brings 
this insight to bear in his historical, rather than philosophical, approach to the problem of 
harm. Elias argued against the ‘retreat to the present’ that characterised orthodox sociology 
due to its reifying features, in particular focussing on the complexity of the processes that led 
up to contemporary social figurations. While abandoning a teleological approach to historical 
change, he nonetheless maintained that ignoring development altogether would constitute 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater of sociological explanation.
473
 Indeed in doing so, 
conventional approaches to sociology remained once again committed to the ‘thinking adult’ 
as the fundamental constituent of social reality, a fallacy that Elias’ broader ontology 
replaced with a focus on the chain of generations of which all of us are a part. The aim of this 
chapter is to reflect upon how we might incorporate this reflexive approach into our realist 
reconstruction of the sociology of harm conventions. Our argument is that in understanding 
the work, and not just the object, of social science as historical has a significant impact on the 
way that it should attempt to engage in social scientific investigation. 
 While the Eliasian approach tends toward the examination of the past as an object of 
study with equal importance to that of the present, the problem of reflexivity forces us to 
consider the role of International Studies as it engages with the problem of harm as an object 
of study to be simultaneously that of contributing to the problem of harm as a form of social 
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negotiation. The dynamic that allows the formulation of scientific knowledge to be related to 
knowledge of normative value was considered in the last chapter. However, it remains for us 
to outline how such a form of study might relate itself to the world such that it is able to 
acknowledge the possibility that it may be implicated in the promotion of harmful practices. 
The question that must be asked in this context is if the sociology of harm conventions, as 
other social sciences, is engaged in the process of producing explanations and concepts of 
harm, then how might it conduct this engagement in light of its potentially harmful effects? 
Answering this question as an exercise in reflecting on the ethical problems that arise from 
social involvement in the problem of harm can help us to lay out a position with the third 
aspect of the threefold problematic, that of reflexivity, that is broadly compatible with the 
implications of Critical Theory. 
 The stratified understanding of causal powers put forward in the last chapter led us to 
argue that social scientific explanations operate through a process of analytical differentiation 
that ultimately undermine linear understandings of how causal powers work in social life. In 
particular, it overcomes teleological understandings of the causal powers of social structure, 
arguing instead that they instead have tendencies that may or may not bear out. This allows 
us to understand the variety of ways in which social life is structured to have varied and 
potentially antagonistic relationships with each other; a situation which can only pertain if we 
are willing to acknowledge their relative autonomy. The importance for this understanding 
for the sociology of harm conventions lies with the way in which causal powers are not 
merely the imaginings of a more-or-less objective observer, but rather reveal something about 
real and causally efficacious objects of knowledge such as social structure. While we rely on 
a process of abstraction in recognising social structures and their impact on the lives of 
subjects, International Studies can, in important respects, contribute to the development of 
harm conventions by making these more abstract forms of harm intelligible. 
 However, if knowledge is transitive with regard to its (relatively) intransitive object, 
then our concepts of harm are transitive with regard to the object they seek to account for, 
that of suffering. This formulation allows us to account for the variability we find in harm 
conventions throughout history while maintaining the central normative object of suffering 
that Linklater suggests.
474
 The critical role of the sociology of harm conventions comes to 
light once we realise that the meaning of the past or the future is not fixed, but nonetheless 
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can become causally efficacious once it becomes an object of knowledge for reflexive 
subjects; the sociology of harm conventions thus brings to bear new and refined 
understandings of harm upon the reflexive process that Linklater calls the problem of harm. 
As such, the sociologist of harm conventions is a historical actor that finds themselves in a 
particular position with regard to received meanings and concepts of harm, and engages with 
these in order to better ground the ethical decision making in which subjects take part. The 
Critical Realist framework conceptualises this exercise as a political one that involves claims 
concerning the objective basis of social being, and in doing so attempts to counteract the 
dominance of received meanings that lack object adequacy. 
 A clear consequence of this approach is that we must understand the concepts that the 
sociology of harm conventions works with as related to forms of suffering, but which it may 
not fully account for. Rather than the incorporation of numerous correlative factors into 
processes that ‘add up’ to a given process, the development of these accounts should be 
critical of the internal relationships that pertain between causal factors. This is inclusive of 
the process of investigation itself, which must be open to criticism based on its historical 
position and conditions of possibility. In this regard, Critical Realists have gone to great 
lengths to document the various ways in which social scientists abstract from social 
phenomena in order to identify the points at which thought becomes entangled with its 
object.
475
 While the Eliasian language of relative involvement and detachment makes a 
contribution to demonstrating the varied stances that social scientists take toward the world, 
this once again fails to place ontological weight on such problems, placing the onus on the 
misplaced political judgement of the sociologist. As we saw in the previous chapter, both 
approaches converge on the extent to which an awareness of what is being talked about – i.e. 
the implicit or explicit ontology of an approach – is of importance to a politically engaged 
social science. Ultimately, the sociology of harm conventions cannot be separated from more 
philosophical questions concerning the kind of accounts it produces; it is not possible to 
engage in questions of how new forms and ideas of harm develop without an engagement 
with what harm is or might be.  
 This necessity highlights the sociologist of harm conventions – indeed, any subject 
who engages with the problem of harm – as being involved in an active process of 
negotiation and contestation. They are, in a sense, between philosophy and social science; 
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both engaging with the problem of harm at an empirical level and engaging with normative 
questions that concern ontology, reflexivity and judgement. This is in line with Linklater’s 
formulation of the problem of harm as constituting a sociological, and not merely idealist-
philosophical, object of study, but also incorporates the importance of philosophical and 
normative reflection. The processes that are described by the sociology of harm conventions 
are, therefore, the congruence of structure and perceived events when conceived under the 
aspect of a meaningful story which is always, in some sense, pre-determined by the location 
and finitude of the social scientist.
476
 The result of this is to place the social scientist in a 
relationship to the broader social world, articulating their explanations in the context of a 
class, gender or racial background that is immediately subject to causally efficacious relations 
of power.
477
  
 In Critical Realist terms, the way we articulate change and process when we are 
engaged in the study of the social world lead directly back to the triptych of ontological 
realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality.
478
 The validity of social 
scientific statements depends on the extent to which it is able to explain the causal powers 
and emergent properties of the referent object. Such an approach depends on the ability of 
social scientists to address the stratified nature of social reality, a pattern of explanation 
which is required if we are to begin to account for structural and structured forms of harm. 
While the repeated empirical occurrence of one form of harm can be understood as the 
starting point for the sociology of harm conventions, periods of latency, change and 
continuity can only be understood through the analytical separation of the various strata of 
social life and their relationship to each other. In doing so, therefore, the sociologist is 
engaged in the production of ideas of harm in collaboration with others, demonstrating that 
the site of this labour – history – is constitutive for our account in a way that is described by 
Archer’s morphogenetic sequence above.479 
 The focus on processes in Eliasian sociology is useful to the extent that it provides a 
vantage point on the development of concepts of harm that is attentive to the long, varied and 
branching history of the concept, but only in the context of a more nuanced analysis that is 
able to examine processes of interaction across varying – and often contradictory – relations 
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between layers of stratification and temporal scales. In the context of this thesis, we argued 
that this principle is already at play in Critical Realism, and that the objective basis of 
historical enquiry should lie at the core of our efforts to engage with the world. Rather than 
privileging one vantage point, our engagement with the problem of harm should attempt to 
bring together different forms of investigation according to their relationship to the social 
world, as Linklater attempts.
480
 The reconstruction undertaken here goes some way to 
underlabouring for such links between subdisciplines and fields such that their contribution 
can be understood by placing their respective object domains relative to each other. 
 
The Principles of a Reconstructed Sociology of Harm Conventions 
 The arguments put forward throughout this thesis can now be put together in 
programmatic fashion as a way of demonstrating what a reconstructed sociology of harm 
conventions might look like. These principles follow the reconstruction put forward in the 
previous chapter. Justificatory and performative principles, centred on the problem of 
reflexivity and the practical applicability of the sociology of harm conventions to 
International Studies will be put forward in the remainder of this chapter. In large part, it is 
not intended for these ideas to oppose those of Linklater but rather to be understood as a 
process of underlabouring through which the contribution of the sociology of harm 
conventions can be better understood and situated. The principles of our reconstruction are as 
follows: 
- The socialisation of changing concepts of harm through the distinction between 
experience and conceptualisation: The most immediate contribution of the sociology 
of harm conventions concerns the way in which ideas of harm have changed deeply 
and regularly throughout the historical development of society. The aim of the 
sociology of harm conventions is therefore to understand the way in which this 
relationship changes in the context of differentiated and stratified historical 
experiences. The sociology of harm conventions thus begins from the experience of 
harm and investigates its objective basis in order to render them intelligible to 
discourse and conceptual articulation such that they might contribute to the 
negotiating of the problem of harm. 
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- The causal dimension of changing ideas of harm through the distinction between 
objective history and conceptualisation: The way in which experience feeds into ideas 
of harm is an investigation that can only be conducted substantively in a causal 
fashion that is conscious of multiple points of influence and determination. In line 
with Critical Realism, the focus is placed on the patterns of stratification and 
emergence experienced by suffering subjects. Against empiricism, these causal 
powers can be understood as the result of mechanisms, that remain real even when 
unactualised. Rather than a pragmatic convenience, the language of cause in the 
sociology of harm conventions is employed as a way of orienting sociological 
knowledge toward the world such that it can contribute to the object-adequacy of 
subjective understandings of how harm operates. In doing so, it demonstrates the 
relationship between transitive conceptual thought, practical knowledge, and the 
material reality of suffering subjects. 
- The complex mediation of the general and the particular: The position-practice 
system adopted in chapter 4 addressed the way in which talk of ‘structure’ and 
‘agency’ were only ever analytical divisions when referring to some particular case. 
The fully autonomous agent is non-existent due to their embeddedness in history, just 
as the social structure does not fully determine the actions or ideas of particular 
agents. However, the ability to address forms of abstract or structural harm requires a 
form of objectivation if they are to be understood as more general problems that are 
agnostic toward the particular subject occupying a social role. These accounts, we 
have argued, require an emergentist account of social structure that is sensitive to the 
persistence of social structure over time. 
- The conceptualisation of internal and contingent relations: Approaching the way in 
which forms of harm come to be as the result of a nexus of causes, the relation 
between these causal factors necessarily holds to a set of permissive conditions 
without which the object of investigation could not occur. Separating these internal 
relations from those which are efficacious but contingent serves to locate the position 
of a given social structure in relation to others, allowing a far richer understanding of 
the role of structures in harm. 
- The ontological dimension of social change: Social change is not mere fiction or 
construction, but consists of a real change in the causal complexes that are generative 
of emergent social structures. While we might address the problem of harm at many 
different layers of social stratification, i.e. at the level of discourse or of habit, the 
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explanation of these changes needs to engage in a form of stratified explanation that 
accounts for power relations, countervailing forces and structural underdetermination. 
Rather than a purely empirical and subjective assessment, then, social change has an 
objective or ontological dimension that serves as the site of shared engagement 
between subjects. 
- A negative concept of totality: Against the idea that there is a common teleological 
thread that runs throughout history, the negative concept of totality is a normative idea 
that reminds us that the experience of suffering always escapes our concepts of harm. 
In producing knowledge concerning harm, then, we are forced to acknowledge its 
transitive nature with regard to suffering. As a further elaboration on several of the 
principles above, the concept of totality operates as a way of highlighting the 
necessary ceteris paribus clauses that are implied in every, inevitably partial, causal 
account. While social thought tends toward totality, it is necessary to remind oneself 
constantly that the fullness of an account is always precluded by the objectivity of the 
world that it cannot hope to match. In grasping toward the whole, our concepts of 
harm must be qualified as precarious and open to criticism on the basis of other well 
founded social explanations. 
This approach to the sociology of harm conventions would seek to explain the causal 
basis of forms of social determination, rendering them intelligible to those engaged in 
negotiating the problem of harm. As we noted in the last chapter, this strategy can be 
understood as critical both of prior theories and institutions through which they are recreated. 
This bridges the problems of object adequacy and critical value in the sociology of harm 
conventions. It does so, firstly, but providing an explicit basis for critique by making the 
passage from facts to values viable. Secondly, it locates the social scientist historically, and 
acknowledges the political role that even the most detached judgements play. This objective 
basis, from which theory proceeds, requires us to consider the problem of reflexivity in the 
practice of social science lest it become part of the very processes that it seeks to critique. 
 
Reflexive Theorising in the Sociology of Harm Conventions 
 In developing an account of the relationship that the sociology of harm conventions 
has to its real object of study, we also reconceptualise the way in which reflexivity can be 
considered as part of social scientific activity. In short, the assumption of the real historical 
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position of social scientific account permits their regulation through an intensive engagement 
with previously established forms of knowledge. At least in part, the impulse toward this 
reflexive process follows on from the transitivity of our accounts of the problem of harm; it is 
not simply the case that we can, on the basis of any particular scientific account, proceed to 
forms or practice aimed at its mitigation. While the sociology of harm conventions might 
provide the basis for political action and points of possible change, it does so in a way that 
contributes to, rather than solves, the problem of harm. 
 However, this open manner of political engagement does not necessarily follow from 
the kind of philosophical realism adopted here in a straightforward manner. In particular, 
locating the basis of our accounts of the problem of harm as a function of the subject/object 
relationship constitutes a scientific attitude that is susceptible to many of the critiques 
formulated in the work of the Frankfurt School. In this vein, Fluck argues that the Critical 
Realist concern with ‘getting it right’ demonstrates precisely the instrumentalist scientific 
attitude that Critical Theory was so concerned with countering.
481
 There are two points of 
response here. Firstly, as a means of clarifying the relationship between the production of 
knowledge and the world, Critical Realism serves to critique already existing epistemic 
practices that may have violent or detrimental political effects. It therefore holds out some 
normative benefits for the sociology of harm conventions. Secondly, this can be further 
qualified through the necessity of working through rather than against concepts of harm, as 
was acknowledged in a broad sense by Adorno.
482
 The kind of positive critique put forward 
by Critical Realism remains useful and relevant for our approach to the problem of harm. 
However, with regard to how we construct theory, it is important to consider how the 
necessary reifications that play a part in accounts of social structure, indeed any layer of 
social stratification, can be addressed and mitigated. 
 The aim is to outline the mediation of harm as a concept and the historical and social 
experience of suffering in the practice of social science. In examining the concept of harm in 
society, we encounter the expression of suffering through a socially-embedded concept that 
expresses experience in a way that is more-or-less communicable. This expression, a claim 
concerning what is harmful, can be understood as an effort both to communicate this to others 
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intersubjectively and to appropriate and conceptualise its objective basis, that of suffering.
483
 
The intersubjective dimension feeds into political practice such as dialogue and consensus 
building which Linklater located as a key site of normative engagement with the problem of 
harm.
484
 The second concerns the attempt to grasp the reality of experience through concepts, 
and which concerns the ability of subjects and scientific activity to engage in an investigation 
of the subject/object relationship. Understanding the latter in particular has been the goal of 
this thesis, particularly given the necessity of accounting for social structure in abstract and 
seemingly distant forms of harm.  
 This approach begins from the problem of harm as a demand that social science must 
respond to; a demand that we saw as a key object of concern in several areas of International 
Studies, and which was formulated as a problem for knowledge production by Critical 
Theory. Inasmuch as the tension centred on the problem of harm arises from the uncertainties 
that accompany changing patterns of global interconnection, it can be understood as resting 
upon the way in which our concepts of harm are challenged by the developing emergent 
properties of complex social systems.
485
 As the tendency of modern social differentiation is 
toward forms of alienation which isolate subjects from their objective basis, Kompridis 
argues that critique should be understood as a practice of world disclosure, serving to disclose 
possibility in the context of social life.
486
 The realist understanding of social science put 
forward here fulfils this role by highlighting the ontological basis of the received meanings 
that fill out our lives and inform our understandings of what harm is and can be. In 
acknowledging the essential attachments of scientific activity to broader social life, it 
becomes possible to relate our explanations to broader debates concerning the problem of 
harm and attempting to account for their broader social consequences. 
 The critical value of the sociology of harm conventions arises from two points. 
Firstly, it highlights the historical basis of the understandings of harm that characterise 
contemporary society. In doing so, the practice of explanatory critique serves to denaturalise 
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the way in which the reification of concepts presents them as timeless.
487
 Secondly, in putting 
forward this sociological argument, it also identifies the points at which the internal and 
contingent relations that characterise a form of harm can highlight objective possibilities for 
its amelioration that are presented by its real causal basis. The relationship between these two 
aspects can be understood as circumscribing the problem posed by the production of 
conceptual knowledge in the context of the problem of harm and the problems that Critical 
Theory highlights; it is both the case that we are conscious of the failings of our definitions 
and that we are pushed toward making the jump to practical involvement as an ethical 
impulse. The negative moment seeks to decentre knowledge through an insistent argument 
from the impossibility of its adequacy, while the positive moment is pushed toward definition 
and conceptualisation due to the ethical call that harm presents to us.  
 We can understand the space between these two imperatives as a praxeological gap 
that cannot be reconciled in theory. However, the reverse is not the case due to the way in 
which history continues ‘behind the back’ of theoretical scrutiny as a form of transitive 
knowledge. This was clear in the first chapter where we saw theories being updated and 
challenged based on historical change. The objective aspect of history continues in a way that 
is relatively autonomous from the epistemic activity of the social scientist just as it does the 
conceptually-guided of activity carried out by subjects as they create and re-create the 
problem of harm. This can be understood through Adorno’s claim as to the ‘weight’ of 
objectivity and its foundational position in his materialism; it was possible to consider an 
object that was not a subject, but not a subject that was not also an object.
488
 Our attempts to 
account for the problem of harm in social science cannot, therefore, escape historical 
processes, and remain tied to (and influenced by) their objective basis in the position and 
preconceptions of social scientists. Attempts at negation of old understandings of harm and 
definition of new ones also serve to follow this pattern in a way that has ethical 
consequences. Negation may be irresponsible by virtue of its hesitancy to engage in the 
amelioration of harmful practices, while definition may serve to omit unrecognised suffering 
voices. Attempting to account for forms of harm in social science means that we stand in an 
existential position with regard to the objectivity of suffering; the process of objectivation, 
through which we understand the objects of our enquiry as independent of us, can be 
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understood as necessary due to our evaluative judgements despite restricting our 
understanding of the ‘fullness’ of suffering that it refers to. 
 A key argument of this chapter is that the problem of reflexive theory construction is 
articulated, in different directions, in both Critical Theory and Critical Realism. The aim, 
however, is not to compromise between the two, but rather to mediate between them in order 
to understand the productivity of standing at a point between the two extremes. This is 
possible due to the way in which their core arguments are not articulated against each other, 
but rather with regard to their relationship to the object of society. Indeed, one of the points 
that seems in little doubt when they are considered side-by-side is that both assert the 
primacy of the object in the process of thought; either through Adorno’s preponderance of the 
object, as above, or Bhaskar’s insistence on the irreducibility of ontology.489 In order to put 
forward the tension that pertains between these two, we can now consider each of them in 
terms of each other. 
 
Adorno’s Critical theory as Doubly Realist 
 In Chapter 2, we argued that the emphatic a priori that lay at the root of Adorno’s 
writing was that of the concrete historical experience of suffering in social life, and which 
operated as the normative basis for the social scientific enterprise. Inasmuch as the sociology 
of harm conventions is guided by some field of definition, it is located in the way that 
suffering is articulated through the concept of harm and the ways in which this space it 
negotiated historically. Key to this relationship is the way in which suffering is experienced 
as a mediation of forms of reason and their ‘other’ in the work of the Frankfurt School.490 
That this category exists, however, does not immediately imply that suffering is entirely 
amenable to subjective reflection; rather, it demonstrates the way it resists a full 
understanding of particularity and an appreciation of the way that the objective experience of 
suffering goes beyond immediate appearance. 
 In line with the idea that there is ‘much to commend Adorno as a Realist’, the claim 
made here is that the concern with suffering that his work presents can be understood as a 
parallel claim to the Critical Realist metatheory concerning the reality of a causally 
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efficacious real world.
491
 In this context, the assumption of suffering puts forward a negative 
ontology, a way of circumscribing the world that lies outside of the identity thinking utilised 
by science. For the Critical Theorists and, we will argue, a historically grounded Critical 
Realist approach, this strategy operates as more than just a principle for theory construction. 
Rather it should be understood as a way of acknowledging the historical limitations of theory 
in a way that simultaneously locates its practical orientation toward the problem of harm. 
Despite their attempts to push beyond subject centred reason, Adorno in particular would not 
permit himself the arrogance of presuming to have achieved this goal.
492
 The role of the 
world beyond thought, for Adorno, finds itself expressed historically as ‘the other of reason’, 
which evaded conceptualisation in its totality even in those instances where it was struck 
upon in detail.  
 In understanding the basis of social life as having objective qualities that evade 
thought, Adorno already aligns himself with a view that Bhaskar puts forward in his 
understanding of the relationship between the transitive and intransitive dimensions.
493
 
However, while Critical Realists focus on the practice of science and social science, 
Adorno’s broader concern with forms of life under conditions of alienation underpin a more 
comprehensive approach to materialist thought. Ultimately, however, this relationship is one 
of commonality that is obscured by their different approaches to epistemic activity. Sayer and 
others, in deploying the Critical Realist framework in a historical and sociological setting, 
demonstrate the way in which meanings are ‘called upon’ unknowingly by actors whether 
they are engaged with critically or not; such arguments have a long heritage in the theories’ 
shared Marxist heritage and their concern with the formulation of appearances in social 
life.
494
 Adorno’s concern with the historical function of conceptual thought is grounded by 
the way that thought seeks to grasp the threats that confront it from the unknown. He 
consistently uses this insight to demonstrate the fallibility of positive concepts of history, 
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instead putting forward a formulation that acknowledges its own omissions. The apotheosis 
of the Frankfurt School, in offering what we might understand as an architecture of the 
concept, lies with an argument for a distinction between the world and what we know of it in 
social science. By way of comparison: 
“the analysis of experiment has not been useless of the human 
sciences, since it shows something very general about the real 
world, namely that it is structured and stratified, that the concrete 
really is a union of many determinations, and hence that abstraction 
and analysis are appropriate methods of developing knowledge of 
concrete beings. But it also shows that where experiment is not 
possible, this analysis and abstraction is not measurable, and is 
testable only by its capacity to explain the minute particulars of 
concrete entities.”495 
 Here we find that the Critical Realist approach argued for by Collier discusses the 
analysis of nature – thought often in more colloquial terms – in terms of irreducible 
particulars through a strategy of negative framing that would not be unfamiliar to the 
Frankfurt School. The concept of nature is, therefore, enough to put the work of Adorno in 
the same materialist camp as the Critical Realists. However, this is largely put forward from 
the point of view of subjective epistemic activity in his work while, deliberately, being little 
fleshed out in a substantive fashion. To the extent that Adorno did engage in positive 
conceptual examinations, the articulation of positive evaluation was put forward in tentative 
terms which focussed on the possibility of ‘accidental’ truth produced by a relationship 
between subject and object that was in no way guaranteed.
496
 While the extent to which this 
occurred was heavily dependent on historical circumstance as an existential situation which 
was not amenable to subjective reason, the fact that such a possibility remained means that 
realism in some sense remains essential to the viability of critical thought due to its approach 
to the possibility of social change as objective.
497
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 The pervasiveness of this dynamic can be seen running to the core of Adorno’s 
approach to suffering and the role that it plays in his argument. In adopting suffering as the 
functional a priori of Critical Theory, an approach inspired by Adorno would acknowledge 
the inevitability of reification and seek to sublimate it in a direction that is deemed to be 
ethically justified. This orientation, however, is definitively not the same thing as positing a 
particular model of suffering in the form of a clearly defined humanism or other moral 
programme. The persistent reflections on Auschwitz, the use of the atomic bomb and the 
intensification of capitalist production in the Frankfurt School are more than just hermeneutic 
or aesthetic reflections. Rather, they can be understood as outlining a particular practical 
orientation toward history that justifies its normative basis through persistently reflecting on 
the problem of harm while rejecting the idealist moment of synthesis that the work of Marx, 
as much as Hegel, would culminate in. However, what is it that justifies this preoccupation 
with suffering? Adorno and Horkheimer would consider such a focus as self-evident due to 
the way in which the horrifying experience of 20
th
 Century history substitutes for any positive 
argumentation.
498
 This bears parallels to some Critical Realist analyses of Marx, in which 
ethical justification comes from the way in which the subject holds an objective interest in the 
overcoming of forms of oppression and domination.
499
 With the Frankfurt School, this is 
conveyed in an aesthetic and essayistic manner, in effect ‘without words’, a strategy which 
refuses to substitute concepts for the existential horror of real experience.
500
   
 In this regard, we can consider the work of Adorno to be doubly realist – both within 
his approach to the objects of scientific enquiry and in his approach to the problems raised by 
suffering as an existential demand. In particular, the tendency toward designating the 
pathological elements of society has having methodological primacy can be seen as one way 
to ‘make the most’ of a capitalist society that has demonstrated remarkable resilience and 
adaptability despite the suffering it is implicated in causing. Honneth puts forward this idea in 
his evaluation of Dialectic of Enlightenment. The intense focus on the irrationalities of 
modern society can be understood as a way of exaggerating through abstraction; but it is a 
form of exaggeration that is commensurate with the existential problem that suffering raises 
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in the minds of those who have experienced it.
501
 Adopting suffering as an a priori normative 
principle may, therefore, be the only way in which internally coherent and totalising forms of 
rationality can underpin large scale structural harms. In this context, a focus on the rigour and 
purported pessimism of the Frankfurt School overlooks the vital issue of concern for the 
suffering that was epitomised in the work of Adorno. As with Critical Realism, the results on 
conceptual thought under this understanding should be judged against the world as objective 
totality; the hope and meaning that we attach to the practice of critique is a practical issue, not 
implied by the practice of theory as such. The key contribution of Critical Theory in this 
sense is to argue that this judging of social science against the world has a normative 
component that we can see when we highlight the significance of the problem of harm for 
International Studies. 
 In Chapter 2, we argued that the appropriation of suffering in the work of Horkheimer 
and Adorno remains plausible to the extent that it is framed against suffering, but not against 
any particular form of suffering. This ensures that the conceptual appropriation of experience 
that is core to the problem of harm remains minimal while its quality, as an ethical promise 
grounded in experience, is circumscribed through categories that are apparent in the social 
scientific production of concepts and definitions. We can, in figurative terms, begin to 
understand the shape of that which is not known through the shape of our failure to know it – 
a strategy that is grasped through transcendental modes of questioning directed at forms of 
social practice and their implication in the problem of harm. Adorno’s non-scientistic realism, 
then, is clearly found in his emphasis on reconciliation with the object, and operates not 
merely as an epistemological strategy but as a practical strategy that can only be understood 
as holding to a normatively grounded but essentially realist ontology.
502
 
 
Critical Realism as a Critical Theory 
 From the bleak point of view of the Frankfurt School, the approach put forward by 
Critical Realism seems to be yet another attempt at scientific certainty based on the identity 
of concept and object, a process still in keeping with the still-developing conquest of nature. 
However, Chapter 4 demonstrated the way in which the focus on specific objects tends 
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toward a far broader analysis of social interconnection due to Bhaskar’s attempt to decentre 
the object and its internal relations.
503
 Critical Realism, in a remarkably similar way to 
Critical Theory, demonstrates how the traditional scientific attitude is based on a mode of 
enquiry that is based primarily on principles of subjective evaluation and the reduction of 
objects to our knowledge of them. By examining the necessary assumptions taken by 
scientific investigation, it then attempts to enhance our understanding of the truth expressed 
by scientific claims in a way that, we have argued, is fruitful for the sociology of harm 
conventions because of its approach to the subject/object relationship. As an explanation of 
the kinds of practice that the sociology of harm conventions is involved in, it puts social 
scientific attempts to grasp the problem of harm in a position that recognises it as explaining 
both more than intersubjectivist epistemologies would allow, and less than the covering laws 
of positivism would presume to claim. 
  The critique of the epistemic fallacy, through which being was reduced to our 
knowledge of it, places social scientific knowledge in a historical context while not reducing 
the truth of statements to their position in recognisable ideological contexts. It therefore 
allows us to address the problem of harm in a way that is capable of recognising both the 
importance of its intersubjective negotiation and the priority of the experience of suffering.
504
 
While the foundational elements of Critical Realism do not lead immediately to the 
consideration of an intersubjective process of negotiation, they trace the way in which the 
relationship between subjects and their historical location places limitations on the ground 
our social scientific accounts are able to address themselves to. As was the case with Critical 
Theory, we argued that while the causal basis of social action does not preclude subjects’ 
abilities to modify and re-enact social structures, it does serve to outline the objective 
grounding of this process. Archer’s morphogenetic approach demonstrates the way in which 
critique is necessarily socially constituted through her elaboration upon Bhaskar’s position 
practice system, which demonstrates the implication of social scientists in a broader social 
contexts as well as it does their objects of study. In this regard, the approach put forward here 
attempts to buttress Linklater’s sociology of harm conventions by fleshing out the 
subject/object relationship such that attempts at detachment can be better understood and 
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situated. In doing so, it provides a scientific grounding for the investigation of normative 
issues such as the problem of harm in a way that maintains the epistemic relativism that 
follows scientific attempts to grasp understand harm from the standpoint of ‘damaged life’.505 
 The adoption of the principles of ontological realism and epistemic relativism aside, 
the final principle of judgemental rationalism argued for by Critical Realism is less easily laid 
out due to the manner in which it operates in the praxeological gap that was identified earlier 
in the chapter, and as such cannot be fully accounted for. In Kompridis’ terms, it begs the 
question ‘how can we ever reassure ourselves that we have got right, if only provisionally, 
the proportion of continuity and discontinuity in the forms of life we pass on?’506 The process 
of judgement, when considered as the point at which action in the world is concretised and 
made manifest, once again remains at a point of tension between our limited understanding of 
harm and the strong ontology that we commit to in the process of scientific activity and 
abstraction. Indeed, it is only in the context of previous understandings of conceptual activity 
that we can impart meaning on social scientific engagement. Patomäki draws on Derrida’s 
notion of undecidability to describe precisely this ethical point, through which the passing of 
judgement is described as a decision that is taken precisely at the point where the question of 
truth is also one of committing a deeply existential kind of violence.
507
 
 The point raised by the entanglement of social science within historical processes 
leads to several important insights regarding the responsibility adopted by those who attempt 
to engage with the problem of harm. In a form that prefigured the concerns raised by Critical 
Realism, Horkheimer would consider the manner in which our production of concepts was 
not subject to some divine court through which direct judgement on ethical issues could be 
passed. His single recourse lay with a community of the abandoned that must be both the 
subject and the object of emancipatory activity.
508
 In a similar manner, Patomäki draws 
attention to the way in which the reliance of social scientific activity upon an intersubjective 
process of public negotiation implies the necessity of a non-violent and dialogic approach to 
scientific development.
509
 In this context, the explanations produced by the sociology of harm 
conventions would be tested in a democratic context through which their historical meaning 
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is rendered apparent. Through such a process, it becomes possible to acknowledge the full 
implications of Linklater’s Habermasian ethical standpoint in a context which is inclusive of 
scientific activity (but does not subsume it). That the democratic principle underlying 
scientific activity can be derived from the interest that inheres in other subjects ensures that 
the commitment to ontological realism can be justified within the intersubjective approach to 
ethical standards, just as it is rendered necessary when we pay attention to the failings of our 
accounts of the problem of harm along the lines of the subject/object distinction that Critical 
Realism focusses on.
510
  
 
World Disclosure in the Practice of Critique 
 Both the philosophy put forward by Critical Theory and the sociology based on 
Critical Realism considered in this thesis have placed their key wager on engagement in the 
world while not reducing the properties of the world to the manner of this engagement, and as 
such can be seen as putting forward a commitment to a form of ontological realism. This 
wager can be understood not merely as an approach to how we make claims, but as a move 
that places theoretical activity within a historically situated sphere of ethical and political 
responsibility. The practice of theory in the world can be understood in this context as one 
that produces existential judgements; normative claims that are grounded on an ontology and 
which pertain to the historical basis of social phenomena.
511
 These are always articulated in 
context, and can be seen as concrete instances of the kind of explanatory critique that we saw 
in Chapter 4 while still maintaining an openness to ethical disputation that the problem of 
harm requires. In the case of Critical Theory, such judgements are necessarily fallible 
because our attempts to conquer nature through concepts prove woefully inadequate to the 
objective weight of the suffering we are addressing. In the case of Critical Realism, provision 
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of superior explanations leads, ipso facto, to justification in removing the basis of false 
belief.
512
 
 While it is clear that Critical Theory and Critical Realism do not sit in an easy 
relationship to each other, both can be understood as engaging in a process of world 
disclosure through which they attempt to articulate objective possibilities for change in social 
life.
513
 Under this formulation, the practice of critique would be involved in actively 
disclosing possibilities for new meanings of harm through an articulation of the relationship 
between received meanings and their objective basis. Critical Realism, in attempting to refine 
concepts through an examination of ontology, serves to highlight the way our claims are 
related to the world as such. To the extent that this operates in a way which relies on the 
perfectability (but not perfection) of our concepts, Critical Theory serves to remind us of the 
fallibility of this method – the objective results of our scientific enquiry never fully escape 
the problems and uncertainties that the threefold problematic represents. As such, taking the 
two approaches together serves to place our understanding of human activity as one element 
within a world that is fuller than can be entirely appreciated – a dialectical approach to 
practical involvement in the problem of harm that highlights, rather than attempts to move 
beyond, its ethical content. 
 By way of example, we can consider the way in which harm claims, as understood in 
our account of Linklater’s sociology of harm conventions, are embedded in broader yet 
internal structural relationships that can be understood as having causal effects on the way in 
which particular instances of harmful practice occur. Our argument is that the practice of 
science, understood through Critical Realism, can serve to render intelligible these structural 
relationships in a way that is not merely discursive but holds some content that pertains to the 
way in which the world is structured. As such, it discloses some understanding of the way the 
world works in a manner that was not previously acknowledged at a reflexive level. As an 
explanatory critique, such accounts are more than discursive formations but can act as 
injunctions to practice that are predicated on the relationship they hold to previous 
relationships and the truth regimes of historically-located institutions.
514
 While it is 
impossible to entirely move beyond the influence of structural backgrounds, it nonetheless is 
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able to render intelligible part of it in order to open it up to critical negotiation and 
appropriation. 
 Critical Theory, and particularly Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, allows us to understand 
the historical nature of this process by relating subjective history to the broader object of 
natural history, which both determines it and escapes our conceptual frame. While the 
insistence on the subjective aspect of this problem may seem counter to the argument here, it 
remains essential due to the way in which the subject herself is a key aspect of the process of 
explaining historical objects; the social scientist engaged in explaining the problem of harm is 
not involved in passive documentation, but an active process of working through concepts 
and meanings. In positing a new concept of harm, we engage in the same appropriative logic 
through which the initial concept came to be ultimately inadequate to its object, and thus 
providing grounds for concern in the way that Adorno’s normative orientation toward the 
priority of suffering seeks to provide. This mode of critique is therefore engaged in world 
disclosure through the way that it highlights the world in ourselves and, through the 
dialectical relationship between knowledge and its object, ourselves in the world, ultimately 
revealing a component of undecidability to the problem of harm which nonetheless does not 
erase its importance as a site of normative contention. This is not a metaphysically grounded 
programme so much as it is a formulation of the historical failure to address the problem of 
harm fully in the past; as such, it is an iterative process upon the kind of negotiation that we, 
in Chapter One, argued was characteristic of International Studies as a discipline. 
 By bringing to bear the suffering that evades our conceptual formulations, the practice 
of negative critique brings to bear arguments that are not always comfortable from the point 
of view of a relatively closed or functional epistemic totality or truth regime. In this regard, it 
sheds light on the problem of harm in a way that would not otherwise be the case in situations 
where asymmetric power relations serve to perpetuate particular forms of knowledge, as 
Linklater suggests.
515
 While the methodological primacy of the pathological remains, 
situations in which the problem of harm seems relatively settled should not foreclose 
engagement with its possibilities; in a stratified and complex world, that forms of harm are 
not apparent does not mean that suffering does not occur. In this regard, a reading of the 
theories considered in Chapter One highlights that new understandings of harm arise as much 
from sensitivity to suffering as much as they do from rigorously defined conceptual 
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apparatuses. The fullest content of these theories, therefore, cannot be understood just as 
engaging with harm at a conceptual level, but rather expressing suffering in an ontological 
register that highlights it as shot through with ethical content.
516
 Their value, then, is found as 
much in a historically-grounded articulation of objective (and perhaps accidental) truth in a 
way that cannot be reduced to their immediate active intervention into the sphere of dialogue 
and negotiation that the problem of harm constitutes.
517
 
  The various revisions of Critical Theory following the work of the first generation 
have been concerned with various viable reformulations of historically-situated meaning 
while not fully engaging with the world disclosing strategy utilised by Adorno and 
Horkheimer. As such, the way in which immanent critique is approached has altered in 
emphasis such that a clear proclivity toward liberal principles can be discerned in the work of 
Habermas and Honneth.
518
 Our reading of Critical Theory demonstrated the way in which the 
search for such a universal principle from which to begin theorising is a positive move 
characteristic of the universalising tendency associated with the legacy of the Enlightenment. 
On the contrary, the realism that is evident in the work of Adorno, while not necessarily 
justifiable through a conceptual scheme serves to counter subjective with the normative 
provision of a real totality in which suffering plays a key role, and through which the constant 
presence of non-identity is made apparent. This modernist ontology serves the prioritisation 
of suffering because of the essential deficit that accompanies the subject/object relationship; 
the strategy of disclosure is implied once we allow experience to go beyond the concepts that 
we are able to formulate and take suffering seriously as an ethical demand. This allows us to 
understand the intersubjective framing of the problem of harm – the negotiation of new and 
changing concepts of harm – the be underpinned by the experience of suffering in a way that 
has ontological weight; in this regard, suffering constitutes an existential demand on the way 
that we appropriate experience in the form of concepts. In providing this formulation, we 
have clarified and reformulated the contribution that social science is able to make to the kind 
of normative evaluative process that Linklater envisages the problem of harm to be subject to. 
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Harm, Suffering and Critique in International Studies 
 In putting forward the implications of the threefold problematic for our attempts to 
grasp the problem of harm, we have found that the implications for social scientific activity 
run far deeper than the acknowledgement of a particularly pressing normative commitment. 
The initial location of our commitments to the world, through which we acknowledge the 
fundamental impact of position on explanation, leads to a series of issues that force us to 
consider this finitude and limitation as part of, and not merely an inconvenience to, social 
scientific investigation. That this partiality may, following the insights of Critical Theory, 
come to be complicit or permissive of suffering means that accounting for the subject/object 
dimension of knowledge production is essential if we are to better understand and negotiate 
the problem of harm. This defence of the essential position of the subject/object relationship 
gives new life to theoretical concerns in Critical IR that have been ignored in recent trends.
519
 
Beginning from some of the basic points that this thesis began with, this section aims to put 
forward some of the implications for theory and critique in the discipline in a way that 
expands upon its core commitment to the problem of harm. 
 Re-reading the account of disciplinary change and development that was provided in 
Chapter 1, we can now see that the continuous concern with the problem of harm that the 
discipline exhibits involves a series of strategies that rested, in the terms of CR, on a 
negotiation of the fact-value divide. This highlights the close relationship between ideas of 
harm and ideas of reality that has been characteristic of the discipline’s engagement with 
ethical issues. In this regard, the dominance of Political Realism over more idealistic 
approaches can be understood as illustrating the preponderance of objective force over ideas 
of justice; the problem of harm in this regard could not be understood purely as asking after 
how we live together, but how we live together under particular historical conditions. This 
clear demonstration of ideas of object adequacy upon the normative attitudes that theory 
should take indicates a broader pattern by which International Studies, as a developing social 
science, has changed and altered its emphasis over time in order to better situate itself against 
harms that are in various ways characteristic of global interdependence. 
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 That the forms of suffering arising from patterns of interdependence have changed 
over time is evident. This thesis, however, has argued that the modes of theorising prevalent 
in the discipline at a given point are closely related to their basis in the reproductive and 
material aspects of society in a way which precludes transcendental formulations of the good 
or full comprehension of the object of suffering in general. Phenomenological studies of 
suffering have argued that such experiences always take place in the context of a particular 
world, and it is these worlds that are at stake.
520
 The argument of the sociology of harm 
conventions is that we can examine changes in morality and normative conviction, but only 
in a way that is limited. These limitations, arising from the essentially private nature of 
suffering as an experience, persists as a motivation despite our attempts to grasp it in any 
particular form. If International Studies is to consider suffering as a quality of embodied and 
worldly beings, rather than operating with received concepts of harm that may contribute to 
harmful practices, it is necessary for us to approach social science in a way that is able to 
incorporate the myriad complex relationships that subjectivity is implicated in both as a 
subject and an object. The complexities of doing so can be seen in the strategy embraced by 
Critical Theory; in placing a concern for the suffering at the core of social science, it raises 
the problem of harm as an issue of substantive concern for the way in which knowledge is 
produced. 
 An essential element of this reorientation concerns the argument that the 
subject/object relationship has dynamics and qualities that reach beyond what is encapsulated 
by agents’ understandings of it. In their examination of theories in IS, critical realists have 
sought to put this forward by highlighting the epistemic fallacy and engaging in a process of 
underlabouring through which the unacknowledged assumption of a real and causally 
efficacious world is rendered intelligible.
521
 This process of critique demonstrates not just the 
historically embedded nature of theory construction, but also the way in which the geography 
of the subject/object relationship influences our understanding of processes of normative 
engagement of which the problem of harm is a substantial component. Highlighted best 
through Marx’s injunction that men make history but not of their own choosing, the 
possibility of critique rests heavily on how International Studies conceptualises its historical 
position and delimitation whether this is rendered explicit or not. In putting forward the 
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objects of our explanation as relatively intransitive, Critical Realism allows us to examine 
and situate knowledge claims in the discipline and highlights the normative nature of social 
scientific engagement in a way that aids this process of reflecting on disciplinary 
commitments and presuppositions. This orientation toward objectivity allows us in turn to 
better understand the problem of harm as a core concern of International Studies, and to 
highlight the discipline’s interest in the way it plays out in social science and in social life 
more broadly. 
 The way in which concepts lie at the centre of International Studies’ way of 
addressing the world is a necessity at least in part due to the way that the problem of harm 
prompts the discipline to articulate and explain the abstract determinants of social life and its 
myriad interactions. In Chapter 3, we saw that this was necessary if the social sciences were 
to address the increasing complexity of global interconnection; however, in light of the work 
of the Frankfurt School, we can see that such developments simultaneously operate as a 
contribution to scientific rationalisation that is at the core of the obscuring of forms of harm 
in the first place. While it may be the case that reflecting on the violence we do to others, as 
this thesis has tried to do, is one of the less violent activities the social sciences might engage 
in, the extent to which social scientific work can serve to reinforce instrumental attitudes 
toward the experience of suffering is of key concern.
522
 The architecture and history of the 
concept presented in Critical Theory provides a general frame through which we can 
understand the close interplay between instrumental reason and the problem of harm. That the 
rampage of instrumental reason identified by Adorno and Horkheimer may constitute a real 
process does not constitute a historical claim, but rather a normative injunction prompted by 
historical experience. Identifying the problem of harm as the core of attempts to grasp this 
dynamic means that our reflexive engagement with concepts needs to be intense, persistent 
and thoroughgoing; reflexivity is not a task to be engaged in as much as it is a responsibility. 
 While Critical Realism does little to outline a specific theory of IS, it has provided us 
with an underlabouring effort that has allowed us to clarify some key social scientific claims 
– such as the structure/agency debate – with regard to its implications for the way we 
understand the problem of harm. In particular, Chapter 4 demonstrated the way in which 
prioritising agency serves to paper over the role of structure in the morphogenetic cycle, and 
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some ways in which it is essential to our explanations of the problem of harm.
523
 In 
disclosing these relationships, the social sciences begin to reveal a source of ontological 
engagement that underpins an understanding of the problem of harm as a site of shared labour 
with potentially emancipatory consequences. In appropriating the real causal basis of 
suffering through abstraction and concept-driven engagement, the social sciences thus serve 
to provide a basis for the amelioration of states of suffering by rendering abstract social 
forces intelligible. The epistemological opportunism that is embraced by Critical Realism 
formulates this as a transitive epistemic horizon that reflects upon changing fields of 
objective possibility. That the discipline’s engagement with the problem of harm reflects 
upon both the transitive and intransitive domains in this way allows us to see it as engaged 
both with questions of ‘getting it right’ and questions of normative significance in a historical 
context that provides the shared basis for practical action. 
 
Critique and History in International Studies 
 This broader interest in the historical situation of being and subjectivity is the key 
interest of Critical Theory broadly considered, and where it can provide insights into the 
existential situation of International Studies as it grapples with the problem of harm. The 
work of Adorno serves to highlight the precarity and dangers that are associated with identity 
thought, as we have examined throughout this thesis. Despite his negative framing of 
concept-formation, our examination showed that he nonetheless maintained the importance of 
identity thought in the lives of subjects as an important facet of ethical engagement. Levine 
labels this situation the animus habitandi, or that in which one abides, by way of response to 
Morgenthau’s animus dominandi. Under this formulation, the social sciences have an 
important role in embodying the full force of the non-identical against structures of meaning 
that marginalise or oppress the voices of the suffering.
524
  
 This approach demonstrates a view that is approached by Critical Realism but remains 
limited due to the conceptual or definitional nature of scientific development.
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historically-particular situation that knowledge is produced in ensures that attempts to grasp 
that situation are formulated differently according to position, as Bhaskar’s position-practice 
system puts forward.
526
 However, this holds wide-ranging implications for the way in which 
theories attempt to negotiate the problem of harm from which this thesis began and its 
potential for solidarity between different experiences based on the common principle of 
suffering. If social life does not form a whole, but is instead stratified and divided such that 
suffering does not constitute a unitary principle from which to begin, then the conclusion is 
that the opportunities provided by social scientific engagement are fragmented and partial in 
proportion to this. In this regard, suffering is only relatively intransitive, but nonetheless can 
serve as a starting point from which the shared effort that the problem of harm constitutes can 
be laid out in a way that highlights the links between disciplines and areas, rather than purely 
their differences. In putting forward the discipline as characterised by a shared aspect of 
moral and ethical concern, as we did in the first chapter, we both highlight its potential and 
acknowledge that socialisation goes ‘all the way down’. In dialectical fashion, this means that 
subjective reason cannot be expelled as a factor but is an essential facet of our engagement 
with the problem of harm; it is qualified in a way that does not isolate social science from 
social life more broadly, but immerses it in broader forms of ethical engagement and 
negotiation. 
 Understanding social scientific enquiry in this wider context allows us to 
understanding the contradictory and exclusionary nature of theories, at root, as less a function 
of varying epistemological strategies and more an expression of different embodied 
relationships to the world, of which suffering is one important characteristic. In this regard, 
acknowledging the problem of harm as a core concern of the discipline serves to undermine 
the protective identity-foundations of the current state of disciplinary pluralism, and instead 
bases social science on an activity which is by definition inclusive and tends towards 
dialogue between marginalised ethical standpoints. On the constitutive understanding of 
history-as-ontology put forward earlier in this chapter, the intensive confrontation between 
conceptual framings serves to highlight previously underarticulated struggles and 
contradictions in society. As such, the reorientation of IS toward the object of suffering can 
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also be understood as a reorientation of the history from which our engagement with the 
problem of harm proceeds. 
 As Patomäki has argued, the importance of history lies not only with its influence on 
material possibility but also in the way its negotiation is subject to political appropriation.
527
 
In this regard, we can see the fragmentation of the discipline along the heuristic lines that the 
problem of harm provides has important effects on the ethical possibilities that social science 
can engage with. In this regard, it draws close to Benjamin’s insights concerning the nature of 
fragmented history that had such an impact on Adorno.
528
 Rather than a single positive 
history, both authors attempted to discern the indeterminate role that historical materials 
played in social life. On this understanding, historical action involved not only the actualising 
of individual circumstances, but was involved in an appropriation of history such that 
struggle served to bring to bear the unarticulated historical force of suffering. The messianic 
aspect that is evident in this strain of thought operates less as an object to strive for, and more 
as a regulatory principle that persistently, and often uncomfortably, serves to locate 
theoretical activity as a form of historical labour despite its constant drive to move beyond it.  
 Both the camps of Critical Theory and Critical Realism would acknowledge that the 
meaning of an action remains underdetermined after the fact; there is little absolute 
confirmation of whether our interventions in the problem of harm will operate in the services 
of the intended cause. The ultimate result of our consideration of the subject/object is that 
concepts are only ever coincident with the broader historical problem of harm regardless of 
their instrumental content. As such, social science occupies a necessary position but is 
qualified against the problem of harm as an impossible demand upon its ability to grasp the 
world.  
 
The Object of Suffering: Toward a Strategy for Object-Oriented International 
Studies 
 Understanding the discipline of International Studies as oriented toward the object of 
suffering leads to several points concerning the strategies that might follow. First among 
these concerns the way in which there are few disciplinary boundaries that are respected in 
this orientation. Insofar as the determination of academic fields by concepts serves to protect 
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the identity-foundations of particular fields of study, they obscure the objective value that 
they present. Rather, a social science that takes into account the implications of Critical 
Theory in its engagement with the problem of harm should seek to locate the practice and 
aporias of the discipline in the interconnections and stratification of society itself. In this 
respect, Critical Realism provides ontological grounding for many of the claims that have 
been advanced by standpoint theorists.
529
 In this context, the sociology of harm conventions 
offers one point at which the ethical implications of exclusionary practices in the discipline 
are made abundantly clear. However, the way that our reformulation of Linklater’s sociology 
tended toward an examination of different layers of stratification demonstrates that the 
process of world disclosure cannot be conducted purely at the level of International Studies. 
While the discipline’s focus on the highest levels of social interconnection puts it in a 
position to address abstract and structural forms of harm, a transdisciplinary approach is 
necessary if harm as an emergent property is to be addressed. 
 As we saw in the fourth chapter, the acknowledgement that social phenomena are not 
singularly caused but are instead the result of multiple and stratified determinations itself 
militates against any claim to disciplinary autonomy. In arguing that suffering can serve as a 
possible, but by no means the only, basis for this form of enquiry, this thesis has highlighted 
various forms of social pathology that emerge from the way in which instrumentally 
articulated forms of knowledge lie at the basis of the problem of harm in modern society. 
While the contradictions that were at the core of the arguments of Marx and Hegel may have 
passed, the general importance of contradictions remains; it is in discovering and engaging 
with suffering ‘between the cracks’ of seemingly totalising concepts of harm that we begin to 
see their fragmented and partial nature. Rather than engaging in the formulation of ideal 
concepts, this is a historical task; it places the focus on suffering in order to reveal social 
pathologies and further develops Linklater’s historical framing of the problem of harm. In 
this regard, it begins not with ‘pure’ concepts of harm but their social emergence from 
historical circumstances. This operates in opposition to the way in which hegemonic concepts 
have served as the vehicle for stubborn ontologies that conceal their emergence as a result of 
historically contested sites of meaning for worldly activity.
530
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 Sceptics may respond that such an approach is merely business as usual in a 
disciplinary field where pluralism allows for an eclectic approach to data collection and 
epistemic activity.
531
 However, the approach proposed here is one in which the problems that 
International Studies orients toward emerge from the life of society itself, and is characterised 
by it in a way that has significant consequences for the manner of its ethical engagement. In 
this regard, the way that we saw the problem of harm arising time and again in the discipline 
as a core concern demonstrates that IS is not a neutral scientific endeavour, but is shot 
through with ethical content. To this extent, the forefathers of the discipline, whose 
experience of the First World War was so significant in prompting their engagement with the 
problems that the international poses, are significantly closer to the kind of vocational 
approach advocated here than we find with the rendering of the discipline-as-science in the 
field after Kenneth Waltz.
532
 The threefold problematic that the problem of harm poses for 
knowledge production, rather than seeking to isolate science from ethical engagement, insists 
on the links between them. In this regard, IS as a social science is concerned not with the 
production of timeless or absolute truths, but with labouring on and working with 
historically-placed ontologies in a stance of ethical concern. In short, it reformulates the 
question of how we live together historically, moving from asking ‘how shall we live?’ to 
‘how shall we live under these conditions?’ 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has served to develop the arguments found in this thesis in the direction 
of its implications for debates centring on the problem of harm in IS, and to examine how this 
might be done in a reflexive fashion. The result of this effort is less a synthesis or system, and 
more a constellation of factors and orientations from which no easy solution is rendered 
evident; the threefold problematic that Critical Theory poses cannot merely be solved or 
assumed away. Despite the problems that accompany social science in its engagement with 
the problem of harm, it is not the case that our incorporation of the subject/object paradigm in 
the process of this investigation is the imposition of a perpetually anxious disposition upon 
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the discipline. Rather, this anxiety forces us to acknowledge the limited (but still important) 
role that social scientific investigation can play, and suggests that we might understand this 
anxiety as, at root, an ethical injunction motivated by the problem of harm in its wider social 
context. In scientific terms, it asks us to begin to address the huge gaps in knowledge that 
issues such as structural harm present through what Collier has called the ‘methodological 
primacy of the pathological’, such that we might begin to scale what is a scientific and 
theoretical edifice.
533
 
 That this thesis has attempted to address the problem of harm both in an essentially 
social-scientific manner via Critical Realism and as an ethical-epistemological problem via 
Critical Theory has not been a flight of theoretical fancy. It has instead been a response to the 
way that the problem of harm confronts subjects in a way that is both an instantly 
recognisable experience and a remarkably elusive concept. In a historical sense, the threats 
that Adorno and Horkheimer identified as ‘nature’ to us in Dialectic of Enlightenment serve 
to highlight this problem; it is not merely that we are not imaginative enough with words, but 
that suffering is a real problem that International Studies in particular seeks to address 
through the process which we understand as the problem of harm. This places severe 
demands on developments in social thought due to the way that they can serve to reinforce or 
provoke such practices; a problem which we have raised as the problem of reflexivity. The 
response of this chapter – that such a problem constitutes a real existential and historical 
situation for the development of social science and our explanations of harm in society – 
demonstrates the extent to which reflexivity is both an impossible demand and a ceaseless 
motion in the scientific process which can only be approached through a persistent 
commitment to engagement in the world. 
 This chapter has sought to demonstrate that a characteristic element of the thought of 
Adorno was his awareness both of the problems that came with abstract thought and its 
simultaneous necessity on ethical grounds. It is only by working through the concept that we 
are able to begin addressing abstract and structural causal factors in the production of harm; 
but the case remains that these developments are undecidable to the extent that we cannot 
preclude the harmful processes that such work might contribute to. Nonetheless, the aspects 
of a Critical Realist approach to social science embraced here constitute a strategy for 
investigation that is able to acknowledge the role that judgement plays in the instantiation of 
                                                 
533
 Collier, Critical Realism, 165. 
210 
 
ethical practices, of which social science is only one. This serves as a way that we can 
maintain the democratic and intersubjectively-focussed idea of social science that was put 
forward by Linklater in addition to the subject/object paradigm focussed on in this thesis.  
 We concluded by proposing some strategies for the way in which IS might develop its 
understanding of the problem of harm in a way that does justice to its preoccupation with the 
various aspects of the threefold problematic. Key to this is the way that IS, on the 
understanding put forward here, begins not with the identity of its object of study with 
received concepts but with its failure to encapsulate suffering; this normative principle 
highlights the work of the discipline and its ethical consequences as a form of engaged labour 
as opposed to isolated abstraction. Against a form of eclectic pluralism, the understanding of 
the discipline that follows from this involves the intensive mediation of explanations and 
perspectives such that we might better articulate the deeply interconnected and stratified state 
of an interconnected – and interdependent – world. This corresponds to the increasing 
complexity of the problem of harm as it continues to develop, and in doing so, forces us to 
consider disciplinary boundaries in a new light as problematic reifications that might disguise 
or render epiphenomenal important sources of normative concern. As such, the 
epistemologically opportunistic understanding of how social science is conducted, found in 
both Critical Theory and Critical Realism, serves our orientation toward harm as a key object 
of concern.  
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Conclusion 
 
‘Our shared exposure to precarity is but one ground of our potential equality and our 
reciprocal obligations to produce together conditions of liveable life.’ 
- Judith Butler, Can One Lead a Good Life in a Bad Life?534 
 
 
The contemporary global subject is beset by uncertainty over how to live rightly in a 
world where seemingly basic social practices can contribute to suffering on the other side of 
the world. The interconnections and interdependencies between people are becoming longer 
and more abstract, and this puts us in new and challenging ethical situations with regard to 
the way in which we can unknowingly harm others. Foremost among these questions 
concerns how we know what we know about our interactions with others in a world where we 
are often involved in calling upon structures in a practical sense that we cannot fully explain, 
and in which such interactions are rife with unintended consequences.
535
 While the answers 
and responses to this ethical tension have varied historically, it is also the case that some 
negotiation over how we deal with others and what constitutes harm is immanent to nearly 
every society that we are familiar with, as Linklater notes.
536
 This thesis has attempted to 
understand how the discipline has engaged with this process – the problem of harm – and 
how it might understand its engagement in light of the insights of Critical Theory, a 
philosophical approach characterised by a deep preoccupation with suffering and its 
relationship to knowledge. To this end, we put forward the core research question: ‘What 
implications does Critical Theory have for the interrogation of the problem of harm in 
International Studies?’ 
More specifically, we have approached the problem of harm from two principle 
directions. The first of these provided a reading of International Studies that served to 
highlight the close relationship that the discipline holds to the problem of harm as a form of 
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ethical engagement, and articulated this relationship through the lens of Critical Theory. On 
this reading, ethical problems that harm poses are articulated as problems for the production 
of knowledge; the problem of object adequacy, of critical value and of reflexivity. These 
problems, and the relationship between them, serve to highlight that International Studies 
does not merely reflect upon the problem of harm but is – and can be – an important 
contributor to processes of change and restraint that might contribute to the amelioration of 
harmful practices.  
Following from this, the second aspect of our engagement with the problem of harm 
was to consider the implications of Critical Theory for the kinds of theory and study the 
discipline can or should engage in. In doing so it engaged with, and elaborated upon 
Linklater’s attempt to formulate a sociology of harm conventions in light of the threefold 
problematic that Critical Theory raises. In doing so, we argued for a form of social scientific 
engagement based on the principles of Critical Realism, and interrogated these with a view to 
putting forward its consequences for future engagements with the problem of harm. 
 
Summary of Thesis Arguments by Chapter 
 In addressing the problem of harm, this thesis has sought to engage with it in the 
complex and interconnected manner that is demanded by Critical Theory. It has, therefore, 
attempted to address the problem of harm both as a problem of explanation with regard to 
how we explain it sociologically, but also to formulate an understanding of how such 
accounts become implicated in the broader process of normative engagement that the 
problem of harm presents, and how they might contribute to this. While the problem of harm 
can be understood both as a historical-sociological object of study and as an exercise in moral 
and ethical questioning, a combination of the two is more characteristic of the kinds of 
debates that we see in International Studies. In this regard, we have focussed on the links 
between the aspects of the threefold problematic in an attempt to understand the discipline’s 
potential contribution to the problem of harm in a broad sense that is commensurate with 
their complex relationship. 
 In Chapter One, we engaged in a reading of several key debates in the discipline in 
order to highlight the problem of harm as a core concern that crossed many of its traditional 
dividing lines and objects of study. In providing such a reading, we argued that the discipline 
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could be understood as holding a particular evaluative and normative stance toward the world 
that was underpinned by an engagement with the problem of harm. Key to this understanding 
was the strategy of reading the discipline as one constantly in transition; not merely a set of 
theories from which the conclusions follow naturally, but a social effort that seeks to adapt 
itself in light of changed historical circumstances. By observing changes in the discipline in 
this fashion, we saw that these conversations were not merely driven by an ever-deepening 
understanding of an object of study, but by a persistent and pressing need to engage in ethical 
debates surrounding the problem of harm. On this reading then, it is possible to understand 
International Studies as engaging directly in the kind of ethical negotiation that Linklater 
highlights in a way which goes beyond studying their emergence and development. 
 In examining the direction of five debates in the discipline, we found that the problem 
of harm has been formulated in a variety of ways that included questions of scientific 
adequacy, ethical responsibility and strategies for social change. However, it is Critical 
Theory which serves as the point from which these questions can be considered in a 
connected and interdependent fashion. By bringing to light the implication of the theorist in 
the objects and processes of social scientific study, Critical Theory points toward a way 
through which we might begin to understand the work of International Studies as directly 
involved in negotiating the problem of harm. This involvement is characterised by a series of 
problems which reconceptualise the problem of harm as a series of problems for knowledge 
production; the problems of object adequacy, critical value and reflexivity, the interconnected 
nature of which may have implications for the way we understand the problem of harm in the 
discipline. In suggesting that our ability to address the problem of harm rested on our 
understanding of the threefold problematic, we proposed that an engagement with the roots of 
Critical Theory in the work of the Frankfurt School could allow us to more fully understand 
its implications. 
 While the problem of harm as an ongoing social process is unlikely to ever be fully 
resolved, the way in which Critical Theory poses it as a complex and multifaceted problem 
for knowledge production holds out a potential avenue for reflecting upon its significance in 
the context of IS. In particular, we saw in the work of authors such as Adorno that the 
purposive nature of instrumental reason, later highlighted by theorists such as Cox in 
International Studies, both provided a way to understand the complex interconnections of 
modern life and a means by which the suffering that it caused can become obscured. This 
mode of engagement was a generalisation of the Marxian problem-field to the broader 
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problem of knowledge production; it is the ability to abstract that is both a cause of suffering 
and alienation and the greatest chance for emancipatory practice. This generalisation is 
significant for our understanding of the problem of harm because in highlighting the close 
relationship between suffering and knowledge, Critical Theory allows us to relate differing 
approaches to the problem of harm to a common core of embodied human experience. In the 
work of Horkheimer and Adorno, the natural core of suffering operates as ‘the other of 
reason’ that moves beyond our attempts to conceptualise it, only becoming apparent in 
experience. The tendency toward abstraction, so necessary in the struggle for survival, comes 
to dominate our point of view such that we are unable to appreciate the fullness of being; in 
forgetting this, the march of instrumental reason leads us to become estranged from the object 
of our ethical concern. 
 It is at this level we find the problem of harm formulated as a problem of 
conceptualisation; harm is the conceptual appropriation of the real experience of suffering, 
limited in its development due to historically specific modes of objectification. This 
formulation allows us to understand the threefold problematic as arising from the relationship 
between concepts and experience. The problem of object adequacy concerns the way in 
which accounts of harm can maximise the correspondence between our descriptions of social 
reality and our experience of it. The problem of critical value concerns our mode of ethical 
concern and the way in which our explanations can be harnessed to mitigate or in some way 
manage the proliferation of harmful practices. The problem of reflexivity, finally, arises from 
the need to alter change our concepts in light of their potentially violent or reificatory effects, 
and to account for the partial nature of our judgements. This constellation of problems can be 
understood as arising from the combination of normative and scientific attitudes that 
International Studies engages in when it approaches the problem of harm. However, in the 
case of Critical Theory, Adorno in particular would argue that the adequacy of approaching 
social life in this way would always be deficient; the almost entirely alienated form of 
modern life meant that the promise held out by ethical concern would never be fulfilled. 
Nonetheless, in the first chapter we saw that in International Studies, the problem of harm as 
an object of concern is alive and well. Having gained a fuller understanding of the 
significance of the problem of harm through the lens of Critical Theory, we proposed to 
engage with the work of Linklater, whose sociology of harm conventions constitutes a key 
point of engagement with harm in International Studies, in order to examine the way in which 
it fulfils the problems raised by Critical Theory 
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 While Critical Theory presents a strong argument for the threefold problematic to be 
understood as an interconnected whole, it nonetheless emphasised critical value to the extent 
that the explanatory role of the social sciences, and in our case International Studies, became 
ever more marginalised. In addressing the work of Linklater, the aim was to understand how 
we might approach the problem of harm in a historical and sociological fashion while still 
maintaining the form of concern that Critical Theory puts forward. In beginning from a 
sociological framing, Linklater highlights the problem of harm as a process that is negotiated 
and renegotiated every day through the practices of subjects who are often unaware of the 
long term consequences of social action. Through the adoption of various historical vantage-
points, Linklater is able to demonstrate the way in which forms of historical social 
engagement serve to negotiate and justify harm conventions that may be unfamiliar to us 
today.  
 However, in focussing on the object-adequacy of historical accounts of harm, 
Linklater’s sociology of harm conventions does not fully formulate a link between the kinds 
of accounts produced in social science and the critical value that they present. In particular, in 
formulating an account of object adequacy that is tied to the relative involvement or 
detachment of the social scientist, it is unclear what kind of status explanations of more 
abstract forms of harm such as structural harm might have for the negotiation of harm 
conventions in wider society. This problem is further exacerbated by the political stance 
taken by the Eliasian sociology that Linklater draws upon; while Linklater is clear that social 
scientific work has normative value, the detached sociology that Elias argued for holds out an 
eventual but by no means certain role for social science in engaging with the normative issues 
that the problem of harm provokes. This uncertain relationship, we argued, might be clarified 
by engaging in precisely the kind of ontological reflection that Eliasian sociology often 
rejects. In proposing to reconstruct Linklater’s sociology of harm conventions in a way that 
was compatible with such forms of reflection, our aim was to preserve Linklater’s important 
insights concerning the problem of harm while better clarifying and maintaining the 
normative goals that he sets.  
 The fourth chapter undertook this reconstruction by outlining an approach to the 
sociology of harm conventions which draws upon the philosophy of science, and particularly 
Critical Realism. In particular, our attempt to formulate a viable way of addressing social 
structure as an important determinant of harmful practices led us to adopt an understanding of 
social life as characterised by real causal forces that were both emergent and stratified; they 
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arose from social life in a way that allowed us to address social structure as a sui generis 
object of knowledge. This led us to a more adequate explanation of structural harm, but also 
allowed us to engage in characterising the role that social structures play in the determination 
and influencing of the problem of harm more broadly. Despite the unobservability of such 
structures, we argued that the process of structuring was one that could be accounted for in 
social science through the development of concepts and a reliance on the subject/object 
distinction as a way of characterising the problem of harm. In doing so, Linklater’s account 
of detachment becomes subsumed under an understanding of social reality which is better 
able to account for the way in which failings of knowledge is underpinned by the nature of 
the objects to which it seeks to refer. 
 In accounting for the gap between the world and our accounts of it, the Critical Realist 
approach provides a way of understanding the recalcitrance of the world in the face of our 
goals; the relationship of the discipline to the problem of harm lies in the possibility of better 
accounting for the world such that negotiation and debate centred on the idea of harm can be 
better informed. Social life, we suggest, is subject to unplanned processes in much the same 
way as Eliasians would recognise, and the development of concepts provides a key point at 
which ethically informed action to ameliorate harm can be developed in this context. This 
operates along two axes which together provide the grounds for explanatory critique in the 
social sciences. Firstly, explanations are critical of those that have gone before to the extent 
that they are better able to account for the preconditions of suffering. Secondly, they are 
critical of the causes of mistaken prior beliefs and the institutions or processes that give rise 
to them. While the first is in line with Linklater’s broad argument that the sociology of harm 
conventions might provide an orienting function, the second outlines a source of critical value 
that is intrinsic to the practice of social science and its role in navigating the subject/object 
relationship. In doing so, the problems of object adequacy and critical value are accounted for 
and related such that we are able to maintain the specific contribution that IS is able to make 
to the problem of harm.  
 Chapter 5 developed the consequences of this reconstruction, arguing that the 
reconstruction of Linklater’s sociology put forward the objective position of the theorist and 
the discipline as a perennial question for how it might understand the problem of harm. In 
doing so, it elaborated upon the third aspect of the threefold problematic provoked by Critical 
Theory – that of reflexivity. Arguing that the realist reformulation of Linklater’s ideas tended 
toward a particular way of understanding this, we argued that the philosophical negation 
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inaugurated in Adorno’s work and the account of object-adequacy introduced in Chapter 4 
might initially seem opposed, but in fact could be understood in terms of each other when 
centred on the problem of harm. In considering Critical Theory in terms of Critical Realism, 
we argued that the essential insight of Adorno – that suffering could not be subsumed under 
any particular concept – was preserved in the realist characterisation of science as an ongoing 
task with a particular focus on disclosing the determinants of social life. Similarly, while 
Critical Theory would be intensely suspicious of the realist claim to knowledge of the world, 
Adorno’s focus on working through existing concepts rather than attempting to move beyond 
them ensures that a realist focus on stratification and emergence provides an approach to 
social science which recognises the lines of failure that Critical Theory emphasises. 
 In holding the perspectives of Critical Theory and Critical Realism in a productive 
tension, we are therefore able to account for the threefold problematic that arises from our 
analysis of the problem of harm, while still maintaining the contribution that IS is able to 
make to our understanding of it. This contribution, we argued, is best characterised through 
an account of social science which focuses on the way that it labours on concepts, working 
with and through them to provide more adequate explanations whose critical content is 
dependent on their ability to express the world. The problem of harm, as a consistent object 
of fascination for the discipline, provides a point from which we can understand the nature of 
this labour as a shared task in a discipline characterised by fragmentation and which has 
developed historically into a centre of gravity for many seemingly disparate forms of 
scholarly concern. In doing so, we are better able to understand IS’ focus on the problem of 
harm as a historical vocation that derives from its ethical and scientific content in 
combination, thus pressing it in a vital position from which we can address it as it changes 
and develops.  
 
What Implications does Critical Theory have for the Interrogation of the 
Problem of harm in International Studies? 
 This thesis began as an investigation into how Critical Theory can contribute to 
discussions concerning the problem of harm in International Studies. In doing so, began by 
providing a reading of International Studies that highlighted its consistent concern with harm, 
and attempted to put forward the contribution that Critical Theory makes in formulating this 
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concern as a problem for knowledge production. While broader conclusions will be drawn 
from the arguments made here, the immediate answer to the question is this: that Critical 
Theory provides a way of mediating a variety of strategies for engagement in 
International Studies and making their connections apparent. In doing so, it 
simultaneously pushes us toward a more object-adequate understanding of the problem 
of harm on an ethical basis, and a deeper understanding of the normative demands of 
the problem of harm on a scientific one. In this regard, the concern with harm that we find 
in International Studies operates as a broader pattern of the social negotiation that Linklater 
calls the problem of harm; it first seeks to name suffering, and engages in a process of 
articulating the subtleties that escaped this first act of reification. In this way, the problem of 
harm presents a shared historical task for the discipline, one that Critical Theory constantly 
provokes in its refusal to accept the separation of science and ethical engagement.  
 In the course of this investigation, we have largely abstained from the attempt to 
ground some fundamental faculty as the organ from which critique sallies forth against 
reification. While it presents a contribution to our understanding of how Critical Theory 
might operate in its attempt to highlight the opportunities and pitfalls that International 
Studies encounters, it is not an attempt to ground a systematic approach to critical theorising. 
It has instead sought to approach Critical Theory as it did International Studies; a set of 
practices that hold a family resemblance; for Critical Theory, this lies in its shared practice of 
negation against contemporary historical circumstances and the chastening of concepts in the 
service of normative insight. Critical Theory thus stands in relation to International Studies 
not as an external agent provocateur, but as an essential aspect of the scientific process 
through which our answers to the problem of harm can become more adequate to changing 
historical and structural circumstances. 
 If we understand this process against the long and changing history of the problem of 
harm, it quickly becomes apparent that the kind of tension that Critical Theory implies should 
be at the core of the problem of harm in International Studies is not one that can ever be fully 
resolved. In order to prevent the reification of any ‘final’ concept of harm, this thesis has 
engaged with and elaborated upon Linklater’s understanding of harm as a persistent area of 
social engagement and negotiation, and has focussed heavily on the historically contingent 
way that International Studies might engage with this. In this respect, this thesis agrees with 
Linklater’s adopting of an ultimately long-term viewpoint for the development of social 
science, but from an analytical vantage-point centred on the subject/object relation from 
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which the distinction between suffering and harm arises. It was Adorno’s conjecture that the 
reconciliation of this state of affairs was unlikely, if not impossible, under the alienating 
conditions of modern life.
537
 Nonetheless, International Studies continues labouring on the 
problem of harm, in a variety of ways, demonstrating the remarkably persistent nature of the 
discipline’s normative commitment despite considerable variation in its objects of study. In 
insisting on the complexity and interconnected nature of the threefold problematic, Critical 
Theory pushes International Studies to maintain its grounding in the suffering of real subjects 
and its historical situation after Auschwitz, after Hiroshima, after Abu Ghraib. 
 Beginning with the non-identity of suffering and harm, rather than harm’s conceptual 
adequacy, has the result of providing a link between the object-adequacy of explanations and 
their critical value. This is not merely a theoretical issue, but highlights the way in which the 
development of explanations in International Studies is centred on a praxeological gap that is 
a definitive aspect of its vocational calling; it attempting to mitigate suffering through the 
development of concepts of harm, the discipline operates in a fundamentally concerned 
way.
538
 This thesis has attempted to render intelligible the way in which this gap operates in 
practice, putting forward the changing balance between object adequacy, critical value and 
reflexivity as the nexus of critical activity and debate. The result has been a contribution to 
how we might understand the relationship of various forms of knowledge to each other, and 
how our analyses of concrete social reality might give rise to a recognition of the inherently 
normative dynamics of social life.
539
 
 Critical Theory, in framing suffering negatively, further serves to highlight that the 
problem of harm does not only act as a field of contested definition through which we might 
improve our concepts, but also as a reminder that the failure to do so constitutes a complicity 
in the persistence of suffering in the world. Analytically, this thesis has developed this point 
in formulating the commitments of a realist social ontology in an ethical, rather than purely 
metaphysical fashion that arises from the normative call that both Critical Theory and 
International Studies seek to respond to. In this case, a failure to properly engage the problem 
of harm is not merely a failure of theoretical knowledge, but a failing of theoretical 
knowledge whose very basis lies with the promise to engage with the reality of suffering. A 
particularly pressing demand toward reflection and reconstruction can, therefore, be 
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discerned in the power dynamics and partiality of the discipline whose increasing 
democratisation is a key aspect of taking the problem of harm seriously. 
 As a way of reflecting on the presuppositions of ideas and concepts, Critical Theory 
provides a way for International Studies to reflect on its engagement with the problem of 
harm. This thesis has sought to show how this is the case in its characterising of the various 
tensions that build up around historical problems that prompt both positive and negative 
contributions at the same time, tensions which are maintained only if we understand the 
social sciences to be historically-grounded efforts toward qualitatively better knowledge. 
While it does not ‘solve’ the problem of harm, the sociology of harm conventions and its 
reconstruction provide one way in which the purported pessimism of Critical Theory can be 
channelled toward a productive engagement with the problem of harm within the discipline 
of International Relations. The reading of both International Relations and Critical Theory 
put forward here, then, provides a new avenue by which Critical Theory can continue in its 
role of breaking open patterns of theoretical reification.
540
 In presenting the problem of harm 
as an ontological starting-point rather than an epistemological one, it constitutes an explicitly 
normative project through which we are constantly reminded of the Janus-faced practice of 
critique; a practice which is only able to promise great vitality in the acknowledgement of its 
grandest failures. 
 
Implications of the Thesis for the Discipline of International Studies 
 Throughout this thesis, our approach has been similar to that of Linklater, considering 
International Studies as one practice among may that might serve to orient people toward 
better understandings of the problem of harm they confront in social life. Rather than 
engaging purely in theoretical debate, it has sought to qualify the problem of harm against the 
experience of suffering as a key distinction prompted by Critical Theory, and as such has 
focussed on the ontological distinction between the two. While this thesis does not constitute, 
or seek, a unified methodological framework for International Studies, it has attempted to 
clarify the way in which we might relate the ethical impulse of the discipline to the objects 
that it refers to in the context of the problem of harm. This effort has been centred on the 
nature of the problem of harm, which in line with Linklater has been taken as a real object, 
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amenable to sociological investigation. With this being the case, the following broad 
arguments have been made: 
1) That the problem of harm constitutes an object that is amenable to sociological 
investigation in International Studies as an aspect of its prevalence in everyday 
life. This exercise constitutes an attempt to reflect upon the philosophical and 
normative commitments of the discipline in the context of one of its most 
persistent areas of concern. 
2) That Critical Theory highlights the role of our concepts of harm to be social 
appropriations of the experience of suffering, and as such is amenable to a 
process of critique through which our concepts might better capture that 
experience. In doing so, the problem of harm becomes understood as a set of 
problems for the production of knowledge. 
3) That our understanding of how we might explain harm through the aspects of 
object adequacy, critical value and reflexivity is best served by a commitment to 
a realist conception of its significance and constitution due to its ability to 
sustain and balance the need for scientific and normative engagement that it calls 
for. 
4) And that the mode of explanation that the realist conception of science 
necessitates in the context of the problem of harm tends toward a particular form 
of worldly critique. In doing so, it unifies the various problems that harm 
provokes under a broader understanding of the problem of harm as a site of 
shared historical labour. 
There are some points at which this line of argumentation has been subject to 
argumentative and pragmatic, rather than purely logical justification. Indeed, our engagement 
with the problem of harm, as indeed was Linklater’s, that of Critical Theory and many of the 
debates considered in the first chapter, was prompted by a historical interest in the ethical 
concerns prompted by changing patterns of global interdependence. As such, it began not 
with an abstract theoretical basis, but at a site of peculiar and common recurrence in human 
affairs, as well as within the discipline of International Studies itself.
541
 While this is not, 
perhaps, the a priori principle that the great systematisers may dream of, the harm we do to 
others constitutes a point at which many disparate viewpoints converge and serves to 
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highlight the ethical content at play in even the most austere forms of scientism. Critical 
Theory highlights this feature of the discipline in a way that demonstrates its complex and 
interconnected character, and allows us to understand one of the centres of gravity around 
which the ‘broad church’ that is International Studies continues to rotate. 
In a manner that is intended to be close to the spirit, if not the letter, of Adorno’s work 
and the critique of the fact/value divide put forward in Critical Realism, this thesis has sought 
to highlight the potential political implications of conceptual thought on the basis of its 
historical limitations. However, it has attempted to push beyond a tendency to marginalise the 
role of abstraction and reason on this basis, and highlighted that the social sciences can be as 
much an embodiment of normative commitment as they are the site of pure instrumentality. 
In both arguing for the history and architecture of concepts in the vein of Critical Theory, and 
adopting the analytical histories of emergence found in Critical Realism, we have put forward 
a way of studying the problem of harm that is capable of reflecting upon its own limitations 
while still maintaining normative content. If the problems posed by forms of social structure 
in harm force us into a position of uncertainty with regard to social action aimed at its 
amelioration, then International Studies, in focussing on the highest levels of social 
stratification and interconnection, is a discipline well placed to address this uncertainty. That 
the core concern of the problem of harm is essential to social reproduction shows us that in 
doing so, it orients toward a source of great normative insight while simultaneously 
shouldering a significant burden of responsibility. 
In some respects, this is more radical than the poststructuralist attack on the concept 
of truth precisely because it acknowledges epistemic relativity while refusing to admit that it 
constitutes the whole story. In grounding International Studies on an ontological principle, it 
acknowledges the multiplicity of historical origins and ideologies while taking the ethical 
step to ensure that we never slip into the conclusion that our discourse lacks any real 
referent.
542
 As a site of historical labour, knowledge produced concerning the problem of 
harm has ethical consequences that arise through the reality of interconnection and 
interpenetration. Throughout this thesis, we have argued that incorporating the dimension of 
the subject/object relationship is the only way in which we might begin to circumscribe the 
world beyond the play of discourse. While other schools of thought, such as new materialism, 
are beginning to also engage in this form of argument, a restriction of scientific fact-making 
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to the realm of the empirical means that the enterprise remains limited from the point of view 
of this thesis and with regard to the problems that harm raises.
543
 It has been a long-running 
misconception of the Critical Realist project that the real-world principle is an article of faith 
or belief, and one that is only now being addressed.
544
 As a contribution to that conversation 
in International Studies, this thesis has attempted to illustrate the role of Critical Realism in 
bringing the practice and objects of science within ethical concern, rather than its opposite. 
Secondly, while there may be readings of Bhaskar’s work that might suggest a simple 
correspondence between explanations and reality, this project has focussed on the 
relationship between ontological and epistemological reflection in a way that renders the 
practices of Critical Theory and Critical Realism as intertwined, rather than separate, 
exercises.
545
 When centred upon the problem of harm, this thesis has argued that each is 
substantially enhanced by the exchange. 
In sociological terms, the account of social scientific activity given here permits a way 
for International Studies to talk about structural limitations and causal emergence in a way 
that maintains its contribution as a social science; in grounding its conceptual work on 
ontology, it fills the sociological deficit that is the legacy of normative standards such as 
those of Habermas.
546
 In this respect, the understanding of world disclosure put forward here 
does not rule out the importance of the kinds of intersubjective evaluation that Linklater 
seems to favour, but supplements them in a way that conceptualises explanation as placing 
demands both on the intersubjective and subject/object axes. In doing so, it opens up the 
avenue for specifically social scientific explanations of social structure in the context of the 
problem of harm, rendering intelligible the complex and changing forms that global 
interconnection takes. The process of scientific engagement that we conceptualised through 
Critical Realism is intended to orient explanations in International Studies such that these 
forms of interconnection are bought within the sphere of ethical concern; in doing so, it 
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attempts to make our concepts more adequate to the experience of suffering. In grounding the 
problem of harm ontologically, the realist approach to suffering provides a strong regulatory 
function that forces us to reflect on the potential reifications we produce at every stage of the 
scientific process. 
 In placing the existential condition of suffering at the core of the problem of harm, 
Critical Theory holds wide-ranging implications for the conduct of International Studies, 
many of which centre on the potential dangers that accompany social scientific enquiry. In 
attempting to develop an understanding of social science that is adequate to the task, this 
thesis has sought to circumscribe, rather than define, the particular demands that suffering 
places on the way that we produce knowledge. In taking the problem of harm as a core 
concern, and suffering as a key ontological principle, it leads us to consider the consequences 
of taking the problem of harm seriously in a way that has implications for thought that reach 
beyond the demands of any particular instance of suffering; this is what renders the realist 
wager made here a conscious reflection on ethical practice in social science rather than a 
mere article of faith.
547
 In this, the continued need to reflect on such practices is made clear 
by Adorno, whose most famous positive statement that ‘to write poetry after Auschwitz 
would be barbaric.’548 This easily quotable soundbite is often quoted without the later 
qualification; that we are called to lend a voice to suffering due to its maintenance of the 
fullness of life against the forces of reification.
549
 In this regard, the pitfalls that accompany 
International Studies in its concern with the problem of harm at no point remove the call, or 
the responsibility, to continue in the shared historical labour that the problem of harm is 
constituted by. 
 This process of historical labour is what we consider to be the existential condition of 
knowledge in the discipline, or the way in which we attempt to orient ourselves to the 
objective conditions that we experience. That one explanation is superior to another, and can 
better serve us in our engagement with the problem of harm in its ethical fullness, can only be 
understood in this concrete historical context. In this regard, the realism that both Critical 
Theory and Critical Realism argue for is characteristic of a practical orientation toward the 
world. This practical orientation, naturally, comes with its own assumptions and concepts that 
need to be reflected upon and, perhaps, significantly chastened as a continuation of the task 
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that we have begun here.
550
 This tends toward an understanding of the discipline as a social 
project and allows us to consider its social role in ways that hold potentially radical 
consequences for the position and historical mission of the discipline; in particular, it calls for 
a reconsideration, explanation and potential re-description of the ways in which International 
Studies interacts with the wider social world. 
 That the conclusions of this thesis might, in the future, be challenged according to 
new and doubtless more powerful standards of explanation is, perhaps, a welcome promise 
given the arguments we have made concerning epistemic precarity and historical delineation. 
However, despite this problematic position, we have considered the way in which the 
investigation of the problem of harm might constitute some of the least violent practices it is 
possible for International Studies to engage in.
551
 In formulating the burden of reflexivity as 
an obligation to object adequacy, and where the objects of scientific investigation might be 
real, experiencing and suffering subjects, it should be evident that the weight placed on 
International Studies is significant. However, it is an obligation that the discipline must 
shoulder because it would claim objective value for the knowledge that it produces. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 As an exercise in relating the production of knowledge to its normative aspects, this 
thesis has put forward the idea that the consistent fascination that the problem of harm holds 
for International Studies presents more than an aesthetic tendency, but constitutes an 
ontological principle with implications for the way IS reflects upon the production of 
knowledge. Moving beyond a subject-centred idea of scientific adequacy allows us to make 
some inroads into understanding the discipline as part of the chain of generations that 
Linklater and Elias highlight, situating political and ethical discussion in a reflexive position 
that maintains a specific role for the social sciences in the negotiation of the problem of harm. 
That theory is confronted by the impossible demand of suffering in the form of the problem 
of harm is the necessary counterpart to problem-solving strategies, allowing Critical Theory 
to fulfil the role of reflecting upon knowledge production as a limited and partial attempt to 
grasp a broader totality. Indeed, it is the shared historical nature of these efforts, as we saw in 
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the first chapter, that places a concern with the problem of harm at the core of even the most 
impersonal and abstract conceptual frameworks.  
 The various debates that we saw in the first chapter operate against the background of 
a world that is not exhausted by our attempts to grasp it, a problem which Critical Theory 
highlights in the form of the gulf between experience and concept formation, and which 
raises the problem of harm to a kind of communal principle around which viewpoints in the 
discipline can congregate. Indeed, the potential universality of the problem of harm is a 
consequence of the intensification and density of global interconnection; it operates in 
historical period where the role of the modern states-system and capitalist production are 
likely to be internally related to many attempts to grasp its significance. Insofar as this is the 
case, the theories of International Studies cannot reflect on their own consistency in an ideal 
fashion but remain tied to their worldly origins in orientations that are normative all the way 
down. This task might consist purely of negating existing understandings were it not for the 
clear call that the problem of harm presents to International Studies that pushes toward 
harm’s amelioration.552 
 This is not as much a call for a coherent and consistent theoretical outlook so much as 
it is a demonstration of the viability of a particular ethical stance toward the world on the part 
of International Studies. Taking each of the stands of this thesis separately militates strongly 
against the viability of systemic theory. There are insurmountable obstacles that stand in the 
way of a theorist who may wish to explicate a positive Adornian IR theory, just as critical 
realism is forced into an attitude whereby it must embrace epistemological opportunism in 
spite of the certainty that ontological approaches can provide. However, it is also the case that 
social science can and does operate. The fact that even the most sceptical theorists get out of 
bed in the morning is a damning indictment of those who would claim to avoid normative 
commitments; that they close the gap between positive knowledge claims and attempts at 
negation through action is a practice that is shot through with ethical content.
553
 While 
acknowledging the irreducibility of the praxeological gap in theory, it is also the case that the 
circumscription of concepts in International Studies forces it closed, a practice of reification 
that is both the necessary supposition of our attempts to ameliorate harm and a point at which 
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it may be forgotten.
554
 This fact is one that demands reflexivity from the social scientist to the 
extent that it must be echoed in practice, a demand to hold a situation of dialectical tension 
between suffering and harm in a situation of considerable pressure toward its foreclosure. 
 The problem of harm provides a valuable starting point from which Critical Theory 
prompts us to reflect upon and critique the ethical content that is an essential aspect of 
International Studies. As a concept, it provides a visceral reminder of the way in which 
theory is tied to the world and which presents demands for both the most pressing practical 
involvement and the most consistent negative reflection. We can, therefore, consider it a 
constant reminder of the archetypal orientation of a discipline that is centred upon the idea of 
critical practice, one idea of which has been circumscribed in this thesis. Such a form of 
practice involves forms of explanation which bear witness to an unreconciled reality in which 
suffering is not accounted for, and as such social science must remain unreconciled as a 
reflection of this. It is this precarity, the knowledge that one may be ‘thrust back into nature’ 
into a situation of the most unintelligible suffering, that is the core of the relevance of a 
Critical Theory that begins with the problem of harm, and its most impossible demand. 
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